The trial court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to question the cofelon Salinas about the witness’ conviction of first-degree murder for the same homicide for which the defendant was on trial. See People v Lytal, 415 Mich 603; 329 NW2d 738 (1982). The standard for determining whether the error requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction is whether the defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the evidence. We think he was not.
After the prosecutor erroneously elicited Sali*111nas’ acknowledgment that he had been convicted of killing the deceased, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witness, fully developing for the jury the idea that the witness had substantial motive to testify falsely against the defendant. The evidence of the murder conviction might well have impeached Salinas’ credibility leading the jury to believe that, as a convicted murderer, his overall testimony was unworthy of belief. Moreover, the trial court promptly instructed the jury that it might consider the witness’ prior conviction only as bearing upon the witness’ credibility. The court repeated the instruction once again at the conclusion of the evidence.
In addition, the jurors were presented with an abundance of independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged. That evidence included Allen’s own inculpatory statement to three other persons. On one occasion, Allen admitted to a witness that he had hit the victim with an ashtray and poured hot water on her face. Another witness testified that Allen admitted that he had gotten blood on his shoe when he hit the victim with the ashtray. This evidence, together with testimony of the pathologist that the cause of death was injury to the head resulting in a cerebral concussion, was itself sufficient to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of first-degree felony-murder, People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). There was more, however. Two serologists testified, without objection, that the blood found on the defendant’s shoe was consistent with the blood type and genetic markings of the victim, and inconsistent with that of Salinas. One of the serologists also testified that approximately five percent of the population would have had the same blood markings as the victim.
It is true, of course, that Salinas testified in *112detail about the defendant’s involvement in the homicide, and his credibility was thereafter impeached in the fashion we have described. Nevertheless, although Salinas provided the only eyewitness account of the murder, his testimony was corroborated in part by that of other witnesses. At least two witnesses testified to a conversation with Salinas prior to his arrest in which he described the crime, and several other persons verified the fact that Salinas and Allen were together at a party store prior to the murder. Salinas’ description of Allen kicking the knife further into the victim’s back was corroborated by the testimony of a technician that he had to "get up on a stool and onto the morgue table, and put my knee against the victim’s back in order to extract the knife.”
We are satisfied that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the felony murder of Minnie Ingram is virtually overwhelming. Consequently, the trial court error in receiving evidence of cofelon Salinas’ murder conviction did not unfairly prejudice the defendant.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Brickley, Cavan agh, Boyle, and Riley, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.