This case involves a determination of the accuracy of jury instructions given on the issue of intent in a prosecution of felony murder and aiding and abetting the murder. Specifically, the first issue revolves around the following sentence: "If you find that the defendant consciously intended to commit, attempted to commit or assisted another in the crime of robbery, you may infer that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would cause death.” (Emphasis added.) While this sentence in isolation may be inaccurate, the instructions in their entirety correctly state the law.
*265The second issue involves a portion of the instructions given on the aiding and abetting charge which was not objected to in the trial court. We apply the standard of review for unpreserved objections and find that no manifest injustice occurred. We offer no opinion as to the result if this issue had been properly preserved.
The appeal raises two additional issues: (1) whether the trial court committed error requiring reversal by allowing the introduction of a rebuttal witness to testify about an issue raised by the defense and elaborated upon by the prosecutor in cross-examination; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of the defendant’s three prior convictions to be used for impeachment purposes. We answer each of these issues in the negative, and we therefore affirm the defendant’s conviction.
I. Facts
On the evening of July 18, 1980, Willie Espy, Sr., was found dead on the floor of his house with his hands tied behind his back and a large wound, made by several cuts with a sharp instrument, on the side of his neck. The house had been ransacked, and among the items missing were a large television set and a rifle.
The defendant, Jerome Kelly, and Lawrence Moses,1 were linked to the killing by witnesses who saw them approaching the house, signaling to each other before entering the house, carrying a rifle and a large knife towards the house, and running from the direction of the decedent’s house with a rifle and a large knife wrapped in a bloodied sheet. They were also seen loading a television set into a *266van parked a short distance from the Espy residence.
The defendant admitted to helping Moses remove the television set from the decedent’s property and to having bloodstains on his pants, but denied any involvement in the killing.
The prosecution proceeded on one of two theories at trial: (1) that the defendant was guilty of first-degree felony murder, or (2) that the defendant aided and abetted the felony murder. Consistent with this, the jury instructions specified the elements of each theory as well as the broader requirements with respect to burdens of proof and the presumption of innocence. The relevant portions of the instructions follow:
Now the defendant in this case is charged with murder in the first degree — felony murder. The essential element of aU murder is malice. Now malice is a term with a special meaning in the law. Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that his act would probably result in death.
Now there are two degrees of murder, and if you find that defendant is guilty of murder, it is your duty to state in your verdict whether the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree. For murder of the first degree there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing occurred as a result of the crime of robbery and that the defendant was at the time engaged in committing, attempting to commit or aiding another in the commission of that crime.
As I have told you before, there are two kinds of murder, first and second degree, and I will instruct you as to both. Now, murder of either degree, as I have told you before, is the killing of one person *267by another with malice. Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would result in death, and that he did so under circumstances which did not justify, excuse or mitigate the crime.
You will first be instructed on murder of the second degree. Keep in mind that all of the elements of second degree murder are necessary to prove first degree murder.
Second, that his death was caused by an act of the defendant or because the defendant consciously created a very high risk of death to another with knowledge that it probably would cause death.
Fourth, for murder you must ñnd that the defendant consciously and knowingly performed the act which caused death. The defendant must have either intended to kill, that is, he must have done the act intending that it result in death or in great and serious bodily injury, or he must have knowingly created a very high risk of death with the knowledge that it probably would cause death.
If you find that the defendant consciously INTENDED TO COMMIT, ATTEMPTED TO COMMIT OR ASSISTED ANOTHER IN THE CRIME OF ROBBERY, YOU MAY INFER THAT HE KNOWINGLY CREATED A VERY HIGH RISK OF DEATH WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD CAUSE DEATH.
Now, you may also gain some insight into the intent with which an act is done by the way in which it is done.
Now, a gun is a dangerous weapon. There are some instruments which are dangerous because they are specifically so designed and are in themselves deadly, such as firearms, knives or bombs. Now, other instruments, though designed for peaceful and proper purposes, also may be dangerous weapons. The manner in which an instrument *268is used or intended to be used in an assault determines whether or not it is a dangerous weapon. If an instrument is used in a manner reasonably calculated and likely to produce serious physical injury or death, it is a dangerous weapon. You may infer an intention to kill from the use of a dangerous weapon when it is used in a manner that the death of the person was plainly likely. Now, you may infer that a person intends the usual results which follows from the use of a dangerous weapon.
