OPINION
LARSEN, Justice.This litigation began on December 7, 1971. Studio Photographers, Inc. (Studio), assignor to Irving Elkin, the appellant, filed a four-count complaint in trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County against the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania (Bell), appellee. The first count alleged Bell negligently failed to furnish Studio “reasonable, rapid and efficient service” with respect to three wide-area telephone service (“WATS”) lines. Count two was based on Bell’s alleged deliberate refusal to furnish Studio with adequate directory assistance information service.1 The third and fourth counts alleged negligent failure of Bell’s directory assistance service to furnish written telephone listings (i. e., telephone numbers) for prospective customers of Studio where Studio had submitted telephone listing requests for over 2,500 such customers. Damages, both compensatory and punitive, were demanded.
Bell filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the court asserting that the matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC). A court en banc entered an order which “stayed” the matter until “there is a determination of standards for the services involved by the [PUC] . ...”2
*128A proceeding was commenced by the PUC, upon the complaint of Studio raising the same allegations contained in the complaint before the court. Following an evidentiary hearing and consideration of the briefs and arguments of the parties, the PUC rendered an adjudication and order dismissing the complaint, stating “[ajfter full consideration of all the facts of record the Commission is of the opinion and finds that [Studio] has failed to substantiate its allegations and that [Bell] has, in fact, provided [Studio] with a reasonably continuous and adequate telephone service . . . . ”
No exceptions were filed .to this PUC determination, nor was an appeal taken. Studio then had the aforementioned civil action listed for trial. Bell filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting inter alia that the complaint raised questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC and that the unappealed determination of these questions by the PUC was conclusive and could not be collaterally attacked in the Court of Common Pleas. This motion was denied.
Bell appealed the denial to the Superior Court which reversed the lower court and ordered judgment entered for Bell. Elkin v. Bell Telephone Co., 247 Pa.Super. 505, 372 A.2d 1203 (1977) (opinion by Judge Jacobs; concurring opinion by Judge Spaeth).
This Court granted Studio’s petition for allowance of appeal to determine the effect of the PUC adjudication of the standards of services involved upon the trespass action before the Court of Common Pleas, especially in light of our then-recent decision in Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 383 A.2d 791 (1977).
This case requires accommodation of the respective spheres of adjudicatory authority of the PUC and the Courts of Common Pleas where each has jurisdiction over some facet of the controversy. The PUC has long been recognized as the appropriate forum for the adjudication of issues involving the reasonableness, adequacy and sufficiency of *129public utility services. Behrend v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 431 Pa. 63, 66, 243 A.2d 346, 347 (1968); Duquesne Light Co. v. Monroeville Borough, 449 Pa. 573, 581, 298 A.2d 252, 257 (1972); Lansdale Borough v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 403 Pa. 647, 650-51, 170 A.2d 565, 566-67 (1961). The Public Utility Law has expressly granted the PUC the power to “prescribe as to service[3] and facilities . . . just and reasonable standards ... to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by any or all public utilities . . ..” and upon finding, after reasonable notice and hearing, “that the service or facilities of any public utility are unreasonable, unsafe, inadequate, insufficient, or unreasonably discriminatory . . ..” the PUC “shall determine and prescribe, by regulation or order, the reasonable, safe, adequate, sufficient, service or facilities to be observed, furnished, enforced or employed . . ..” Sections 412 and 413, respectively, of the Public Utility Law, as amended 66 P.S. §§ 1182, 1183 (1959) (replaced by 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1504, 1505 (1978)).4
In spite of the PUC’s rather extensive statutory responsibility for ensuring the adequacy, efficiency, safety and reasonableness of public utility services, we recognized in Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, that the Courts of *130Common Pleas have original jurisdiction to entertain suits for damages against public utilities based upon asserted failure to provide adequate services, even though the subject matter of the complaint is encompassed by the Public Utility Law. 477 Pa. at 7-11, 383 A.2d at 795-96. Traditional judicial remedies such as damages had been preserved by the Public Utility Law, Id., 477 Pa. at 8-9, 383 A.2d at 795, 66 P.S. §§ 1357, 1500 (1959) (replaced by 66 Pa.C.S. § 103), and, since the legislature had withheld from the PUC the power to award damages, Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, 477 Pa. at 8, 383 A.2d at 794, this Court concluded that the courts must have jurisdiction over all damage actions.
The lower court apparently recognized the split jurisdiction and the advantages of referring the matter of the standards of services to the PUC, and so stayed the civil suit for damages pending a “determination [by the PUC] of standards for the services involved.” We must now decide whether this bifurcated procedure was proper and, if it was, we will determine the effect of the PUC adjudication upon the litigation in the Court of Common Pleas.
