OPINION
MARCI B. McIVOR, Bankruptcy Judge.In these consolidated appeals, Beverly M. Burden, Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”), appeals the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Debtors may use income which becomes available once 401(k) loans are repaid to commence making contributions to debtors’ 401(k) plans. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Panel concludes that post-petition income which becomes available after a debtor repays a 401(k) loan must be committed to the chapter 13 plan. Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s rulings confirming the Debtors’ chapter 13 plans are reversed. The cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue raised in this appeal is whether a chapter 13 debtor who is repaying a 401(k) loan, but not making any 401(k) contributions at the time the bankruptcy *206petition is filed, may use the income which becomes available when the loans are repaid to start making contributions to debt- or’s 401(k) plan rather than committing the extra income to repay creditors.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has authorized appeals to the Panel, and neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6), (c)(1). A final order of the bankruptcy court may be appealed as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For purposes of appeal, an order is final if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1497, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The order of the bankruptcy court confirming the Debtors’ chapter 13 plans over the objections of the Trustee is a final, appealable order. Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C. (In re Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R. 274, 278 (6th Cir. BAP 2008).
The bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, including its interpretation of the applicable statutes, are reviewed de novo. Brice Rd. Develops., L.L.C., 392 B.R. at 277. “De novo means that the appellate court determines the law independently of the trial court’s determination.” Treinish v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. (In re Periandri), 266 B.R. 651, 653 (6th Cir. BAP 2001) (citations omitted).
The court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Riverview Trenton R.R. Co. v. DSC, Ltd. (In re DSC, Ltd.), 486 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir.2007). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous ‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).
III. FACTS
On November 20, 2008, Deborah Seafort filed a petition for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. On November 25, 2008, Frederick C. Schuler and Carrie A. Schuler filed a joint petition for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the time the debtors filed their respective petitions for relief, Deborah Seafort and Frederick C. Schuler (hereinafter collectively “Debtors”) were both eligible participants in their respective employers’ ERISA qualified 401(k) retirement plans. The Debtors were not making contributions to their plans at the time they filed for bankruptcy relief; however, each Debt- or was repaying a 401(k) loan. Seafort was paying her loan at the rate of $254.71 per month, and Schuler was paying $815.86 per month.
The Debtors each filed a proposed chapter 13 plan which provided for a commitment period of five years. Under their respective proposed plans, the loans would be repaid in full before completion of the plans. The plans proposed to complete repayment of the loans and then continue payroll deductions as 401(k) contributions in the same amount as the loan payments. The plan payments would not, therefore, increase after the loans were paid in full. The Trustee objected to confirmation of both plans asserting that because the Debtors were not making 401(k) contributions as of the commencement of their bankruptcy cases the Debtors must in*207crease their plan payments by the amount of the loan payments once the loans were paid in full.
The bankruptcy court consolidated the cases to determine whether the Debtors could exclude their proposed 401 (k) contributions from projected disposable income which would otherwise be paid into their respective chapter 13 plans. On June 22, 2009, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order concluding that the exclusion was permissible and that the Debtors’ respective chapter 13 plans should be confirmed without modification. On June 30, 2009, the Trustee moved the court to alter or amend its order. The Trustee’s motion was resolved by entry of an agreed order on October 5, 2009, which required the Debtors to provide certain documentary evidence to the Trustee regarding their 401 (k) plans and established certain events which would require amendment of the plans during the applicable commitment period. The Trustee’s timely appeal followed.
