Insurer-respondent, American National Fire Insurance Company, brought this declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation under a homeowners’ policy that provided personal liability coverage for Robert Fournelle and his wife, Joanne Grimsrud, as named insureds. Grimsrud filed for divorce and got a court order *293granting her temporary possession of and excluding Fournelle from the insured premises. Fournelle shot and killed their children while visiting them at his wife’s house. The question arose as to whether the policy allowed the trustees of the deceased children to collect damages for their deaths under the homeowners’ policy written to Fournelle and Grimsrud. The trial court entered summary judgment for the insurer and was affirmed by the court of appeals. 459 N.W.2d 157. We granted review. We reverse and remand to the district court for trial.
The facts are largely undisputed. Robert Fournelle married Joanne Fournelle, now Joanne Grimsrud, in 1967. The couple lived at 1272 James Avenue, St. Paul. On January 16, 1985, Robert Fournelle left the marital residence under court order. Grimsrud remained in the house with the couple’s two teenage sons. She filed for divorce on January 25, 1985, and received temporary custody of the children and temporary possession of the house. Thereafter, Fournelle occupied a separate residence from Grimsrud and the children.
On March 3, 1985, Fournelle arrived at the marital residence to visit his sons. He shot and killed the boys, vandalized the house, and then committed suicide. The records of the Ramsey County Medical Examiner state that each boy died of multiple gunshot wounds to the head.
Grimsrud brought a wrongful death action against Fournelle’s estate. The estate tendered defense of the lawsuit to American National pursuant to the Fournelles’ homeowners’ policy. Grimsrud and the estate reached a Miller v. Shugart1 settlement, awarding $250,000 to Grimsrud to be paid from insurance proceeds.
Under the homeowners’ policy issued by American National, both Fournelle and Grimsrud were named insureds.2 The deceased children were not named insureds. The policy provides personal liability coverage for Fournelle, which coverage does not depend on whether the liability arose from or was related to the homestead.
The insurance policy includes several definitions and clauses that are of particular importance. First, the policy contains what is commonly known as a “household exclusion.” This exclusion provides:
2. Coverage E — Personal Liability, does not apply to:
* * * * * *
f. bodily injury to you and any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of Definition 3. “insured”.
The term “You” is defined as follows: Throughout this policy, “you” and “your” refer to the “named insured” shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household.
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The following definition of “insured” appears in Definition 3, parts a. and b. of the policy:
3. “insured” means you and the following residents of your household:
a. your relatives;
b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care of any person named above.
Finally, the policy also contains a sever-ability clause, which states:
2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies separately to each insured. This condition shall not increase our limit of liability for any one occurrence.
Given these policy provisions, the issue presented by this appeal concerns whether the “household exclusion” of a homeowner’s insurance policy containing a sev-erability clause excludes coverage for a named insured’s killing of his two children.
American National maintains that the severability clause is immaterial to determination of this lawsuit where the exclusion, by its terms, applies to “any insured.” At the time of their deaths, the children resided with Grimsrud, a named insured under the policy. Hence, the children qualify as “insureds” under the omnibus or *294general insureds provisions of Definition 3. American National reasons that there can be no recovery since the children otherwise qualify as “insureds” under the policy. The trustee, on the other hand, asserts that the severability clause demands that the exclusion be read in reference to Foumelle because he alone seeks protection under the policy. Since the children were residents of the mother’s household and not Fournelle’s, the trustee claims that the policy provides coverage.
We believe that the trustee makes the better argument. To claim that the household exclusion applies because the children were residents of a named insured’s household misconstrues not only the policy language, but also the doctrine of severability. Moreover, the language in the policy is, at best, ambiguous. Therefore* we will strictly construe it against its drafter, resolving all doubts concerning the language used in favor of the insured. Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn.1985); Nordby v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn.1983).
