dissenting. The majority holds that Fowler’s political opinions are relevant evidence in his prosecution for harassment. The majority does so by stating that a witness’s credibility is always an issue and by pointing out that proof of bias goes to credibility and is therefore admissible. The majority thus affirms the trial court’s decision to permit the prosecution to enquire into the defendant’s political beliefs in order to discredit his testimony that he did not follow the victim in his vehicle on October 9, 1997. In particular, the majority takes the position that Fowler’s beliefs regarding United States flags and miliary courts called into question his respect for the authority of the court. Thus, if he might question the court’s authority he might also not honor his oath as a witness to speak truthfully. The majority further holds that Fowler’s objection to the questioning failed to raise an issue of prejudice under Ark. R. Evid. 403. I disagree.
Evidence of bias is clearly admissible and for good reason. However, there are limits. Bias evidence, just like any other relevant evidence, is subject to limitations under Ark. R. Evid. 403, should an objection be made. The majority holds that Fowler failed to make this objection. I believe Fowler preserved objections to the evidence both as to its ultimate relevance and as to its potential prejudice under Rule 403.
As the majority quoted above, during Fowler’s cross-examination, Fowler’s attorney in his third of six objections to the line of questioning, stated:
Mr. Bryant: Objection, Your Honor, may I approach please?
The Court: You may.
Mr. Bryant: Your Honor, the only thing the Prosecutor is trying to do in this case is prejudice the Jury against my client because of his political beliefs. There’s no way this has anything to do with the ability to tell the truth or not. This is an outrageous attempt on the Prosecutor’s part to prejudice my client and I’d ask that he not be permitted to do that.
THE COURT: Well, you can narrow your question down to that particular issue which goes to credibility. I’m going to permit it but we need to narrow the scope of the inquiry and get on with it. All right. You may proceed.
The court then allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the questioning on the basis of credibility, in effect denying the objection.
While Fowler’s objection does not specifically cite Rule 403 as the basis for the objection, his objection clearly addresses “prejudice” as a ground for exclusion of the evidence. Specificity in making objections is important, but not-always essential.
Because the purpose of a trial objection is to avoid error, an objection to a question should be specific enough to inform the trial court of the particular problem, so that the court can realize what rule of evidence is being invoked, and why that rule would exclude a responsive answer, and can then rule intelhgendy thereon, and so that the party offering the testimony is given an opportunity to confront the- objection. ... But all that is required of any objection to evidence is that the objection be sufficiently clear and definite so that the court will understand the reason for the objection and so that the basis of the objection is apparent to the trial court. Thus, even if inartfully stated, the courts will allow an objection that apprises the trial court of the reason for the objection.
75 Am. JUR.2d Trial § 424 (1998). Accordingly, Fowler’s objection on the grounds of “prejudice” sufficed to alert the trial court that although possibly relevant, the evidence the prosecutor was attempting to elicit regarding Fowler’s political beliefs was substantially more prejudicial than probative. In addition, a specific ground for an objection need not be stated where the error is clear from the context. See Ark. R. Evid. 103; Thomson v. Littlefield, 319 Ark. 648, 893 S.W.2d 788 (1995). Because a sufficient objection was raised, we should review the prejudicial impact of the prosecutor’s line of questioning in this case.
As the majority noted, the United States Supreme Court considered the admissibility of similar evidence for bias purposes in Abel, supra, and under a Rule 403 analysis in Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). While the Court found that evidence of the tenets of the “Aryan Brotherhood” in Abel was properly developed, in Dawson, the Court found that it was reversible error to allow such information into evidence. The distinctions between Abel and Dawson are crucial. The instant case is much more similar to Dawson than to Abel.
In Abel, the defendant and two cohorts were indicted for bank robbery. At Abel’s trial, the prosecution called a witness who had also been a member of this gang. One of Abel’s witnesses, Mills, had testified that he had no knowledge of the gang or its tenets, and the prosecution then offered for rebuttal another gang member who testified that he, Abel, and Mills were all members of this gang. This witness testified that the gang had sworn to perjure themselves to protect one another. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the testimony could not be offered to show that Mills was lying because he was a member of the gang. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Abel’s and Mills’ membership in the gang was sufficiendy probative of Mills’ possible bias towards Abel to warrant its admission into evidence.