IV. DISCUSSION
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), a chapter 13 debtor could not make contributions to a 401(k) plan because such funds were considered disposable income which had to be committed to the chapter 13 plan. Harshbarger v. Pees (In re Harshbarger), 66 F.3d 775, 777-78 (6th Cir.1995). For the same reason, chapter 13 debtors were also prohibited from repaying a 401(k) loan during the life of a chapter 13 plan, regardless of any adverse consequences which might result from nonpayment. Id. The adoption of BAPCPA, however, resulted in several changes to the treatment of ERISA qualified employee benefit plans (“Qualified Plans”). In particular, BAPC-PA amended § 541 to add subsection (b)(7) which allows debtors to shelter contributions to certain Qualified Plans from property of the estate. As a result, a debtor may now exclude contributions to Qualified Plans, including contributions to a 401 (k) plan, up to the permitted amount of the plan from his bankruptcy estate. In re Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670, 676 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2007) (citing In re Johnson, 346 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2006)), aff'd, No. 07-2446, 2007 WL 4623043 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 28, 2007), aff'd, 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.2009). In addition, BAPCPA added subsection (f) to 11 U.S.C. § 1322 which prohibits a chapter 13 plan from altering the terms of a 401 (k) loan and excludes “any amounts” used to repay loans from Qualified Plans from the calculation of a debtor’s “disposable income.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f). In sum, BAPCPA changed the way contributions to Qualified Plans and loan payments to such plans are treated in chapter 13 cases.
BAPCPA also made changes to 11 U.S.C. § 1325, the Code section which spells out the requirements for confirmation of chapter 13 plans; however, the amendments did not directly address how to treat the income which becomes available when a 401(k) loan is repaid during the applicable commitment period. The Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal have classified the resulting available funds as projected disposable income which must be committed to the debtor’s chapter 13 plan. McCarty v. Lasowski (In re Lasowski), 575 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir.2009); Nowlin v. Peake (In re Nowlin), 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.2009). However, no court has addressed the precise question presented by this appeal: whether a debt- or, who was not contributing to an ERISA qualified plan when the case was filed, may begin making 401 (k) contributions once the 401 (k) loan has been repaid.
The Trustee makes three arguments in support of her position that the bankrupt*208cy court erred in permitting these Debtors, who were not making contributions to their 401 (k) plans at the commencement of their cases, to exclude the income which became available once their 401 (k) loans were repaid from projected disposable income and then use that income to make contributions to a 401(k) plan. First, pursuant to fundamental rules of statutory construction, the Trustee argues that chapter 13 debtors may only exclude contributions they are making to a 401(k) plan as of the commencement of their case from property of the estate and disposable income. Second, the Trustee asserts that the Debtors’ proposed plans did not comply with the projected disposable income requirements of § 1325(b)(1). Lastly, the Trustee contends that the Debtors’ plans were not proposed in good faith.
A. Property of the Estate and Exclusions from Property of the Estate
In determining the meaning of a statute, the Panel must first examine the plain language of the statute. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, ... that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1169, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (citations omitted). “When a statute is ambiguous, we look to its purpose and may consider the statute’s policy implications in determining what Congress intended.” Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Rd. Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986, 989 (6th Cir.2000).
Section 541(a)(1) provides:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added). The definition of “property of the estate” is exceptionally broad and designed to “ ‘bring anything of value that the debtors have into the [bankruptcy] estate.’ ” Lyon v. Eiseman (In re Forbes), 372 B.R. 321, 330 (6th Cir. BAP 2007) (citation omitted). While reaching broadly to bring a wide variety of property into the estate, § 541 also provides for a number of exclusions. Subsection (b) lists certain interests which may exist as of the commencement of the case, but are nevertheless excluded from property of the estate. BAPCPA amended § 541(b) by adding subsection (b)(7) to the list of property which could be excluded from property of the estate. Section 541(b)(7) states:
(b) Property of the estate does not include' — •
(7) any amount — •
(A) withheld by an employer from the wages of employees for payment as contributions—
(i) to-
ll) an employee benefit plan that is subject to title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or under an employee benefit plan which is a governmental plan under section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
except that such amount under this subparagraph shall not constitute disposable income as defined in section 1325(b)(2)[J
11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7).
In this case, the bankruptcy court concluded that because § 541(b)(7) ex-*209eludes contributions to a 401(k) plan from property of the estate and excludes the amount of those contributions from being considered disposable income, contributions which commence after the filing of the case must also be excluded from property of the estate. The Panel disagrees. The Panel concludes that the language of § 541(a) is clear. Property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) and exclusions from property of the estate under § 541(b) must both be determined on the date of the filing of the case. As provided in the statute, § 541(a) specifically states that “the commencement of a case ... creates an estate.” Section 541(b) excludes certain property from the definition of “property of the estate.” Read together, § 541(a) and (b) establish a fixed point in time at which parties and the bankruptcy court can evaluate what assets are included or excluded from property of the estate. Section 541(a) clearly establishes this point as the commencement of the case. Therefore, only 401(k) contributions which are being made at the commencement of the case are excluded from property of the estate under § 541(b)(7). The Panel is not concluding that property which the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case is not subject to the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the Panel holds that a debtor’s ability to exclude property acquired post-petition from the claims of creditors is not controlled by 11 U.S.C. § 541.