Initially, we address appellant’s argument, the entire thrust of which is that Feingold has ousted the PUC for all purposes in any case involving an action for damages.5 Appellant’s interpretation of Feingold is too broad and would “virtually strip” the PUC of all jurisdiction merely by framing the allegations in contractual and/or trespassory terminology, and demanding damages. As noted by Mr. Justice Pomeroy’s insightful dissenting opinion in Feingold which expressed concern for such a sweeping interpretation, “[s]uch a result is unwarranted.” Id., ill Pa. at 18, 383 A.2d at 800.
*131In Feingold, the case began as an action before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County seeking both injunctive relief and damages. Mr. Feingold asserted inadequate telephone service by Bell in several particulars. Bell filed preliminary objections and the trial court dismissed Feingold’s complaint on the ground that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the PUC. We said “[t]he question presented by this case is whether appellant, seeking both legal and equitable relief against a public utility, should have first exhausted his administrative remedies under the Public Utility Law . . . before seeking a judicial remedy.” Id., 477 Pa. at 5, 383 A.2d at 793. (emphasis added) In the posture of that case, we were primarily concerned with “the narrower issue of whether appellant had adequate remedies available under the Public Utility Law.” Id., All Pa. at 7, 383 A.2d at 794. (emphasis added).
Since, as noted, the PUC had no authority to award damages, appellant in Feingold had no adequate administrative remedy, and thus we held he had no duty to first exhaust administrative procedures before resorting to the courts. Id., All Pa. at 10 12, 383 A.2d at 795-96. We had no occasion in Feingold to address the issue here presented. Feingold, therefore, poses no bar to the procedure adopted by the trial court in referring the standards of services issue to the PUC.
Appellant's simplistic notion ignores the reality that frequently both the courts and administrative agencies must each play roles in the adjudication of certain matters, and would have this Court ignore an adjudication of a competent Commonwealth administrative agency rendered after a full and fair evidentiary hearing and consideration of briefs and arguments of the parties, in an area peculiarly within the area of expertise entrusted to the agency by the legislature. This we will not do.
To accommodate the role of the court with that of the agency, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction (or primary exclusive jurisdiction) has been developed. Essentially, the doctrine creates a workable relationship between the courts *132and administrative agencies wherein, in appropriate circumstances, the courts can have the benefit of the agency’s views on issues within the agency’s competence. Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, 477 Pa. at 16, 383 A.2d at 798-99 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) and Mezines, Stein and Gruff, Administrative Law, § 47.01[1] (1978) (hereinafter “Mezines”). This Court has approved the doctrine in Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182, 282 A.2d 714 (1977) (equity court must defer to Interstate Commerce Commission). In Weston, we stated:
The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. The United States Supreme Court “. . . recognized early in the development of administrative agencies that coordination between traditional judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary if consistent and coherent policy were to emerge.... The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has become one of the key judicial switches through which this current has passed.” Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Trans-Atlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68, 91 S.Ct. 203, 208 [, 27 L.Ed.2d 203] (1970) (footnote and citations omitted).’ The doctrine “. . . requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme.” United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, 68, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165 [, 1 L.Ed.2d 126] (1956). (further citations omitted).
445 Pa. at 198-199, 282 A.2d at 723. (opinion of the Court by Roberts, J.)
The doctrine serves several purposes, chief of which are the benefits to be derived by making use of the agency’s special experience and expertise in complex areas with which judges and juries have little familiarity. Mezines, supra at § 47.02[2], citing Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477, 66 L.Ed. 943 (1922); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 1037, 1040 (1964) (hereinafter “Jaffe”). Another important consideration is the statutory purpose in the creation of the *133agency-the powers granted by the legislature and the powers withheld. Jaffe, supra at 1039. And, another fundamental concern is the need to promote consistency and uniformity in certain areas of administrative policy. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907). It has been noted that these purposes are frequently served in, and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction principally applicable to, the controversies concerning the so-called “regulated industries.” Jaffe, supra at 1039.
It is equally important to realize what the doctrine is not-it is not simply a polite gesture of deference to the agency seeking an advisory opinion wherein the court is free to ignore the agency’s determination. Rather, once the court properly refers a matter or a specific issue to the agency, that agency’s determination is binding upon the court and the parties (subject, of course, to appellate review through normal channels6), and is not subject to collateral attack in the pending court proceeding.7 “The common law doctrine of res judicata, including the subsidiary doctrine of collateral estoppel, is designed to prevent the relitigation by the same parties of the same claim or issues.” K. C. Davis, Administrative Law, § 18.10 (1972). Once the administrative tribunal has determined the issues within its jurisdiction, then the temporarily suspended civil litigation may *134continue, guided in scope and direction by the nature and outcome of the agency determination. Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, 477 Pa. at 22, 383 A.2d at 801 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
We must enter a caveat, however. Courts should not be too hasty in referring a matter to an agency, or to develop a “dependence” on the agencies whenever a controversy remotely involves some issue falling arguably within the domain of the agency’s “expertise.” “Expertise” is no talisman dissolving a court’s jurisdiction. Accommodation of the judicial and administrative functions does not mean abdication of judicial responsibility. The figure of the so-called “expert” looms ominously over our society-too much so to permit the roles of the court and jury to be readily relinquished absent a true fostering of the purposes of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Therefore, where the subject matter is within an agency’s jurisdiction and where it is a complex matter requiring special competence, with which the judge or jury would not or could not be familiar, the proper procedure is for the court to refer the matter to the appropriate agency. Also weighing in the consideration should be the need for uniformity and consistency in agency policy and the legislative intent. Where, on the other hand, the matter is not one peculiarly within the agency’s area of expertise, but is one which the courts or jury are equally well-suited to determine, the court must not abdicate its responsibility. In such cases,8 it would be wasteful to employ the bifurcated proce*135dure of referral, as no appreciable benefits would be forthcoming.