Now, you must consider all of the facts and circumstances in determining the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the act. This may be inferred from the kind of weapon used, the nature of the wounds indicted, the circumstances surrounding the killing, the acts, conduct and language of the accused or any other circumstance in evidence.
In determining whether a person who has killed another is guilty of murder, the nature and extent of the injury or wrong which was actually intended must usually be of controlling importance. There cannot be a conviction of murder unless the injury intended was one of a very serious character which might naturally and commonly involve loss of life or grievous mischief.
If all of the evidence does not convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either intended to kill or consciously created a high risk of death with knowledge of the probable consequences, then you must ñnd the defendant not guilty of this crime.
Now, the degree for murder must be so reckless and wrongful as to amount to a criminal purpose aimed against a person’s life, and the defendant must have been conscious of that risk.
Now, it is the theory of the prosecution in this case that the defendant either directly committed the crime charged, that being felony murder, or that he intentionally aided or assisted another in the commission of that crime.
*269All persons who aid or assist in the commission of a crime are as liable as if they had directly committed the crime and may be convicted of the principal offense or as aiders and abettors. Before you may convict you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, that the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery, either robbery unarmed or robbery armed at the time of giving the aid or encouragement.
Second, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement which aided or assisted the commission of the crime of robbery either before or at the time of the commission of the crime.
Third, that the crime of felony murder occurred as a result of this robbery.
Fourth, that this crime which occurred, that IS THE. FELONY MURDER, WAS FAIRLY WITHIN THE CRIMINAL PLAN AND THE DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED THIS TO HAPPEN IN THE COURSE OF COMMITTING the robbery. [Emphasis added.]
During trial, defense counsel objected to that portion of the instruction involving the malice requirement of felony murder2 (first portion of the *270instructions in capitals above), but did not object to the instructions given with respect to aiding and abetting (second portion of the instructions in capitals above). The jury convicted Kelly of felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and he was sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on March 11, 1983, in an unpublished decision. We granted leave to appeal, instructing the parties to "include among the issues to be briefed whether the trial court’s instructions were erroneous in permitting a conviction of felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory without a finding that defendant possessed an intent to murder, People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 [299 NW2d 304] (1980).” 419 Mich 922 (1984).
II. Applicable Law With Respect to Jury Instructions
A. Jury Instructions Should Be Reviewed in Their Entirety
In People v Dye, 356 Mich 271, 279; 96 NW2d 788 (1959), cert den 361 US 935 (1960), we enunciated the standard under which we review jury instructions. We stated that it was improper for the appellant to extract
several short excerpts from the entire context of the charge and discuss[ed] their claimed inadequacies at great length. Jury instructions in a criminal case . . . must be read in their entirety.
See, also, People v Dupie, 395 Mich 483, 488-489; *271236 NW2d 494 (1975). Numerous Court of Appeals decisions have also quite properly focused on the totality of the instructions given. See, e.g., People v Ritsema, 105 Mich App 602, 609-610; 307 NW2d 380 (1981); People v Bailey, 103 Mich App 619, 626; 302 NW2d 924 (1981); People v Choate, 88 Mich App 40, 45; 276 NW2d 862 (1979).
The Supreme Court of the United States has similarly stated:
In determining the effect of this instruction on the validity of respondent’s conviction, we accept at the outset the well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Boyd v United States, 271 US 104, 107 [46 S Ct 442; 70 L Ed 857] (1926). . . . [A] judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction. . . . [T]he question is not whether the trial court failed to isolate and cure a particular ailing instruction, but rather whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. [Cupp v Naughten, 414 US 141, 146-147; 94 S Ct 396; 38 L Ed 2d 368 (1973).]
See, also, United States v LaRiche, 549 F2d 1088, 1093-1094 (CA 6, 1977), cert den 434 US 966 (1977) (quoting Cupp for the proposition that particular instructions must be viewed within the context of the entire charge).
