State v. Garza

Boslaugh, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent only from that part of the opinion that holds there was a failure of proof that the value of the merchandise stolen was in excess of $300.

The statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-511.01 (Reissue 1989), requires only proof of the “retail value” of the merchandise stolen. The statute itself refers to “retail price,” “price marking, ” and, in three different places, to “price tag.”

The assistant store manager testified that the four items *266stolen had price tags of $85, $170, $130, and $152. This evidence was sufficient to establish that the total retail value of the items stolen was in excess of $300 on the day they were stolen.

In Robinson v. State, 107 Neb. 591, 186 N.W. 977 (1922), the petitioners in error were convicted of stealing merchandise from two Lincoln, Nebraska, department stores: Rudge & Guenzel Company and Miller & Paine. With regard to proof of the value of the items stolen, we said: “As to the proof of value, there is no better way of showing the market value of any article than the price at which it and others of its class are being offered and sold on the market.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 592, 186 N.W. at 978.

In People v. Vanderhall, 168 A.D.2d 655, 563 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1990), the court held that testimony by store security personnel who referred to the price tag on the item stolen was sufficient proof of value. In Norris v. State, 475 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971), the court held that evidence that merchandise was displayed for regular sale at a “marked price representing its retail price,” where uncontradicted, was sufficient to support a conviction grounded upon the marked price as its value. See, also, Scott v. State, 519 So. 2d 734 (Fla. App. 1988); Kowalczk v. State, 195 Ga. App. 714, 394 S.E.2d 594 (1990); State v. Stout, 273 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1978).

In this case, the uncontradicted evidence established the prices at which the merchandise was being offered for sale by the owner, Dillard’s department store. That evidence was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the retail value of the items stolen was in excess of $300.

The judgment should have been affirmed.