dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this petition is moot. Merely by issuing a new rate-setting order in 2003 for Island Hi-Speed Ferry (Hi-Speed) — one that continued in effect Hi-Speed’s challenged rates for the previous 2002 season9 — the Public Utilities Com*530mission (commission) did not moot the issues that Interstate Navigation Company (Interstate) and the Town of New Shore-ham (town) have raised with us in this statutory certiorari petition.
The petition asks us to review the propriety of a 2002 commission rate order pertaining to Interstate’s competitor, Hi-Speed, one that merely continued Hi-Speed’s previous rate in effect for the remainder of the 2002 season. I would hold that the issues raised in this petition present a live, justiciable controversy because the 2002 rate order in question continues to have a present effect on the current rate that Hi-Speed charges for its services. Moreover, even if the commission subsequently had entered an entirely new rate order — instead of continuing the previous rate in effect — Interstate still holds a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the previous rate-setting proceeding that is the subject of its present petition because that order, it alleged, adversely affected its financial performance while it was in effect.
In similar cases, other courts have rejected mootness arguments based upon the mere fact that a regulatory authority has entered a new rate order before the appellate court could review the challenged rate order. For example, in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 402 A.2d 14, 22-23 (D.C.1979), the court rejected a mootness argument even though the Public Service Commission (PSC) had entered a later rate order superseding the previous rate order that was the subject of the appeal. In that case, the PSC issued an initial rate order from which the affected power company appealed. Id. at 16. At or about that same time, the power company applied for a second rate increase. Id. at 21. By the time the appellate court heard the power company’s appeal from the initial rate order, the PSC had issued a second rate order that superseded the first one. Id. Nevertheless, even though the second order was final, the appeals court cautioned that “[t]he question * * * of mootness is not so clear.” Id. at 22.
Although the court in Potomac Electric Power Co., 402 A.2d at 23 ultimately found in favor of the PSC, it rejected the PSC’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. It concluded that the power company held a continuing stake in resolving whether the PSC properly conducted the previous rate proceeding. Id. at 22-23. According to the court, the PSC’s “arbitrary decision” in the previous rate proceeding entitled the power company to “seek[] an opportunity to be made whole .for the revenues it claim[ed] it lost during the period this [first rate] order was effective.” Id. at 22. In addition, the appeals court suggested that it might remedy an arbitrary act of the PSC by allowing the power company to impose a surcharge on its present customers. Id. at 22-23. The court, therefore, refused to dismiss the appeal as moot and held that the later rate order — even though it was final and superseded the previous rate order — did not inexorably moot an appeal taken from a prior rate proceeding, as long as the appealing party held a continuing economic stake in establishing the impropriety of the first order. See id. Cf. State ex rel. Intercon Gas, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 848 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (“The fact that an act authorized by PSC has been completed pending appeal does not itself render an appeal moot.”).
By a parity of reasoning, this Court should not deem issues arising from the commission’s rate-setting orders to be moot simply because the commission has opened a new rate proceeding and entered a new rate order concerning the same party-while an appellate challenge to that *531previous rate order is pending. Instead, we should reject a mootness claim when, as here, the challenged order under appellate review not only continues to affect the current rate order but also, as a practical matter, when it continues to function as the current rate order. That previous rate order, (that is, the August 20, 2002 order), which itself merely extended Hi-Speed’s previous rate, still affects — indeed, constitutes — the present rate order, thereby effectively keeping Hi-Speed’s challenged rate in force yet again.
It goes without saying that this Court does “not address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical” issues, Morris v. D’Amario, 416 A.2d 187, 139 (R.I.1980), but only those cases that present a live, justiciable controversy. Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 752 (R.I.1997). Thus, we have “consistently held that a case is moot if the original complaint raised a justiciable controversy, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of a continuing stake in the controversy.” In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d 545, 553 (R.I.2004) (quoting Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 1105 (R.I.2002) (per curiam)). A case is moot, therefore, when a party no longer “has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of [the] litigation,” Malinou v. Powers, 114 R.I. 399, 403, 333 A.2d 420, 422 (1975), and a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. E.g., Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 1988).
But the general rule in public-utility rate-setting cases, such as this one, is that issues concerning the propriety of a rate order do not become moot merely by the opening of a new rate proceeding or even by the entry of one or more subsequent rate orders — especially when, as here, a later order is not final because of a pending appellate proceeding challenging the legality of that order. Gas Service Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 6 Kan. App.2d 592, 631 P.2d 263, 265 (1981). See also Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 183 Conn. 128, 439 A.2d 282, 285 (1981) (“A regulatory agency does not moot an appeal from a rate order by issuing a more recent order.”). If the previous rate order can have any possible prospective effect, then even the entry of a later rate order does not moot the previous order, and arguments concerning the propriety of the order from the previous rate proceeding constitute a live, justiciable controversy. See Gas Service Co., 631 P.2d at 265. Hence, a statutory certiorari petition challenging a previous rate order is not moot so long as the rate order from the previous proceeding may have “real, even if short-lived, effects.” Id.