B. Review of Unobjected-to Errors
This Court has stated that "instructional error *272should not be considered on appeal unless the issue has been preserved by an objection to the instruction in the trial court.” People v Handley, 415 Mich 356, 360; 329 NW2d 710 (1982). Relief will be granted absent an objection only in cases of manifest injustice. See, e.g., People v Woods, 416 Mich 581, 610; 331 NW2d 707 (1982); People v Rand, 397 Mich 638, 643; 247 NW2d 508 (1976); People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 586; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a similar test. It stated that "[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.” Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US 145, 154; 97 S Ct 1730; 52 L Ed 2d 203 (1976). Relief will be given only when necessary to avoid manifest injustice to the defendant.3
III. Application of the Law to the Instructions
A. Felony-Murder Instructions
In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court held that
malice is the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural ten*273dency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. We further hold that malice is an essential element of any murder . . . whether the murder occurs in the course of a felony or otherwise.
We therefore decided that the malice necessary for a felony-murder conviction could not be inferred merely from the intent to commit the underlying felony. However, we went on to state:
The facts and circumstances involved in the perpetration of a felony may evidence an intent to kill, an intent to cause great bodily harm, or a wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm; however, the conclusion must be left to the jury to infer from all the evidence. [Emphasis added. Id., pp 728-729.]
Read in their entirety, the jury instructions at issue clearly do not require the jury to find the malice necessary for murder from the mere intention to commit the underlying felony. The felony is a factor the jury may use to find malice.
The defendant objects to the felony-murder instructions because the court at one point stated:
If you find that the defendant consciously intended to commit, attempted to commit or assisted another in the crime of robbery, you may infer that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would cause death.[4]
*274This particular instruction was preceded by explicit and correct definitions of malice. (See the italicized portions of the charge ante, pp 266-269.) The court stated:
The essential element of all murder is malice. . . . Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that his act would probably result in death.
An elaboration of this definition followed:
Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would result in death, and that he did so under circumstances which did not justify, excuse or mitigate the crime.
A correct definition of malice was then given for a third time in the paragraph immediately preceding the one in which the language objected to was used. More importantly, the court clarified any *275ambiguity in the instruction objected to by explicitly noting in the proximately following paragraphs the factors the jury had to consider in order to find malice. Specifically, the following instruction was given:
[Y]ou must consider all of the facts and circumstances in determining the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the act. This may be inferred from the kind of weapon used, the nature of the wounds inflicted, the circumstances surrounding the killing, the acts, conduct and language of the accused or any other circumstances in evidence. [Emphasis added.]
Our responsibility as a reviewing court is to balance the general correct, clear tenor of the instructions in their entirety against the potentially misleading effect of a single sentence isolated by the defendant. Dye, 356 Mich 279; Dupie, 395 Mich 488-489. In doing so, we find that the instructions, as a whole, correctly informed the jury of the Aaron standard governing malice in felony murder and do not require the jury to have determined such malice only on the basis of the intent to commit the underlying felony.5
We are also aware that the trial judge was cognizant of the implications of Aaron. The court stated:
Aaron says specifically that the jury may infer malice from the very thing you are objecting to [the facts of the underlying felony] and all of the facts and circumstances ....
*276A correct understanding of the applicable standard by the trial court further supports our belief that the instructions given were accurate.
Where instructions on malice in other cases were found to be incorrect, the inference of malice was made an automatic result once the intent to commit the underlying felony was found. (By contrast, the case before us raises at most a possible inference.) In People v Thompson, decided jointly with Aaron, the jury was instructed that if "the said defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate said assault upon the deceased, Mary Emma Hendry, with intent to rob, then it is not necessary for the state to prove a premeditated design or intent.” The judge further explained that even though there was no intent to injure anyone, "the evil intent to commit the robbery carries over to make that crime murder in the first degree under the law in this state.” Aaron, 409 Mich 687, n 3. In People v Wright, also decided with Aaron, the jury was instructed:
For murder of the first degree there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing occurred as a result of the crime of arson and that the defendant was at the time engaged in committing or attempting to commit, or was aiding another in the commission of that crime. [Aaron, 409 Mich 688, n 5.]
