PUBLISHED ORDER CONCERNING sUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN CAPITAL CASE
Introduction
Petitioner Matthew Eric Wrinkles was convicted and sentenced to death for the multiple murders of his wife, her brother, and her brother's wife. Having exhausted the judicial review to which he is entitled as a matter of right, Wrinkles has filed papers seeking permission to litigate a sue-cessive post-conviction claim, again arguing that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's lack of objection to Wrinkles's wearing of a stun belt restraint during trial and sentencing proceedings. We deny his request, and by separate order set a date for execution of the sentence.
Case History
In June 1994, Matthew Wrinkles filed for divorcee from his wife Debbie, and Debbie obtained a protective order prohibiting Wrinkles from having any contact with her or the couple's two children. At that time, Debbie and the children were living in the home of Debbie's brother Mark Fulkerson and his wife Natalie. On July 20, 1994, following a provisional divorce hearing, Wrinkles and Debbie agreed to meet at a local restaurant so Wrinkles could see his children; however, Debbie and the children did not show up for the meeting. Later that night, Wrinkles tried to contact Debbie at the Fulkersons' home but was unsuccessful. Debbie likewise attempted, unsuccessfully, to arrange another meeting with Wrinkles.
During the early morning hours of July 21, 1994, Wrinkles, wearing camouflage and face paint and armed with a knife and .357 magnum revolver, climbed over a fence into the Fulkersons' yard, cut the phone lines, and kicked in the back door. *964Wrinkles fatally shot Mark four times in the presence of his three-year-old son. Next, Wrinkles shot and killed Debbie as the couple's daughter pleaded with Wrinkles not to shoot her mother. Finally, as Natalie tried to flee the house, Wrinkles pursued her to the front porch and shot her in the face at close range, killing her. Wrinkles was apprehended in a neighboring county later that day.
Wrinkles was charged with three counts of murder. See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1). The State sought the death penalty, alleging the commission of multiple murders. See I1.C. § 85-50-2-9(b)(8). The jury found Wrinkles guilty as charged and, in the penalty phase that followed, unanimously recommended the death penalty. On June 14, 1995, Judge Richard L. Young followed the jury's recommendation and imposed the death sentence.
This Court unanimously affirmed Wrinkles's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 861, 119 S.Ct. 148, 142 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998) ("Wrinkles I"). After Wrinkles sought post-conviction relief, in part challenging the use of the stun belt, the trial court denied his petition, and we unanimously affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.2001), reh'g denied (2001), cert. demied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 1610, 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002) ("Wrinkles II"). Wrinkles then sought, for the first time, permission to file a successive post-conviction petition, which we denied by published order. Wrinkles v. State, 776 N.E.2d 905 (Ind.2002) (addressing Ring v. Arizona, 586 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), as well as arguments by Wrinkles regarding the jury venire and comments by the prosecutor). Thereafter, Wrinkles sought relief in federal courts, again challenging in part the use of the stun belt during trial and sentencing. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, by Tinder, J., denied Wrinkles's petition for a writ of habe-as corpus in Wrinkles v. McBride, No. IP-01-1668-C-T/K, slip op. (S.D.Ind. May 18, 2005). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d 804 (7th Cir.2008), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (2008), cert. denied sub nom. Wrinkles v. Levenhagen, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2382, 173 L.Ed.2d 1300 (May 18, 2009).
Following the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, Wrinkles filed a second request to file a successive post-conviction petition, which is the matter pending before us now.1 This Court has jurisdiction because the sentence is death. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a).
Successive Post-Conviction Procedures
Wrinkles already has utilized the rule that permits a person convicted of a crime in an Indiana state court one collateral review of a conviction and sentence in a post-conviction proceeding. See Ind. Post-Conviection Rule 1. Wrinkles now seeks permission to litigate a "successive" post-conviction claim in the trial court where he was convicted.
We perform a sereening function with respect to successive post-conviction claims; the petitioner needs our permis*965sion to litigate the merits of such claims. P-C. R. 1 § 12. The petitioner must show a "reasonable probability" that he is entitled to relief. P-C. R. 1 § 12(b). In deciding whether a petitioner has made the required showing, we consider the applicable law, the successive post-conviction papers, materials from the prior appeals and post-conviction proceedings including the record, briefs and court decisions, and any other material we deem relevant. See id. Authorization of a successive post-conviction proceeding would entitle Wrinkles to counsel at public expense, and the case would return to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with Post-Conviction Rule 1. See Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 924, 126 S.Ct. 312, 163 L.Ed.2d 269 (2005).