Here, the issues that Interstate raises about the propriety of the previous rate proceeding are not moot because even though the new rate “proceeding” has produced a new rate order, that order allowed Hi-Speed to continue the same rate in effect as the previous rate. In other words, the challenged rate order still has some prospective effect because it constitutes the very basis for the new rate order. See Gas Service Co., 631 P.2d at 265 (holding that later rate orders do not moot issues raised in prior rate proceedings if the prior rate order can possibly have any prospective effect).
Moreover, the new order is not yet final, because it too is presently subject to a pending petition by the town before this Court. The town’s statutory petition for certiorari challenging the commission’s decision denying it intervenor status in the most recent rate proceeding is presently pending before this Court. Thus, the new rate will not become final for mootness purposes until the town exhausts its right *532to have this Court review that later rate order. See G.L.1956 § 39-5-4 (vesting Supreme Court with discretion to suspend execution of commission order); Narragansett Electric Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.I. 940, 942, 367 A.2d 195, 197 (1976) (recognizing that this Court has power to stay order of commission).
Furthermore, in addition to the challenged 2002 order’s continuing effect on the current 2003 rate, both Interstate and the town still hold a legally cognizable interest in obtaining a decision from this Court about whether the commission acted properly in issuing the previous rate order, one that it allegedly issued without holding a required public hearing and without allowing these intervenors effectively to participate in the rate-setting process. See Potomac Electric Power Co., 402 A.2d at 22 (noting that “[t]he question * * * of mootness [was] not so clear” even though second rate order arguably superseded first). Presumably, this is why the commission found, in the first place, that Interstate and the town possessed sufficient standing to intervene and to participate as parties in the challenged proceeding.
Although standing and mootness are distinct concepts, they often overlap. See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 345 (3d ed.2000); 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: § 3531.12 at 50 (2d ed.1984). Mootness is “ ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’ ” United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). Here, Interstate has a continuing stake in the commission’s rate-setting for Hi-Speed because it allegedly continues to suffer the adverse economic effects of the commission’s decision to allow Hi-Speed to operate at the rate in question, a competitive interest that makes it an aggrieved party for standing purposes. The commission itself recognized this competitive ■ interest when it allowed Interstate to intervene in the challenged rate-setting proceeding.
Under § 39-5-1, a party possesses standing to challenge an order of the commission that aggrieves that party. See In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d at 553. In addition, regulated businesses, like Interstate, possess standing to challenge commission decisions that directly involve a competing regulated business, such as Hi-Speed. See RAM Broadcasting of Colorado, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 702 P.2d 746, 749-50 (Colo.1985) (holding that a regulated paging company had standing to challenge the Public Utility Commission’s grant of a competing-paging company’s application).
As a former monopolist of ferry service to Block Island, Interstate allegedly suffered a direct competitive injury from the rate proceeding in question. The order allowing Hi-Speed to continue operating at the previously approved rate directly injured Interstate’s business by depriving it of revenues and profits that it otherwise would have realized but for the commission allowing its competitor to operate at the rate in question. See id. (reasoning that “additional competition” resulting from commission decision injured the regulated company sufficiently to give it standing to challenge competitor’s application). This allegation of a direct economic injury confers standing on Interstate to challenge the previous rate-setting order. And Interstate allegedly continues to suffer the adverse' economic effects of the commission allowing its competitor to operate at the rate set in the commission’s previous rate order because the commission has *533allowed that rate to remain in effect after its latest rate setting. Thus, Interstate holds a continuing stake in having this Court determine whether the commission acted arbitrarily or unlawfully when it approved the previous rate.10
In addition, this case is not moot because this Court could issue a decision that has a practical legal effect upon this controversy. See Potomac Electric Power Co., 402 A.2d at 22-28 (refusing to dismiss on mootness grounds, in part, because court had the ability to award equitable relief to the power company). If, for example, we were to reach the merits of Interstate’s arguments and decide that the commission had issued a rate order without conducting the required public hearings or that it did so without providing the intervenors or their counsel with sufficient access to the documents on which the commission based its rate-setting order, we could vacate the previous order and direct the commission to hold a new hearing on that rate-setting request.
Indeed, this Court could authorize the commission to require Hi-Speed to impose a surcharge on, or provide a rebate to, its current customers, if that were necessary to counter the effects of an improper rate-setting order. Although the commission is generally barred from retroactive rate-making, this rule is subject to exceptions that may be applicable in this case. E.g., Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147, 1148, 1149 (R.I.1986) (“The rule against retroactive ratemaking will not preclude the granting of refunds in situations * * * wherein a utility earns well in excess of its authorized rate of return.”). We have recognized one such exception when the commission issues “a rate schedule which represents a deprivation of due process either in its inability to provide a fair return or in the grossly excessive time it took to correct good faith errors of the commission in arriving at the new rates * * New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 116 R.I. 356, 392, 358 A.2d 1, 22 (1976). Accord Bristol County Water Co. v. Harsch, 120 R.I. 223, 231, 386 A.2d 1103, 1108 (1978) (recognizing exception); Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 119 R.I. 559, 569, 381 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1977) (same). Such a conclusion “would certainly entitle the company to some sort of extraordinary relief.” New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 116 R.I. at 392, 358 A.2d at 22.
