concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I join in the majority opinion except with respect to its disposition of appellant Taylor’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a demonstration of his voice to the jury. Although I agree with the majority that the trial court’s reason for the ruling was erroneous insofar as premised on the assumption that the proffered demonstration was testimonial and excludable unless appellant submitted to cross-examination, I cannot agree that the trial court did not provide a valid alternative basis for its decision which should be affirmed. The record reflects that the grounds for the trial court’s alternative ruling were the unreliability of the evidence because of appellant’s failure to show that a recorded voice and a live voice will sound the same and because of appellant’s failure to proffer an expert to explain the significance of any comparison. The absence of substantially similar conditions is a legitimate reason for the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to exclude demonstration evidence which might confuse or mislead the jury. McKnight v. Wire Properties, 288 A.2d 405, 407 (D.C.1972); see Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1027 (10th Cir.1981). In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, and a remand for further elaboration by the court on its reasons for doing so is not warranted.
The majority rejects the government’s argument that the trial court made an alternative ruling on discretionary grounds, finding that the decision was “shaped primarily by (the court’s) conception of the testimonial nature of the evidence.” Although the decision may have been based primarily upon an erroneous legal ground, the decision was also based on a separate, *1068alternative discretionary ground.1 In my view, the erroneous legal reason was a separate consideration and not a factor in the trial court’s alternative discretionary ruling. The trial court considered the issue on two separate days. On the first day, refusing to admit the evidence and characterizing the proposed demonstration as a denial, the trial court nevertheless invited appellant’s trial counsel to submit authorities supporting his position. On the next afternoon, having read the cases submitted (United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Brooks v. United States, 494 A.2d 922 (D.C.1984); and Hill v. United States, 367 A.2d 110 (D.C.1976)),2 the trial court persisted in its earlier legal conclusion; however, it specified an alternative discretionary basis for its ruling as follows:
THE COURT: Sir, I know you disagree with it, but I’m saying, I have stated my reasons. And, moreover, Mr. Horton, there is nothing been shown to me, and I don’t think it would persuade me in any manner any differently, that the voice that one hears from a defendant in this room, is going to be the same sounding voice as something that comes over a tape.
But now, leaving that aside you haven’t even proffered that, that an expert would testify to that. But, moreover, I’m saying, my position is, you’re using, trying these cases as a means to have your client get up there and in effect, deny that is his voice, without being subject to cross-examination, and my answer is, no.
In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the evidence for lack of reliability, given its slight probative value in the context of this case. See People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 779, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87, 525 N.E.2d 728, 732 (N.Y. 1988).
The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether to allow a demonstration during trial. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 39 (D.C.1989). The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by its tendency to prejudice the other side or to mislead the jury even if the evidence is relevant and technically admissible. Reed v. United States, 584 A.2d 585, 591 (D.C.1990); Scarola, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 525 N.E.2d at 732. Its decision to exclude demonstrative evidence should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Irick, 565 A.2d at 40; see also Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 525 N.E.2d at 732; United States v. Esdaille, 769 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923, 106 S.Ct. 258, 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
“The test of whether voice exemplar evidence should be admitted as real or demonstrative evidence ... is whether it is relevant and reliable.” Scarola, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 525 N.E.2d at 732. Trustworthiness and reliability are typically pertinent considerations to the trial court’s exercise of discretion when determining whether to admit such evidence. Id.; Esdaille, supra, 769 F.2d at 108; see also Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 852 (D.C.1978).3 In Scarola, observing that voice exemplar evidence is easy to feign, the Court of Appeals of New York found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of a voice exemplar to demonstrate a speech impediment or nasal quality. 71 N.Y.2d at 778-79, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 87, 525 N.E.2d at 733. The victims in the cases did not rely on the appellants’ voices in making the identifications; therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion in the determination that its *1069probative value was “outweighed by its unreliability and potential for prejudice.” Id. Similarly, in Esdaille, the Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of a voice demonstration proffered to show that the defendant had a heavy Caribbean accent in light of lack of inherent trustworthiness and difficulty in testing the authenticity of the accent. 769 F.2d at 108. The slight probative value of the demonstration, given the visual identification of Esdaille as the perpetrator of the crime, was found to be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice created by the lack of reliability. Id.
This case is similar to Scarola and Esd-aille. Here, the police officer did not rely on appellant’s voice to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime. Only if the jury believed the officer’s visual identification of appellant could they convict him.4 See Id., at 108 (relevance of voice demonstration only slight where witness did not rely on it in making the identification). The probative value of the demonstration here was only slight. The trial court’s concern that the proffered voice demonstration was not shown to be nearly identical to a taped voice and the absence of an expert to explain any variations are legitimate considerations in determining whether the evidence is prejudicial and misleading. See McKnight, supra, 288 A.2d at 407. Under the circumstances, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of questionable reliability which had only slight probative value. See Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 108. A remand for the trial judge to elaborate further or “to exercise proper discretion” on the admissibility of the voice demonstration, as the court holds, is not warranted in my opinion. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the court’s disposition of this issue.
. This is not a case like Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915 (D.C.1986) where there is no indication that the trial judge believed he had discretion, and the appellate court would have had to supply the missing discretionary reason to uphold the decision. Id. at 919.
. These cases hold that compelled production of a voice or other physical demonstration is not testimonial. When the trial court made its final decision on the evidentiary question, it was aware of these holdings.
.A portion of Springer, not pertinent here, has been overruled. See Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 717 n. 5 (D.C.1986).
. Since the officer did not rely on appellant’s voice to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime, the error, if any, in exclusion of the voice demonstration would be harmless even under the Chapman standard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).