Wrinkles's Claim
Wrinkles was required to wear a stun belt restraint at trial. He once again claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing proceedings because counsel did not object to the restraint. This claim has been raised repeatedly and thoroughly vetted in the post-conviction court, on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, in habeas corpus proceedings in federal district court, and on federal appeal from the denial of habeas relief. Each time, the courts have concluded that Wrinkles was not denied effective assistance of counsel. While Wrinkles now seeks the chance to litigate this claim again based in part on differences in how the various courts rejected it, we conclude that the denials of relief were largely complementary.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves two components. First, the petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, in that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, the petitioner must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. In other words, the petitioner must show that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.2
Throughout his post-conviction and ha-beas corpus proceedings, and again in his successive post-conviction papers, Wrinkles has argued that counsel should have objected to the use of the stun belt. As acknowledged in this Court's opinion in Wrinkles II that prospectively barred the use of stun belts in Indiana courtrooms, this manner of restraint has the potential to compromise the presumption of innocence and a defendant's ability to participate in his own defense. See Wrinkles IL, 749 N.BE.2d at 1198-95. In this case, Wrinkles asserts he was prejudiced because, according to Wrinkles, several jurors either saw or otherwise were aware that Wrinkles was wearing a stun belt. Much ink has been devoted to this factual question. See Post-Conviection Record ("R.") at 582-84, 590, Wrinkles II (No. 82800-9803-PD-170) (post-conviction court's findings of fact and conclusions of law); Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1192, 1195; Wrinkles v. McBride, No. IP-011668-C-T/K, slip op. at 7-9; Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d at 815-23; id. at 823-29 *966(Rovner, J., dissenting). Each time a court has reviewed this claim, however, the court has concluded Wrinkles was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
In its detailed 48-page order denying post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court concluded that Wrinkles failed to meet his burden of proving "that the belt was visible or that the jury knew about it." R. at 588. In so deciding, the post-convietion court found the juror affidavits relied upon by Wrinkles to be inconsistent with one another, inconsistent with the bailiffs affidavit, inconsistent with the recollections of both of Wrinkles's trial attorneys, and not subjected to cross-examination. See id. Further, in a hearing on post-judgment motions, the post-conviction court found additional juror affidavits tendered by Wrinkles after the hearing to be cumulative and not of a nature that "would have any effect on the court's ruling." R. at 669. The post-conviction court's factual findings were carefully considered by this Court in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, by the federal district court in denying Wrinkles's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and by the Seventh Circuit in affirming the denial of habeas relief. Each time the post-conviction court's findings have been reviewed, relief has been denied.
Just as importantly, Wrinkles's failure to establish the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim is not limited to whether jurors were aware of the belt. The post-conviction court also found a lack of prejudice because jurors already knew Wrinkles was incarcerated and because the evidence overwhelmingly established Wrinkles's guilt. See R. at 590. We agree with the post-conviction court on these points. Further, the evidence in this case leaves little doubt regarding both the existence and weight of the multiple murder aggravator rendering Wrinkles eligible for the death penalty, and this Court independently evaluated the propriety of Wrinkles's sentence on direct appeal. See Wrinkles I, 690 N.E.2d at 1168-73 & n. 31; see also Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1182 (Ind.1992) (characterizing the multiple murder aggravator as "an aggravating cireumstance in the highest range"). In the middle of the night, Wrinkles dressed in camouflage and face paint, cut the phone lines, kicked in the door of the Fulkersons' home, shot and killed two people in the presence of children, then shot and killed a third person after pursuing her as she attempted to flee the carnage. Wrinkles has fallen far short of showing a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's lack of objection to the imposition of a stun belt restraint, the result of Wrinkles's trial or sentencing would have been different. Indeed, we say that given these facts there is no reasonable doubt that re-litigating the prejudice prong of Wrinkles's claim would lead to the conclusion that his lawyers' handling of the matter contributed to the verdict or penalty.
Conclusion
Wrinkles has not met his burden of establishing a reasonable possibility that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we decline to authorize the filing of a successive petition. A date for execution of the death sentence will be set by separate order.
Rehearing should not be sought if Wrinkles intends merely to raise the same arguments we already have addressed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. BOEHM, J., dissents with opinion.. More specifically, on May 27, 2009, Wrin-kies filed a "Tender of Successive Post-Conviction Petition" and tendered a proposed "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" After we issued an order permitting responsive briefing, the State filed a "Verified Response in Opposition to Motion for Permission to Proceed on a Successive Post-Conviction Relief Petition," and Wrinkles filed a "Reply To State's Response Regarding Successor Post-Conviction Petition." Wrinkles also submitted additional authority on July 2, 2009, to which the State responded on July 10, 2009.
. We note that Wrinkles's successive post-conviction papers appear to rely exclusively on Strickland's formulation of the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim. See, eg., '"'Tender of Successive Post-Conviction Petition" at 2 ("At issue then and now is the oft-cited standard of Strickland ..."); at 7 (arguing "this Court never resolved the prejudice component of Wrinkles' restraint-based Strickland claim"); and at 9 ("Wrinkles ... asks this Court to permit him to be heard on his Strickland-based restraint claim").