This Panel’s construction of § 541(a) and (b) is consistent with the manner in which “property of the estate” is defined in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Section 1306 provides:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 of this title—
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title whichever occurs first.
11 U.S.C. § 1306. Notably, this section, which addresses property and earnings that come into existence after the debtor files a petition for relief does not exclude 401(k) contributions from property of the estate. Rather, 401(k) contributions are only excluded in § 541 which specifically applies to property in existence at the commencement of the case. Because Congress identified 401(k) contributions as excluded in § 541, but not in § 1306, the Panel concludes that the absence of any reference in § 1306 to 401 (k) contributions was intentional. Hildebrand v. Petro (In re Petro), 395 B.R. 369, 375 (6th Cir. BAP 2008) (“If a statute uses a particular phrase in one section, but not in another, courts should assume the inclusion or exclusion to have been intentional.”) Congress did not intend for income which becomes available post-petition to be excluded from property of the chapter 13 estate or from the calculation of projected disposable income.
The Panel’s conclusion that § 541(b)(7) does not exclude income which becomes available post-petition in order to start making contributions to a 401(k) plan, is also supported by the language in § 541(b)(7) and its reference only to “disposable income.” Conspicuously, § 541(b)(7) makes no reference to “projected disposable income.” Projected disposable income is based on debtor’s income as of confirmation and also allows for *210“consideration of reasonably certain future events.” Nowlin v. Peake (In re Nowlin), 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.2009). Had Congress intended to protect income which becomes available after the petition is filed, Congress could easily have written § 541(b)(7) to read “any amount withheld by an employer ... shall not constitute disposable income as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) or projected disposable income under § 1325(b)(1)(B).” Income which becomes available after the filing of a case is “projected disposable income” and that income is not excluded from property of the estate. Projected disposable income must be used to pay creditors pursuant to § 1325(b)(1)(B) and may not be used to commence making payments to a 401(k) plan.
This Panel’s construction of § 541(a) and (b) and § 1325 is also consistent with the stated objective of BAPCPA. A primary objective of BAPCPA, insofar as consumer bankruptcy was concerned, was to “ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” H.R.Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2005, pp. 88, 89. BAPCPA also included various consumer protection reforms. It “allows debtors to shelter from the claims of creditors certain education IRA plans and retirement pension funds.” Id. BAPCPA also “expands a debtor’s ability to exempt certain tax-qualified retirement accounts and pensions.” Id. at 104. In explaining the impact of BAPCPA, Congress stated that “[t]he new property-value limitations could make more money available to creditors in some cases, while the exemptions on some retirement ... savings generally would make less money available.” Id. at 115.
In regard to retirement savings, Congress clearly intended to strike a balance between protecting debtors’ ability to save for their retirement and requiring that debtors pay their creditors the maximum amount they can afford to pay. This balance is best achieved by permitting debtors who are making contributions to a Qualified Plan at the time their case is filed to continue making contributions, while requiring debtors who are not making contributions at the time a case is filed to commit post-petition income which becomes available to the repayment of creditors rather than their own retirement plan. To conclude otherwise encourages the improvident behavior that BAPCPA sought to discourage. If the bankruptcy court is affirmed, debtors who were not contributing to their tax qualified plan and borrowing against their own retirement savings may file bankruptcy, repay themselves, and, once the loan is repaid, start contributing again to their own retirement savings. Allowing debtors to do so would tip the delicate balance struck by BAPCPA impermissibly in favor of debtors. On the other hand, allowing debtors who are making contributions at the commencement of a case to continue making those contributions furthers the goal of encouraging retirement savings. Limiting these protections to contributions in place at the time debtors file their petitions also protects the goal of ensuring that debtors pay creditors the maximum amount debtors can afford to pay.1
*211B. Disposable Income and Projected Disposable Income
The bankruptcy court also erred in confirming the Debtors’ proposed plans because the plans do not comply with the projected disposable income requirement of § 1325(b)(1)(B). Under that section, if the chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of a debt- or’s chapter 13 plan, a court may not confirm the plan unless the debtor pays unsecured creditors the full value of their claims or “the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period ... will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A) and (B) (emphasis added). The bankruptcy court must calculate the debtor’s projected disposable income and ensure that the proposed plan applies the entire amount to pay unsecured creditors in order to confirm the plan over an objection by the trustee or an unsecured creditor.
