Michelle Richard (Richard), who was incarcerated in the Pennington County Jail for civil contempt for refusal to testify before a grand jury, filed a petition in this court requesting issuance of a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari against Seventh Circuit Judge Jeff W. Davis (trial court), claiming that he had exceeded his authority by barring Bruce Ellison (Ellison) from any manner or form of contact with her. At the time, Ellison, who had apparently been previously appointed by the trial court to represent Richard and subsequently discharged by the trial court, was still representing her as volunteer counsel. This court determined that certiorari was the appropriate vehicle, issued an order to show cause why a writ should not be granted and directed both sides to submit briefs. We grant the writ of certiorari.
We summarize briefly the history of this case leading up to the trial court’s actions. In April of 1982, Richard was charged with two counts of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Conrad and Sylvia Wilson, father and daughter. Ellison was appointed counsel for Richard and represented her until the charges were dismissed in May of 1983. In September of 1984, Richard was subpoenaed to testify before a Pennington County Grand Jury investigating the homicides. She requested the appointment of counsel, specifically Ellison, and the trial court complied although there is no order of record. The immediate issue at that point appeared to be the type of immunity the state’s attorney would grant Richard.1 Since the state’s attorney would only agree to grant “use and derivative use” immunity, not “transactional” immunity, Ellison advised Richard not to testify. After one hearing before the trial court wherein she was instructed to testify, she nevertheless refused to do so:
MS. RICHARD: I still really don’t understand the meaning of the immunity and I don’t trust the State because I have been threatened so many times already with being charged with murder charges and accessory and being picked up, so I refuse to testify.
Richard was again taken before the trial court and the trial court adjudged her to be in contempt and ordered her incarceration until she decided to testify before the grand jury. At the time her incarceration began, Richard began a fast, refusing food but taking liquids, including juices.
At some point thereafter, which Richard alleged to be September 14, 1984, the trial court upon its own motion and over the objection of Richard, apparently removed the appointment of counsel for Ellison and substituted Rapid City attorney Allen Nelson (Nelson). It appears it was the trial court’s intention to give Richard a second opinion regarding grants of immunity. We glean all this from the transcripts of a September 19, 1984, hearing because there is no written order of Nelson’s appointment nor any written order of Ellison’s removal. At this juncture, Richard also raised an additional reason regarding her refusal to testify. The then target of the grand jury investigation was Charles Swallow, whom Richard alleged was a first cousin which, *431according to Indian tradition, made him a brother. She claimed that according to Indian values and traditions she could not testify against her brother, therefore, she again refused to testify. The trial court denied her petition for release upon the grounds that she had not shown that incarceration would not persuade her to testify.
About three weeks later, the incident occurred which ultimately triggered this proceeding. The jailer was informed by Ellison, after he had been visiting Richard, that she was going to refuse the liquids she had been receiving and go on a complete fast. The next day, October 12, 1984, after an ex parte meeting with the Pennington County Sheriff, the trial court convened a hearing which resulted in the trial court ordering Ellison barred from seeing Richard, speaking to her, or consulting with her. The grand jury subsequently indicted Swallow without Richard’s testimony and Richard was released from incarceration. The matter, however, is not rendered moot by her release, since Richard’s subpoena remains in effect as does the trial court’s order barring her representation by or consultation with Ellison.
Prior to the return date, the trial court informed us by letter that it did not intend to attend the hearing on the show cause order unless this court deemed it necessary. It further stated:
My position is that the Writ of Mandamus and/or Certiorari demanded by Mr. Ellison is not proper in this instance. Recognizing that a Writ of Mandamus cannot be granted by default, I have chosen not to answer and thus confine the case to the papers of the applicant. Also recognizing that the scope of review on a Writ of Certiorari cannot be extended any further than to determine whether I have regularly pursued the authority of my court I chose (sic) to stand on that record.
I only wish to emphasize that the entire record in this matter presents the actions that have taken place throughout these proceedings and not the limited references made by Mr. Ellison on his behalf in his brief.