*534In addition, the general rule against retroactive ratemaking is not strictly applied when a court is attempting to remedy a utility commission’s previous procedural mistakes. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current Applications of the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991 U. Ill. L.Rev. 983, 1002 (1991) (“Although a rigid interpretation of the rule against retroactive ratemaking would also prohibit any modification by the commission of a prior rate order that affects past utility gains or losses, courts have allowed such changes in situations in which the commission is remedying procedural mistakes.”). For example, in Mike Little Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 574 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Ky.Ct.App.1978), the court rejected the argument that a later order improperly raised rates. Instead, the commission entered the new order nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical error in the previous order. Id. Cf. Building Owners & Managers Association of Metropolitan Detroit v. Public Service Commission, 424 Mich. 494, 383 N.W.2d 72, 81 (1986) (“A challenge to a-rate based on a procedural flaw does not render its subsequent validation a retroactive rate.”).
Here, I would hold that this Court has the ability, for example, to order the commission to enter a new order nunc pro tunc that would charge a different rate to Hi-Speed’s current customers if that were necessary to remedy the commission’s alleged procedural errors when it set the challenged rate. If we were to decide that the previous rate order unlawfully, deprived Interstate of revenues it otherwise might have realized, we could order the commission to enter a new order nunc pro tunc that would impose a surcharge or provide a rebate to Hi-Speed’s current customers. However unlikely such potential remedies might be in this ease, it is nevertheless the possibility, not the probability, of our granting such relief that is relevant in a mootness inquiry.
Thus, because this Court has the authority under certain circumstances to remedy the continuing injurious effects, if any, of the previous rate order, this case is not academic and presents a live, justiciable controversy. Accordingly, I do not agree that this appeal is moot.
Finally, if this Court deems the challenged rate order to be moot, what is to stop the commission and Hi-Speed from continuing to moot present and future attempts by Interstate and the town to have us review the commission’s present and future rate-setting orders for Hi-Speed by the simple expedient of opening a new rate-setting proceeding for every new season and continuing the previous rate order in effect? Thus, before this Court could review any petition challenging the propriety of this most curious method of setting a rate, the town’s petitions for review challenging that new order would be moot. I do not believe that, by declaring this petition to be moot, we should leave this Court so wide open as to be “gamed” in this fashion.
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that the commission’s mere opening of a new rate proceeding and its issuance of a new rate-order for Hi-Speed that continued Hi-Speed’s previous rate in effect did not moot the issues that Interstate and the town have raised in this statutory petition for review. Therefore, I would proceed to decide the petition on its merits.
. The commission issued this new order in docket number 3495 on November 25, 2003. In that order, the commission determined that the appropriate form of rate regulation for Hi-Speed was a price floor with no revenue or profit cap. But it set the price floor at Hi-Speed's current passenger rate based on the business plan it filed in late 1998 in docket number 2802. The commission also decided that Hi-Speed could set its own bicycle rates and that it could retain any money collected in excess of the previously determined revenue cap.
Previously, in docket number 2802, the commission regulated Hi-Speed by fixing a specific rate accompanied by a revenue cap. In that docket, the commission issued the 2002 order, which is the subject of the present statutory petition for certiorari. The 2002 rate order continued the rates originally set in the commission’s 1999 rate order. Thus, from the 1999 order to the 2003 order, the commission has changed only the form of regulation from a revenue cap to a price-floor model. The rates themselves, however, have remained constant. Although Hi-Speed may now raise its rates under the price-floor form of regulation, as a practical matter, its rates have not changed since the commission’s original rate order.
. Likewise, I would also hold that the new rate proceeding did not moot the issue of whether the Town of New Shoreham (town) possessed a statutory right under G.L.1956 § 39-3-11(b) to participate effectively in the previous rate-setting proceeding. Under G.L. 1956 § 39-5-1, a municipality has standing to seek appellate review of a commission decision that allegedly has aggrieved the municipality’s residents. See City of East Providence v. Public Utilities Commission, 566 A.2d 1305, 1307 (R.I.1989) (holding that City of East Providence had standing to challenge decision of commission because it was the appropriate party to represent the interests of the residents who were allegedly injured by that decision). See also Londonderry Neighborhood Coalition, 145 N.H. 201, 761 A.2d 426, 428 (2000) (holding that neighborhood coalition had standing to challenge administrative agency decision). Here, the town’s residents were aggrieved because the commission arguably violated their rights by failing to provide the town with meaningful participation as a party in the challenged rate-setting proceeding, as required under § 39-3-11(b). Cf. Leone v. Town of New Shoreham, 534 A.2d 871, 874 (R.I.1987) ("The foundation of due process rests on an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner at a meaningful time.”). Because the town and its residents allegedly continue to suffer the effects of the way in which the commission set the previous rate, they have a continuing stake in our determining whether the commission violated § 39-3-11(b) when it issued the previous rate-setting order.