The term “projected disposable income” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code; however, the United States Supreme Court recently concluded that a forward-looking approach should be taken whereby “projected disposable income” is calculated based on both debtor’s circumstances as of confirmation, and on “changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.” Hamilton v. Lanning, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 2478, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010); see also Darrohn v. Hildebrand (In re Darrohn), No. 095499, 615 F.3d 470 (6th Cir.2010) (relying on banning and holding that the bankruptcy court violated § 1325 when it failed to consider debtor’s changed circumstances in calculating “projected disposable income”). Because repayment of a 401(k) loan during the life of the plan can be reasonably anticipated at the time of confirmation, the Panel concludes that post-petition income which becomes available after 401(k) loans are repaid must be considered as projected disposable income available to unsecured creditors.
The Panel’s conclusion that income which becomes available after 401(k) loans are repaid is projected disposable income which must be committed to the repayment of unsecured creditors, is also supported by two recent Court of Appeals’ decisions out of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. See Lasowski, 575 F.3d 815; Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258. Although these cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamilton v. Lanning, both courts used the forward-looking approach to determine that funds used to repay 401(k) loans constituted projected disposable income which must be used to pay unsecured creditors once the 401(k) loans were repaid. Because the Supreme Court has adopted the forward-looking approach as the proper method of determining projected disposable income for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)(B), the Panel finds the Fifth and Eighth Circuit cases persuasive.
In Nowlin, at the time of filing, the debtor was making contributions to her 401(k) plan in the amount of $1,062.51 and monthly 401(k) loan repayments in the amount of $1,134.79. The 401(k) loan would be repaid after two years. Debtor’s plan proposed continuing her 401 (k) contributions and loan repayments, but did not propose increasing her chapter 13 plan payments by $1,134.79 — the amount which would become available after she completed repayment of her 401(k) loan. The trustee objected to debtor’s proposed plan on the grounds that the plan did not comply with the projected disposable income *212requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) because it did not commit the funds which became available after the 401(k) loan was repaid to the payment of creditors. Nowlin, 576 F.3d at 260-61.
The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee’s objection and denied confirmation of debtor’s plan holding that the debtor’s failure to allocate ascertainable projected income to repayment of her creditors made her plan uneonfirmable under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court. The Fifth Circuit concluded its opinion by stating:
The parties in this case dispute whether bankruptcy courts may consider a future event that is reasonably certain to occur at the time of projecting the debtor’s disposable income. For the reasons stated, we conclude that bankruptcy courts may consider such events and adjust projections of disposable income accordingly. Because Nowlin’s proposed plan did not include all of her “projected disposable income” in payments to creditors following the repayment of her 401(k) loan, which was reasonably certain to occur on or before the twenty-fourth month of her sixty-month plan, the bankruptcy court properly denied confirmation under § 1325(b)(1).
Id. at 267.
