dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent to the reinstatement of the summary judgment in the lower court. Summary judgment is entirely inappropriate unless, “as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (1991). Here, there is evidence that a few minutes before the shooting, Isaacs verbally attacked Smith and Wilhoit, who were sitting a few feet behind Isaacs and his friend. Although the first incident attracted the attention of the club’s security force, Isaacs was not ejected, and, in fact, the club continued to serve Isaacs alcoholic beverages despite his obvious intoxication.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, and acknowledged by the majority herein, “the question of proximate cause is a factual one, not a legal one, depending upon whether the evidence shows that the results of misconduct are reasonably foreseeable.” Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1987). The majority does not disagree with the correctness of that statement, but *504rather, it “disagreed] that the results of the misconduct in this case were reasonably foreseeable by the establishment.” Similarly, in granting summary judgment in favor of the nightclub, the trial court concluded that, “as a matter of law ... reasonable minds could not disagree that it was clearly unforeseeable that by serving Mr. Isaac [sic], Camelot East created a foreseeable risk that he would remove a concealed weapon from his waistband and shoot Mr. Smith.”
With this conclusion, I cannot agree. While the majority has removed consideration of the instrumentality of the injury from the equation, it still concludes that further fueling Isaacs’ intoxication, given his prior behavior, did not create a foreseeable risk of the attack on Smith. In my mind, which I believe to be a reasonable one, it was not entirely unforeseeable that, by continuing to serve alcohol to an intoxicated customer who had already created one disturbance by harassing Smith and Wilhoit, the club created the risk that the belligerent customer might attempt to do harm to those with whom he had earlier quarreled.
We think it is clear that so far as foreseeability enters into the question of liability for negligence, it is not required that the particular, precise form of injury be foreseeable — it is sufficient if the probability of injury of some kind to persons within the natural range of effect of the alleged negligent act could be foreseen.
Miller v. Mills, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 520, 522 (1953) (citing Morton’s Adm’r v. Kentucky-Tennessee L. & P. Co., Ky., 282 Ky. 174, 138 S.W.2d 345 (1940); Dixon v. Ky. Utilities Co., Ky., 295 Ky. 32, 174 S.W.2d 19 (1943)).
Because I believe Smith presented sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Isaacs’ violent outburst was within the scope of the foreseeable risk of further serving alcohol to the intoxicated, hostile patron, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for farther proceedings.
LAMBERT, C.J., and WINTERSHEIMER, J., join this dissenting opinion.