In the opinion, the Court discussed how bias applies to a witness’ testimony for or against a defendant. Because of the “common law of evidence” concept under which this testimony came in, the Court applied Rule 403 regarding the probative value of the evidence versus its prejudicial effect to determine in part whether the evidence was admissible to the issue at hand. The Court determined that its probative value outweighed its prejudice because of the common bond and shared beliefs Mills and Abel had through the gang in which they were involved, and specifically because these beliefs included a willingness to pegure themselves. Abel is also important because of the discussion the Court gave to the common membership that Abel and the two other witnesses shared. The Court specifically noted that “a witness’s and a party’s common membership in an organization, even without proof that the witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative of bias.” Abel, 469 U.S. at 52. Flowever, the Court qualified this broad statement by stating:
[T]he type of organization in which a witness and a party share membership may be relevant to show bias. If the organization is a loosely knit group having nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation, the inference of bias arising from common membership may be small or nonexistent. If the prosecutor had elicited that both respondent and Mills belonged to the Book of the Month Club, the jury probably would not have inferred bias even if the District Court had admitted the testimony. The attributes of the Aryan Brotherhood - a secret prison sect sworn to perjury and self-protection - bore direcdy not only on the fact of bias but also on the source and strength of Mills’ bias. The tenets of this group showed that Mills had a powerful motive to slant his testimony towards respondent, or even commit perjury outright.
Abel, 469 U.S. at 54.
By contrast, in Dawson, the Court reversed a first-degree murder sentence in the sentencing stage of trial based on the admission of a stipulation that Dawson was involved with the Aryan Brotherhood. The stipulation apparently proved only the group’s abstract beliefs without proving that the group had committed any unlawful conduct or violent acts. As such, the Court found that it was not relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstances, or to rebut any mitigating evidence because membership in the group, in and of itself, cannot be considered sinister. In Dawson, the Court, in essence, determined that the admission of the stipulation was more prejudicial than probative because the stipulation was not sufficient to prove any aggravating circumstances. There was no foundation for finding that membership in the Aryan Brotherhood in and of itself proved anything relevant. The Court stated:
Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had presented evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson’s part, but, on the present record, one is left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible. Because Delaware failed to do more, we cannot find the evidence was properly admitted as relevant character evidence.
Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167. However, in Abel, the prosecution laid the foundation by offering its own witness who was a member of the group who testified regarding the tenets of the group, including that they would lie for one another. The Court allowed that testimony in order to show that Mills, Abel’s witness, was possibly biased in Abel’s favor.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the group to which Fowler belonged espouses perjury in defense of other members before the courts. Nor is there any clear connection made between the witness’s abstract belief regarding indicia of court authority and a propensity for dishonesty. In fact, the record reflects very little about the group in question called “Community Improvement”. The prosecutor began with a general inquiry concerning the subject matter of the group’s meetings. He progressed to inquire into Fowler’s beliefs about constitutional documents, citizen’s rights, governmental abuses, the U.S. flag and concluded with a query about whether Fowler believed he was in a military court. On redirect, Fowler acknowledged his submission to the court’s jurisdiction and reaffirmed his obligation to speak truthfully. Certainly, Fowler and any alibi witness who testified that he was elsewhere during the commission of the offense was fair game for cross-examination. But, what little, if anything, the prosecution’s questions may have proved of bias was outweighed by the prejudice of stigmatizing Fowler as one with uncommon political beliefs. Those who have views, whether political, religious, moral, or philosophical, not generally embraced by the majority should not find those views so easily used to their detriment in our courts. Mr. Fowler may well have committed the offense for which he was charged and if so should endure the appropriate consequences. However, evidence of his abstract beliefs, without more than shown in the instant case, should not have been admitted into evidence. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Thornton, J., joins. GLAZE, J., dissents separately.