dissenting:
The majority denies the plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment invalidating the redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission and denies plaintiffs’ request for an order adopting the modified district boundaries proposed by plaintiffs. In reaching its decision, the majority concludes that “[i]n its final form, the plan ultimately adopted and filed by the Commission is not discernibly different, in terms of compactness, from the plan approved by this court in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992), following the last federal decennial census.” 198 Ill. 2d at 299. Assuming, arguendo, that this is an accurate statement, the fact remains that the proceedings ultimately leading to the adoption of the plan in Ryan were markedly different from the proceedings in this case. Consequently, I find comparisons to the plan approved in the Ryan case to be disingenuous.
In reaching its decision, the majority observes that our predecessors on this court more than a century ago recognized that:
“There is a vast difference between determining whether the principle of compactness of territory has been applied at all or not, and whether or not the nearest practical approximation to perfect compactness has been attained. The first is a question which the courts may finally determine; the latter is for the legislature.” People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 480 (1895).
While the majority characterizes these cases as raising the latter question, I believe that these cases, like Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, 198 Ill. 2d 233 (2001), raise questions concerning whether the principle of compactness of territory has been applied at all or not.
Certainly, a cursory review of the challenged districts raises questions of compactness. As noted, in denying plaintiffs’ compactness challenges, the majority states that the overall level of compactness in this plan has changed little when compared with the plan in Ryan. 198 Ill. 2d at 299-300. However, before approving the map at issue in Ryan, this court remanded the case to the Commission for hearings to address questions with regard to those districts that did not appear to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements of compactness and of free and equal elections. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 285-86. Remand was necessary because the parties had presented insufficient evidence for the court to ascertain whether the district lines met legal guidelines. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 284. Both sides had thwarted any type of hearing on their proposed maps by submitting their plans and amendments on the last two days. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 284-85. Absent any evidence, this court declined to “approve or disapprove any plan no matter how fair, compact or contiguous and substantially equal the districts have been formed.” (Emphasis added.) Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 285. To review the maps without sufficient evidence would “circumvent the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Constitution.” Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 285.
In approving the map following remand, the majority in Ryan expressed its “hope that this situation will not again be before this court and place in jeopardy the voting rights of the people of this State.” Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d at 294. Unfortunately, this situation again is before this court. Justice Carman and I noted in our dissents to the Cole-Randazzo decision that the process through which the plan in this case was drawn was at variance with the constitutional mandate. The map that was approved in this case was presented in the last few days, thereby thwarting any type of hearing that would ensure that constitutional requirements were met. Cole-Randazzo, 198 Ill. 2d at 240 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). The proceedings culminating in the adoption of the map included surprise expert witnesses, secret witness lists, lack of opportunity for meaningful cross-examination, and minimal findings of fact and conclusions of law. Cole-Randazzo, 198 Ill. 2d at 248 (Carman, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
Despite the infirmities in the process leading to the adoption of this map, the majority in Cole-Randazzo did not address that process, choosing instead to accord the map a presumption of validity. Here too, the majority glosses over the procedural shortcomings in the creation of the map by noting that the plaintiffs in these cases “make no claim that the process employed by the Commission in formulating the new redistricting plan was in any way improper.” 198 Ill. 2d at 297. Nonetheless, the majority later seems to suggest that the hearings were proper, indicating that the “redistricting plan before us today was the product of a series of meetings and public hearings held in September of 2001 ***. During those proceedings, the Commission considered various plans.” 198 Ill. 2d at 299. This statement is misleading, as the majority of those proceedings did not address the map ultimately adopted, because that map was introduced in the last days of the proceeding. See Cole-Randazzo, 198 Ill. 2d at 240 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Carman, J.).
Absent a remand in this case directing the Commission to hold a hearing consistent with the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Constitution, it is inappropriate to approve this plan on the ground that the plan is “not discernibly different, in terms of compactness, from the plan approved” in Ryan. Until the Commission has been presented with and has considered evidence justifying departures from the constitutional requirements of compactness, it is premature to presume the validity of such departures.
Because I believe the map should be returned to the Commission for further proceedings, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
JUSTICE CARMAN joins in this dissent.