By this reply, the trial court first tells us that the writ is not proper in this instance. It cites no authority for this proposition. Second, it tells us that it stands on the entire record as support for its action. The trial court apparently expects this court to search the record and brief its case. This is totally unacceptable. As a tribunal, we may not lend our offices to a respondent in order to formulate its argument and then sit in judgment on the merits of its cause.2
SDCL 21-31-1 provides: “A writ of cer-tiorari may be granted by the Supreme and circuit Courts, when inferior courts ... have exceeded their jurisdiction, and there is no writ of error or appeal nor, in the judgment of the court, any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”
The right to counsel is a fundamental, right. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); S.D. Const. art. VI, § 7. As this court stated in State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson, 80 S.D. 639, 645-46, 129 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1964):
In criminal actions South Dakota has long recognized an accused’s constitutional and statutory guaranty of right to counsel, Article 6, Section 7, South Dakota Constitution, SDC 1960 Supp. 34.1901, SDC 1960 Supp. 34.3506, which in this state at least has been equally comprehensive to that accorded by the federal system. Consequently, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1963 extending this constitutional guaranty to state courts as one of the fundamental rights essential to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainright, [supra], is currently without impact on our criminal procedure.
*432A grand jury witness’ right to counsel is recognized in SDCL 23A-5-11.3 Because the right to counsel is so fundamental under our criminal justice system, any trial court which interferes with that right under SDCL 23A-5-144 should clearly set out the basis for such action, specifying whether the attorney violated SDCL 23A-5-11 or unduly delayed or impeded the activity of the grand jury. No findings and conclusions are found in this record establishing any misconduct on Ellison’s part. Indeed, the trial court did not even enter a written order for the record.
In Save Centennial Valley Ass’n Inc. v. Schultz, 284 N.W.2d 452, 454 (S.D.1979), we defined our scope of review in certiora-ri: “When such courts, officers, boards or tribunals have jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the party, their action will be sustained unless in their proceedings they did some act forbidden by law or neglected to do some act required by law.” (Citations omitted.) We refined this statement when we further quoted: “Certiorari will not as a rule lie to correct mere errors and irregularities in the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior court or tribunal which had jurisdiction. It will not lie to review technical lack of compliance of law or be granted to correct insubstantial errors which are not shown to have resulted in prejudice or to have caused substantial injustice to the relator.” Id., citing 14 Am.Jur.2d Certiorari § 10, p. 786. The issue then becomes whether the trial court, which had statutory authority to remove a grand jury witness’ attorney when removal and replacement is necessary to ensure that the activities of a grand jury are not unduly delayed or impeded, was acting within the scope of that authority in this instance or whether the trial court committed substantial error which resulted in prejudice or caused substantial injustice to Richard.
“ ‘Once counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or by the accused, the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial.’ ” Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C.App.1978) (citation omitted). The Harling Court went on to recognize, however, that the right is not absolute, suggesting it is proper to remove counsel only in instances demanded by the interests of justice when the gross incompetence or physical incapacity of counsel, or contumacious conduct, cannot be cured by a citation for contempt. We recognize that Ellison was not representing Richard as defense counsel in a criminal action at the time of the trial court’s action. We take note, however, that Richard had been originally charged with the murder. The record reflects her statement that she was continually being threatened by the state’s attorney with further prosecution and he was unwilling to grant transactional immunity when she was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. By statute, she was entitled to representation by counsel and we see no reason to distinguish between the attorney/client relationship in this case and the Harling case. Furthermore, we note that in Bottaro v. Hatton Associates, 680 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir.1982), a security frauds case where the defendants sought to dis*433qualify plaintiff’s counsel of choice from appearing to represent plaintiff, the Second Circuit panel stated: “... [L]itigants have a right to select their own counsel. While the right may not be absolute, it can be overridden only where compelling reasons exist.”
There is nothing in the record that indicates to us that the trial court removed Ellison from representation for any of the reasons authorized in SDCL 23A-5-14. There is no doubt that the decision of Richard to go on a full fast was the precipitating factor.