In Aaron itself, the instruction authorized the jury to convict the defendant of first-degree murder "if they found that defendant killed the victim during the commission or attempted commission of an armed robbery.” Aaron, 409 Mich 688. In People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328; 308 NW2d 112 (1981), the instructions were given as follows:
Now I know you have heard of a premeditated *277killing. We are not concerned with that in this case, because the law supplies the premeditation and the deliberation if a person is killed in the perpetration of a robbery, or the attempted] perpetration of a robbery. The prosecution does not have to prove premeditation and deliberation, it is automatically supplied because the law says that, if a person is killed in the perpetration or attempted] perpetration of a robbery that is first-degree murder, felony. But you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a robbery or the attempted] perpetration of a robbery committed by these defendants, not by somebody else. And that’s important. The prosecution must prove that they committed that act or attempted to commit that act of robbery and during that Mr. Reaves was killed. [Emphasis added. Wilder, 411 Mich 340-341.]
In the case now before us there is no similar mandatory language.
B. The Aiding and Abetting Instructions
The aiding and abetting instructions given in this instance were not objected to at trial; therefore, the appropriate standard of review is whether manifest injustice has occurred. Woods, 416 Mich 610. While the instruction given on this issue was arguably erroneous, after a careful review of the record, we find no evidence of injustice.
The defendant argues that the aiding and abetting instructions given allowed the jury to convict him of felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory without explicitly requiring the jury to make a determination of his intent to aid and abet the murder. The language under point four provides as follows:
[T]hat this crime which occurred, that is the *278felony murder, was fairly within the criminal plan and the defendant might have expected this to happen in the course of committing the robbery.
The defendant reads this as permitting the jury to apply an objective standard of foreseeability on the issue of intent. He concludes that conviction under this language violates the Aaron requirement that malice on the part of the defendant be found before any killing can be deemed "murder.”
Before discussing the defendant’s contention further, it is necessary to understand the elements of an aiding and abetting charge in Michigan. The Michigan statute, MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979, provides:
Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.
The requisite intent is that necessary to be convicted of the crime as a principal. Meister v People, 31 Mich 99 (1875). In this instance, under Aaron, it therefore must be shown that the aider and abettor had the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm or wantonly and willfully disregarded the likelihood of the natural tendency of his behavior to cause death or great bodily harm. Aaron, 409 Mich 733. Further, if the aider and abettor participates in a crime with knowledge of his principal’s intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, he is acting with "wanton and willful disregard” sufficient to support a finding of *279malice under Aaron.6 This result is in accord with numerous decisions reached by the Court of Appeals over a considerable period of time. See, e.g., People v Schaffer, 129 Mich App 287, 291; 341 NW2d 507 (1983); People v Turner, 125 Mich App 8, 11; 336 NW2d 217 (1983); People v Davenport, 122 Mich App 159, 164; 332 NW2d 443 (1982); People v Harris, 110 Mich App 636, 643; 313 NW2d 354 (1981); People v Wilbert, 105 Mich App 631, 640; 307 NW2d 388 (1981); People v Wirth, 87 Mich App 41, 46; 273 NW2d 104 (1978); People v Poplar, 20 Mich App 132, 136; 173 NW2d 732 (1969).
The Aaron concerns are not implicated by this standard. In Aaron, we expressed concern for co-felons who, under the old felony-murder rule became involved in an unforeseen and unagreed-to murder. Aaron, 409 Mich 731. We stated:
In the past, the felony-murder rule has been employed where unforeseen or accidental deaths occur and where the state seeks to prove vicarious liability of co-felons. In situations involving the vicarious liability of co-felons, the individual liability of each felon must be shown. It is fundamentally unfair and in violation of basic principles of individual criminal culpability to hold one felon liable for the unforeseen and unagreed-to results of another felon.
This concern is not implicated by an aiding and abetting standard which requires a finding that *280the co-felon acted with malice. We do not address the defendant’s contention that the actual instruction given does not require this level of intent to be found because the objection was not properly preserved. We review in this instance only to determine whether the defendant was subject to a manifest injustice.
Because the intent necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction is so overwhelmingly evident from the record, we find that no injustice has occurred. The entire criminal enterprise, including the robbery and the killing, was cooperative in nature. Eyewitness testimony established that Kelly and Moses signaled to each other prior to entering the house, headed in the direction of the house with a rifle and a knife, and left the house with a rifle and a knife wrapped in a bloodied sheet. They were observed loading a television set into a van. There was also testimony by a witness that Kelly had told him that he (Kelly) pushed Espy down while Moses tied him up. The defendant admitted having blood on his pants. The nature of the killing itself clearly demonstrates that it was neither accidental nor done without malice. The victim’s hands were tied behind his back, and his throat was slit a number of times. Even assuming the defendant did not enter the house with the intent to murder, it is clear that he either formulated such an intent once inside the house, or at the very least became aware of his codefendant’s specific intent at some point during these gruesome proceedings.