In Lasowski, the debtor was making both a 401(k) loan payment and a regular 401(k) contribution at the time she filed for bankruptcy. The 401 (k) loan would be paid off within the first 13 months of her 60 month plan. The trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s plan contending that debtor’s failure to commit the additional income resulting from the repayment of her loans to her chapter 13 plan violated 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee’s objection and confirmed the plan. Lasowski, 575 F.3d at 818. The Eighth Circuit BAP reversed the bankruptcy court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Eighth Circuit BAP. The Court of Appeals stated:
The court in Nowlin thus affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation when a debtor’s plan failed to take into account the reasonably certain future termination of the debtor’s 401(k) loan repayments during the term of the debtor’s proposed plan. Similarly here, even if Lasowski is correct that it is appropriate for her to exclude the entire $150 she is currently repaying on her 401 (k) loans from her disposable income on Form 22C, the bankruptcy court could not ignore, when calculating projected disposable income, that these payments would reduce to $100 per month after six months and end completely after thirteen months. Only by taking into account this fact could the bankruptcy court’s determination of projected disposable income accurately reflect Lasowski’s ability to pay her unsecured creditors over the course of her plan.
Interpreting “projected disposable income” to recognize the reasonably certain future termination of loan repayments does not require Lasowski to propose a plan that changes the terms of her 401(k) loans. Nor does it deprive her of sufficient funds to repay the loans, for she is free to propose a tiered plan that increases payments to unsecured creditors after the 401 (k) payments have ceased.
Id. at 819, 820. The Court of Appeals reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of debtor’s plan and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court case of Hamilton v. Lanning, “projected *213disposable income” is based on a debtor’s circumstances at the time of confirmation as well as on “changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.” 130 S.Ct. at 2478. The courts in Nowlin and Lasowski both found that termination of 401 (k) loan payments during the life of a chapter 13 plan was a “reasonably certain future” event that must be considered in an analysis of a plan under § 1325(b)(1)(B). Lasowski, 575 F.3d at 820; Nowlin, 576 F.3d at 267. Consistent with these interpretations of “projected disposable income,” the Panel concludes that to obtain confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, debtors are required to commit the income which becomes available after their 401(k) loans are repaid to the payment of unsecured creditors.
The dissent strays far from the narrow ruling of the majority opinion. The dissent repeatedly argues that the majority opinion establishes an “irrebuttable presumption” that a debtor may never commence or increase contributions to a tax qualified retirement plan after confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan. The majority opinion creates no such presumption. The majority ruling only holds that 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) precludes confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan which provides as part of the plan, that income which becomes available after a 401(k) loan has been repaid, must be used to commence or increase contributions to a Qualified Plan. There is nothing in the majority opinion that would prevent a debtor from making an argument after confirmation that a change in debtor’s circumstances2 justified committing income to a Qualified Plan.
C. Good Faith
Finally, the Trustee contends that the Debtors have not proposed their plans in good faith because they could pay substantially more into their plans once their 401(k) loans are repaid, but instead are seeking solely to contribute to their 401(k) plans to the detriment of their unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court made no findings of fact on this issue. In light of the Panel’s conclusion that the Debtors’ proposed plans should not have been confirmed because they cannot commence making contributions to their 401(k) plans once the loans are repaid, the Panel need not reach the merits of the Trustee’s appeal on the issue of good faith.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, post-petition income which becomes available after a debtor repays a 401(k) loan is not excluded from property of the estate under § 541(a) and (b), is property of the estate in a chapter 13 case pursuant to § 1306(a), and is projected disposable income which must be committed to the chapter 13 plan pursuant to' § 1325(b)(1)(B). Once the Debtors, Seafort and Schuler, have repaid their 401(k) loans, the funds which become available must be committed to the plan for the repayment of unsecured creditors.
The bankruptcy court is reversed. These cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. The dissent argues that the majority ruling "unfairly discriminates against low income debtors in favor of high income debtors.” The dissent fails to provide any support for this conclusory statement. The majority notes that its ruling does not discriminate between high and low income filers. The opinion states only that debtors who are not making contributions on the date of filing cannot use income which becomes available after a 401(k) loan is repaid, to start making contributions to a retirement plan. The majority opinion does not either expand or nar*211row the availability of § 541(b)(7) and it does not discriminate against any class of debtors.
. For e.g., the loss of employment, In re Lavin, 424 B.R. 558 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2010); or where a debtor has a medical condition that might hasten their retirement, In re Jones, No. 07-10902, 2008 WL 4447041 (Bankr.D.Kan. Sept. 26, 2008); or where a debtor is required to make a mandatory percentage contribution as a condition of employment.