(dissenting).
We have another affirmance for the State even though there has been a flagrant error by a motor patrolman in advising a citizen of his rights. Therefore, I dissent.
Once defendant was stopped for speeding, all other facts flowed which established probable cause for arrest. Hence, I cannot accept Olien’s probable cause argument.
The pith of the warning by the officer must be that the driver’s license shall be revoked for one year, not that it “may be revoked” or “might be revoked” or “can be revoked.” There is nothing ambiguous about the statute. Read it. SDCL 32-23-10 plainly states in part:
The person shall be requested by the officer to submit to the analysis and shall be advised by the officer that: ******
(2) If he refuses to submit to the chemical analysis, his driver’s license shall be revoked for one year.... (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, this motorist was given improper advice by the motor patrolman, for the motor patrolman read verbatim from a card which stated that the Department of Public Safety “can” revoke his driver’s license. This driver was not fully informed of the consequences of his refusal. Our state law said that he was entitled to know of the consequences. So it is absolutely beyond me as to how the majority opinion can rationalize the clear intent of this statute into something other than what it unequivocally mandates. “Since our statute requires it, an arresting officer is obligated to inform a driver of the consequences in the event of his refusal to submit to a test.” Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40, 44, 130 N.W.2d 423, 425 (1964). Accord with my writing: Decker v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 6 Cal.3d 903, 495 P.2d 1307, 101 Cal.Rptr. 387 (1972). The majority’s pivotal rationale is moored to the officer’s “substantial compliance.” The heart of the warning, as expressed by the statute, is that the person “shall be advised by the officer” that “[i]f he refuses to submit to the chemical analysis, his driver’s license shall be revoked for one year_” SDCL 32-23-10(2). This Court deeply analyzed this “substantial compliance rule” in State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418, 419-20 (S.D.1982). We stated that substantial compliance with the statute “means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” Id. at 420. We then cited Coe v. Davidson, 43 Cal.App.3d 170, 117 Cal.Rptr. 630 (1974). We further cited Kasner v. Stanmire, 195 Okla. 80, 155 P.2d 230 (1944), which holds that substantial compliance is not shown unless it is made to appear that the purpose of the statute is shown to have been served. I submit that by every authority in this state, and by the absolute requirements of the statute, the majority opinion grievously erred in its analysis.
As this was a civil revocation proceeding involving the loss of a driver’s license for one year, and not a criminal proceeding per se, I find it unnecessary to address the legal issues addressed by State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984), and State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.1985).