Defendant’s testimony was contradicted by the witnesses and unsupported by the evidence. He stated that he was walking down the street when Moses threw a rifle to him and he followed with no knowledge of what was happening. He did, however, admit to agreeing to steal the television set, *281and, on cross-examination, to entering the victim’s enclosed porch.
In reviewing the record for evidence of manifest injustice to the defendant, we find none. Instead, we find the evidence of intent necessary to support an aiding and abetting conviction so overwhelming that even if the instructions are considered ambiguous no injustice is done to the defendant by allowing his conviction to stand.
IV. The Admissibility of Rebuttal Evidence
We find no merit in the defendant’s assertion that the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion when it admitted the testimony of William Lester Espy, Jr., in rebuttal. We note as an initial matter that a specific objection to the admissibility of this testimony as improper rebuttal was not made at trial. We therefore review only to determine whether the defendant was subject to manifest injustice as a result of admitting the evidence. Not only do we find no such injustice, we find the testimony was properly admitted.
Rebuttal testimony may be used to "contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same.” People v DeLano, 318 Mich 557, 570; 28 NW2d 909 (1947), cert den 334 US 818 (1948), quoting People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 83; 185 NW 830 (1921). In this instance, the defendant’s prior contact with the decedent and his son was brought up during direct examination by the defense. Further, the defendant testified on direct examination that he had gone to the Espys’ house that evening to see if Willie Espy, Jr., was at home. It is clear that this placed the relationship between the defendant and the Espys at issue. The *282prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was therefore properly admitted.7
V. Admissibility of Past Convictions to Impeach the Defendant
The defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to bring in evidence of his past convictions for attempted larceny in a building, attempted robbery, and larceny is clearly erroneous. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the prior convictions by arguing that they did not clearly bear on the issue of credibility, that their effect on the jury would be too prejudicial, and that their admission might cause him to refrain from taking the stand.
MRE 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of such convictions are admissible if "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect and articulates on the record the factors considered in making the determination.”8 The *283trial court exercised its discretion and enunciated its reasons for allowing evidence of the prior convictions on the record. The court considered the defendant’s motion to suppress the prior convictions twice. The first time, on a motion in limine on September 23, 1980, the court stated:
... I would allow the prosecution to use the conviction for attempt [sic] larceny in a building whether he wishes to or not, attempt [sic] robbery unarmed and larceny from a person. The credibility is important, and this is not so prejudicial as to outweigh the probative value.
When the motion was raised again, the court stated:
It becomes very obvious from what counsel has said that credibility is going to be an important factor in this case. ... I know what the rule is and know that similar crimes ought not to be admitted when they will be so prejudicial that probative value becomes very small. In this particular incident, I’m convinced that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. These are larcenous kinds of crimes. As I remember, there are a couple of felonies, all larcenies, and it goes directly to credibility and therefore, I deny the motion.
The trial court’s decision was made after consideration of the relevant factors. See, e.g., People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550; 275 NW2d 253 (1979); People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978). The court determined that evidence of the prior convictions was extremely relevant with respect to the defendant’s credibility and that any *284potential similarity between the earlier convictions and the current case was outweighed by this probative value. The similarity of past crimes to the current case was further diminished because the defendant in effect admitted he had removed the television set, and the real issue was not the underlying theft, but his involvement in the murder. Most importantly, the defendant took the stand, thus obviating any fear that the use of the convictions for impeachment purposes might result in his refusal to testify.
We therefore determine that the admission of evidence of the prior convictions was certainly within the bounds of the trial court’s discretion, and the defendant’s contention otherwise is merit-less.
VI. Conclusion
The felony-murder instructions of the trial court accurately stated the law with respect to malice when read in their entirety. Any imperfection in the instructions given with respect to the intent necessary to be convicted of aiding and abetting a felony murder did not result in manifest injustice. The court, in allowing rebuttal evidence by the prosecutor and the use of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes, properly exercised its discretion.