Severability is a widely recognized doctrine that acknowledges the separate and distinct obligations the insurer undertakes to the various insureds, named and unnamed. See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Emmco Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 21, 243 N.W.2d 134 (1976); Morgan v. Greater New York Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 305 N.Y. 243, 248-49, 112 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1953); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mangum, 299 S.C. 226, 229, 383 S.E.2d 464, 466 (S.C.Ct. App.1989). The intent of a severability clause is to provide each insured with separate coverage, as if each were separately insured with a distinct policy, subject to the liability limits of the policy. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 60 Ill.2d 295, 299, 327 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1975). Thus, severability demands that policy exclusions be construed only with reference to the particular insured seeking coverage. See Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 309 Minn, at 32, 243 N.W.2d at 140; see also 13 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7486 at 633 (rev.ed. 1976). Past decisions have applied the doctrine to employee exclusionary clauses where the injured person was an employee of a named insured, but not an employee of the particular insured seeking protection under the policy. See Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 309 Minn, at 32, 243 N.W.2d at 140. While severability in an employee exclusion context promotes a different policy goal, that alone is insufficient reason to ignore the insurer’s explicit invocation of the severability doctrine in a homeowner’s policy.
American National, as the drafter of the policy, inserted the severability clause for some purpose. The policy states: “This insurance applies separately to each insured.” A reasonable interpretation of these words leads to the obvious and singularly correct conclusion that each insured must be treated as if each were insured separately, applying exclusions individually as to the insured for whom coverage is sought. Under that reasoning, application of the exclusion focuses on Fournelle, the named insured, and those relatives who are residents of his household. That the children resided with Grimsrud and otherwise qualify as insureds with reference to her is of no concern; Grimsrud is not the insured seeking protection under the policy. The doctrine of severability limits application of the exclusion to the insured claiming coverage and those deriving their insured status from that insured claiming coverage. There would be no point to a severability clause if it did not provide separately to each named insured. The analysis suggested by American National would render the clause a nullity.
American cites State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. McPhee, 336 N.W.2d 258 (Minn.1983), as controlling authority here. In that case, involving an estranged couple, the husband shot and killed his wife. Both the husband and the wife in McPhee were named insureds on the homeowners’ policy, but they lived separately. This court agreed that the household exclusion prevented recovery under the policy for the wife’s death, basing its decision on the wife’s death, this court based its decision of the wife’s status as a named insured, not as a resident. We said:
*295[I]n distinguishing between a “named insured” and an “insured,” the definitions in the policy demonstrate that Linda did not derive her status as an insured from residence in the household but, rather, from her designation in the policy as a named insured. The term “insured” is defined under the policy as including not only the persons named on the face of the policy but also certain members of the named insured household:
# * * * * *
This definition establishes a limit to the scope of those covered by imposing a residency requirement upon an insured who is not a named insured. However, this definition imposes no residence requirement upon a named insured.
Id. at 261 (emphasis added). While not controlling, McPhee supports our decision here insofar as it illustrates the need for careful construction of defined terms when applying an exclusion.
Contrary to American National’s assertion, the exclusion at issue does not apply to “any insured.” Rather, it applies to “any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of Definition 3." The exclusion itself requires reference back to the definition of “insured,” a definition limiting the scope of coverage to those relatives of the named insured seeking coverage who are residents of that named insured’s household. To ignore the remainder of the sentence, as American National suggests, would expand the exclusion beyond its very words of limitation. If an insurer wants to exclude certain coverages, it should do so in clear and concise language.
In this case, American National concedes that, had a multitude of relatives moved into the household of either Grimsrud or Fournelle, they too would have been insured under the omnibus clause. Yet, American National argues, on the other hand, that the policy in this case did not intend to protect the husband and wife in their individual capacity when separated. These arguments are contradictory. It seems to us that it is far easier to contemplate separation of married couples today when 50 percent of all marriages end in divorce than to attempt to speculate how many relatives might move in with the parties. The very purpose of the severability clause appears to be to provide separate coverage to the two named insureds. As noted, this court, as well as the court of appeals, has held that whether the children or relatives are insured depends on whether they were residents of the home of the named insured against whom the claim is brought and who seeks protection of the liability limits of the policy. See McPhee, 336 N.W.2d at 261; National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Anderson, 372 N.W.2d 71 (Minn.App.1985). If they were not named insureds or residents, the exclusion does not apply. We do not find these decisions either ambiguous or unreasonable.
Both lower courts are reversed, and the case is remanded to district court for trial on the remaining issues.
. Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn.1982) (plaintiff claimant and insured defendant may stipulate to amount of money judgment before insurer’s declaratory judgment suit is decided).
. Joanne Grimsrud was formerly known as Joanne Marie Fournelle.