On October 12, 1984, the trial judge called a hearing on his own motion. He first queried Richard as to whether the decision was her own. She stated that it was. She denied that Ellison had advised her to do it. The trial court then asked Ellison if he had advised Richard to go on the full fast, to which Ellison responded that his advice to his client was confidential but that “[i]t is not my decision. It is her own decision.” Then Nelson was also questioned. He replied that he thought the fast was Richard’s own decision. The trial court then called two jailers to testify. One jailer testified that it was Ellison who had told him that Richard was going to go on a complete fast and Ellison who suggested that she should be medically examined. Because of this testimony, the trial court decided to bar Ellison from further contact with Richard, purportedly to protect her health. The trial court granted a brief continuance and when the hearing reconvened that afternoon Richard again testified that Ellison had not advised her to fast, but that it was her decision. She testified:
I made this decision because I am tired of the racist attitude these people have in this state, and I can’t make decisions — ' capable decisions by myself. I am completely competent in making my decisions, and I have made this decision by myself, and these people don’t seem to take me serious. I will never testify, and my traditional values will never be taken away from me. I continue on this fast because people don’t seem to take me serious.
She also testified: “It would be preposterous for anybody who could think they could make a decision for me to go off water and food. I realize it will ultimately result in death.” Richard further testified that she wanted Ellison to continue as her attorney. In addition, Nelson advised the trial court that Richard wanted Ellison as her attorney and suggested that she was entitled to be represented by him. Nevertheless, the trial court continued the order.5
In our opinion, the trial court erred in several respects. (1) It stated no reason for removal of Ellison as counsel that falls within the statutory authority for removal found in SDCL 23A-5-14. (2) The reason the trial court did state cannot be ascribed to the grounds for removal under the statute. The trial court had other means of protecting Richard’s health than terminating the attorney/client relationship. As well intended as the trial court’s concern may have been, and we give it credit for it, it clearly does not fall within the ambit of SDCL 23A-5-14. (3) Finally, the trial court’s action far exceeds the statutory authority for removal of an attorney. Ellison was barred from representation of or contact with Richard. Although she has been freed from confinement and her fast had ended, she is still under the grand jury subpoena and the trial court’s order remains in effect. By the wildest stretch of anyone’s imagination, this action could not fall within the trial court’s jurisdiction. We do not deem the trial court’s action to be a mere error or irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction granted under SDCL 23A-5-14; rather, the trial court has far exceeded any authority granted by the stat*434ute and we grant judgment for a writ of certiorari and set aside the order of the trial court barring representation or contact between Richard and Ellison.
FOSHEIM, C.J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially. WUEST, Circuit Judge, acting as a Supreme Court Justice, dissents.. In the process of appointing Bruce Ellison to represent Michelle Richard, the trial court noted in the record Ellison’s knowledge and expertise on the subject of immunity.
. These remarks are not intended to suggest that we consider the response of the trial court to be obdurate or contumacious. Rather, they reflect the frustrating position that we are placed in as an appellate court, hearing only one side of the argument.
. SDCL 23A-5-11 provides:
Prosecuting attorneys may at all times appear before the grand jury for the purpose of giving information or advice or interrogating witnesses relative to any matter cognizable by it. Prosecuting attorneys, the witness under examination and his counsel, interpreters when needed, and, for the purpose of taking the evidence when authorized by the grand jury, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present when the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting. The role of counsel appearing with a witness shall be limited to advising the witness. The prosecuting attorney shall not be present during the consideration of any charge against himself, except that the grand jury may summon him as a witness.
. SDCL 23A-5-14 provides:
The court shall have the power to remove a witness' attorney and order the witness to obtain new counsel, when it finds that the attorney has violated § 23A-5-11 or that such removal and replacement is necessary to ensure that the activities of a grand jury are not unduly delayed or impeded. Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the court to punish for contempt or impose other appropriate sanctions.
. Admittedly, neither Richard nor Ellison could be held in contempt of court for disobedience of the trial court’s oral order. Karras v. Gannon, 345 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1984). Nevertheless, we can appreciate that Ellison, being a member of the bar and an officer of the court, who undoubtedly had occasion to appear before the trial court often, would feel compelled to abide by the trial court’s oral order.