For all the foregoing reasons, we uphold the felony-murder conviction of Jerome Kelly.
Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, and Riley, JJ., concurred with Williams, C.J.Lawrence Moses was convicted separately of felony murder sifter Kelly, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
"Mr. Binion: Your Honor, defense would like to object to the instruction 16, I believe, 2:03 at page 1671, your Honor, which is on the inference of malice. It is our contention, your Honor, that the case of People versus Aaron, recently decided, your Honor, by the Michigan Supreme Court and appears at 409 Mich Reports, page 672 [299 NW2d 304 (1980)]. I think, your Honor, that the import of the Aaron Decision is that inferences such as the one I think that this instruction involves, that is, that the mere participation in any aspect of the underlying felony. In this case I guess it would be any aspect from any kind of larceny. From that you can infer that the person had malice. I don’t think your Honor, that that is what the Aaron Case permits. I would object to that particular instruction, your Honor. I think it is clear that our case law shows that if there is a conflict between the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions and the case law, that it is the case law, your Honor, which is the determining factor.
"I would ask the Court to follow the case of People versus Aaron, your Honor, and note the conflict between the two and not give that particular instruction to the jury. I think it is going to confuse the jury, your Honor, and it is going to permit the jury to infer malice from my client, from his small involvement.
*270"The Court: The instruction, the language that you are talking about comes almost directly from Aaron. As a matter of fact, Aaron says specifically that the jury may infer malice from the very thing you are objecting to and all of the facts and circumstances, and therefore, I am including it in the instruction. Anything else?”
The following are examples of such injustice. See, e.g., Townes, 391 Mich 578, 588; 218 NW2d 136 (in which the court effectively removed one possible verdict from the jury’s consideration); People v Martin, 392 Mich 553, 561; 221 NW2d 336 (1974), and People v Allensworth, 401 Mich 67, 70-71; 257 NW2d 81 (1977), cert den 435 US 933 (1978) (cases in which the court ruled as a matter of law on an element of the offense); People v Liggett, 378 Mich 706, 715; 148 NW2d 784 (1967) (judge repeatedly misidentified the joint defendants); People v Lenkevich, 394 Mich 117, 124; 229 NW2d 298 (1975) (court repeatedly misdefined self-defense in a murder trial).
This language clearly does not involve a burden-shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption. At most, the instructions can be read to raise a permissive inference. The United States Supreme Court in its most recent discussion of this distinction has stated:
"The court must determine whether the challenged portion of the instruction creates a mandatory presumption. ... A mandatory pre*274sumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.
"Mandatory presumptions must be measured against the standards of [In re] Winship [397 US 358; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970)] as elucidated in Sandstrom [v Montana, 442 US 510; 99 S Ct 2450; 61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979)]. Such presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense. ... A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts proven. Such inferences do not necessarily implicate the concerns of Sandstrom. A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.” (Citations omitted.) Francis v Franklin, 471 US 307; 105 S Ct 1965; 85 L Ed 2d 344, 353-354 (1985).
The Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion on the issue of malice, based on a reading of the instructions at issue in their entirety. People v Ewing (On Remand), 102 Mich App 81, 86; 300 NW2d 742 (1980). We note further that to the extent the jury found Kelly was the principal actor, given the circumstances of the murder, there was no question that the killer himself acted with malice. The only issue was whether Kelly was the principal.
It is noted that in the order granting leave to appeal we stated the issue as "whether the trial court’s instructions were erroneous in permitting a conviction of felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory without a finding that defendant possessed an intent to murder.” As Aaron indicates, the malice necessary to support a murder conviction can be found by a "wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Therefore it is clear that the Aaron rule is broader than our question implies.
We find the defendant’s reliance on the following cases to be misplaced. People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449; 224 NW2d 840 (1975) (rebuttal evidence did not bear on an issue raised by the defense); People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 351-353; 320 NW2d 49 (1982) (evidence involved either a collateral matter of material which should have been in the prosecution’s case in chief); People v Teague, 411 Mich 562, 566; 309 NW2d 530 (1981) (evidence was on a collateral matter).
"Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
"(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
"(1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or the crime involved theft, dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment, and
"(2) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect and articulates on the record the factors considered in making the determination.
"(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not *283admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date.”