dissenting:
In my view, the majority commits two errors. First, it applies the principles of statutory construction to the interpretation of what is clearly not a statute. Second, even if those principles actually apply, the majority summarily invokes the principle of lenity while ignoring other principles that convincingly establish that the order of protection was intended to prohibit defendant’s entry onto Cathy’s land. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
At the risk of stating the obvious, a court order is not a statute. I do not deny that, in defining the offense of violating an order of protection, section 12 — 30 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 — 30 (West 2002)) makes reference to a court order; after all, prohibiting the violation of a court order without referring to a court order would be a difficult task indeed. This does not mean, however, that the court order becomes a part of the statute and thereby subject to the rules of statutory construction.
As the State points out, a court order is subject to its own rules of construction. “In determining whether there has been a violation of a court order, the order must be construed with reference to the context in which it was issued and the purpose for which it was requested.” Doe v. Lutz, 253 Ill. App. 3d 59, 64 (1993). The order “is to be interpreted in its entirety, taking into consideration other parts of the record, including the pleadings, the motions before the court, and the issues to be decided. [Citations.] [The] order should be construed reasonably so as to give effect to the discernable intent of the court.” People v. Ryan, 259 Ill. App. 3d 611, 613 (1994).
The majority asserts that these rules do not apply here because defendant was not found in contempt of court but rather was found in violation of section 12 — 30. I do not understand the difference that makes. No matter the nature of the proceedings, the issue is the interpretation of a court order, not a statute. Accordingly, I submit that we should invoke the rules that apply to the interpretation of a court order, not those that apply to the interpretation of a statute.
That said, the distinction makes little difference in this instance. The primary objective in interpreting anything is to ascertain the intent of its creator. See People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005) (statute); Ryan, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 613 (court order). As noted, when the thing is a court order, we must consider it in its entirety and in context to determine the intent of the court. However, when the thing is a statute, and when the provision at hand is ambiguous, we must do the same. That is, we must read in pari materia all the parts of the statutory scheme, to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby avoid injustice. See Kousins v. Anderson, 229 Ill. App. 3d 486, 492 (1992). I do not deny that, at least for our purposes, the provision here is ambiguous.1 Thus, whether we interpret this court order as a court order or as a statute, we must determine the court’s intent by reading the order as a whole.
In reading the order, as a whole, there is no doubt that the court prohibited defendant’s entry onto Cathy’s land. The order granted Cathy the exclusive possession of the residence, and it stated that the grant of such possession “constituted] notice forbidding trespass to land.” I understand that defendant was not charged with trespass to land. Nevertheless, the order informed defendant that his entry onto the land was forbidden. Thus, while “household of premises” is ambiguous as to whether defendant was prohibited from entering the house, the land, or both, that ambiguity vanishes when the order is read as a whole. Because the order otherwise prohibited defendant’s entry onto the land, defendant could not have reasonably interpreted “household of premises” to allow his entry onto the land. Such an interpretation clearly contravenes the court’s intent.
Needless to say, the majority does not read the order as a whole. Instead, it reads “household of premises” in a vacuum and summarily applies the principle of lenity. I first note that, on this point, the question of which rules of construction we apply might matter a great deal; although lenity certainly applies to the interpretation of a criminal statute, it does not necessarily apply to the interpretation of a court order. Cf. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 142 (2005) (questioning its application to a statute that is “civil in nature”). However, assuming that it does apply here, either because it applies generally to court orders or because the majority properly invokes the rules of construction of criminal statutes, “[i]t is well settled that this rule does not require a court to construe a statute ‘so rigidly *** as to defeat the intent of the legislature.’ ” Powell, 217 Ill. 2d at 142, quoting People v. Washington, 343 Ill. App. 3d 889, 903 (2003). In my view, the majority does exactly this. It reflexively adopts the lenient interpretation of “household of premises” when the application of other principles of construction, namely the rule that we must resolve the ambiguity by reading the order as a whole, convincingly establish the opposite intent.
Here, defendant entered onto Cathy’s land. He asserted that he did so to return Jessica and her many belongings at the end of a visitation. Doing so was not unreasonable, and arguably the order of protection allowed his entry for that limited purpose. However, he did more than that. According to his own testimony, he then decided to sit in Cathy’s driveway, putting reflectors on Jessica’s bicycle. In light of what I consider the proper interpretation of the order of protection, the jury was entitled to determine that defendant intentionally violated it.
I would affirm defendant’s conviction of violating an order of protection.
I say “at least for our purposes” because I share the State’s suspicion that the phrase “household of premises” was merely a drafting error. I am highly inclined to think that the form order used here was intended to state “household or premises,” which is a common phrase in orders of protection. See, e.g., People v. Priest, 297 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (1998). However, I do not propose to substitute my personal suspicion for established rules of construction, and I join in the majority’s suggestion that the circuit clerk amend the form to reflect whatever was intended.