dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as I believe that the packaging equipment at issue in this case falls within the General Assembly’s definition of “manufacture” as “packaging ... passing to the ultimate consumer,” 72 P.S. § 7201(c), and that AMP’s utilization of that equipment in its operations constituted a “direct use” pursuant to 72 P.S. § 7201(o)(4)(B)(i).
Unlike the majority, I simply cannot accept an interpretation of the manufacturing exclusion that excludes from taxation equipment used by an assembler of component parts to package its completed product for sale to a retail consumer, while simultaneously permitting the taxation of packaging equipment utilized by the manufacturer of one of the retail product’s component parts to prepare its completed product for delivery to its ultimate consumer, i.e., the assembler. Moreover, I disagree with the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the small geographical distance and time delay between AMP’s assembly of its products and its packaging of those products at the Distribution Center was sufficient to remove the equipment used in the packaging process from the scope of “direct use” as set forth in 72 P.S. § 7201(o)(4)(B)(i) and interpreted in 61 Pa.Code § 32.32(a)(i).