In the litigation before us, the allegations of Studio’s complaint quite clearly involved an area where the PUC’s expertise was needed the adequacy and efficiency of WATS and directory assistance services. The competence of the agency in these areas is substantially greater than the court’s, and the need for uniformity of policy is apparent.
Appellant had a full and fair evidentiary hearing, and consideration of briefs and arguments by the PUC. Their determination was that the applicable standards for the services involved had been met. Appellant had adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of this determination in Commonwealth Court, see note 5 supra. They did not. We will not now permit a collateral attack on the PUC determination in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County-
For the foregoing reasons, the order of Superior Court reversing the denial of appellee’s motion for summary judgment by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, and entering judgment for appellee, is affirmed.
EAGEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, J., filed concurring opinions. NIX, J., filed a dissenting opinion.. Specifically, for Bell’s refusal to supply more than one telephone listing per phone-call request.
. The text of the order was as follows:
And now, this 12th day of June, 1972, after argument before the court en banc and consideration of the briefs filed, proceedings in this matter are stayed until there is a determination of standards *128for the services involved by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in accordance with Section 412 of the Public Utility Law (66 P.S. [§] 1182).
. “Service” is defined quite broadly in the Public Utility Law. 66 P.S. § 1102(20) (1959) (replaced by 66 Pa.C.S. § 102 (1978)).
. More fully, these sections provide:
§ 1182. Standards of service and facilities
The Commission may, after reasonable notice and hearing, upon its own motion or upon complaint, prescribe as to service and facilities ... just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, and practices to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by any or all public utilities....
§ 1183. Proper service and facilities established on complaint. Whenever the commission, after reasonable notice and hearing, upon its own motion or upon complaint, finds that the service or facilities of any public utility are unreasonable, unsafe, inadequate, insufficient, or unreasonably discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of this act, the commission shall determine and prescribe, by regulation or order, the reasonable, safe, adequate, sufficient, service or facilities to be observed, furnished, enforced, or employed, including all such repairs, changes, alterations, extensions, substitutions, or improvements in facilities as shall be reasonably necessary and proper for the safety, accommodation, and convenience of the public, and shall fix the same by its order or regulation.
. Appellant states “Of course, once we conclude that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction originally in this action, we dispose of any issue arising from Studio’s failure to appeal to the Commonwealth Court from the PUC Order of August 20, 1974 ... As Feingold now makes clear, this Order by the PUC was and is a nullity since original jurisdiction of plaintiffs complaint was in the Court of Common Pleas.” Brief for Appellant at 13.
. Thus, in the instant case, Studio’s right to seek appellate review of the PUC determination was not affected by the bifurcated procedure adopted. See, section 508(e) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, 17 P.S. § 211.508(e) (appeals to Commonwealth Court from PUC adjudication) (replaced by the Judicial Code of 1978, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5105). “Thus review of the PUC action should proceed through the normally existing route of review (see Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 93 S.Ct. 573, 34 L.Ed.2d 525 (1973).” Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, 477 Pa. at 22, n.5, 383 A.2d at 801, n.5 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
. “The pending action in the court of common pleas will not, of course, be used to relitigate the question of adequacy of services, but only to litigate such questions as were not resolved through administrative channels and to grant such relief, if any, including damages, as may be appropriate in light of the administrative determination.” Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, supra, 477 Pa. at 22, n.5, 383 A.2d at 801, n.5 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
. Examples include failure to provide any phone service, or failure to print name and number in phone directories, etc. In this respect, we must distinguish Behrend v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 431 Pa. 63, 243 A.2d 346 (1968). Although that case involved the omission of customers’ names and numbers from the Pittsburgh phone directory, the relief sought was not damages. Complainant prayed, in equity, that Bell and the directory printers, the Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, be compelled to republish or amend the phone directories, or, alternatively, to distribute corrections to all persons and entities who received the faulty directories. Given the nature of the relief sought, it was eminently more appropriate to have the PUC, endowed with authority to render such relief if proper, hear the case in the first *135instance. Matters such as peak-hour loads, WATS line distributions, rates, etc. are clearly within the purview of the PUC’s expertise.