dissenting. I dissent from the majority’s opinion as I believe that appellant’s prior 1988 convictions were properly admitted before the trial court pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). At trial, appellant defended his case by claiming that he was merely present in the vehicle that the police had searched. Appellant claimed that the drugs belonged to his passenger. Clearly, this defense raised issues of knowledge and intent. As a result, I believe that the trial court admitted appellant’s prior bad acts to allow the State to prove appellant’s knowledge and intent at the time of the traffic stop. See Johnson v. State, 333 Ark. 673, 972 S.W.2d 935 (1998). I suggest that appellant’s prior bad acts were admitted for a purpose other than proving his past bad character and the likelihood that his present behavior conformed to it.
To be admissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence must be similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged. See Bragg v. State, 328 Ark. 613, 946 S.W.2d 654 (1997). When admitted for the purpose of showing intent, the prior acts need not be duplicates, but must be sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal intent. United States v. Burkett, 821 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1987). In fact, the degree of similarity between the earlier crimes and the present one need not be striking. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001). I am convinced that appellant’s prior bad acts were sufficiently similar in kind to the offenses charged in this case. Here, appellant’s prior bad acts, possession and delivery of methamphetamine, involved the very type of crime involved in the instant offenses. The evidence of the prior convictions demonstrates appellant’s knowledge of the methamphetamine manufacturing process based upon his hands-on experience with the substance.
Prior bad acts and the current offenses must not be too separated in time or the evidence will be considered unduly remote. See United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied; Thompson v. United States, 519 U.S. 1139 (1997) (holding a seventeen-year conviction not too remote in time); United States v. Engelman, 648 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding thirteen-year-old offense not too remote in time); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993) (admitting thirteen-year-old threats made to ex-wife). The length of time between the incidents clearly affects the relevance of the offered evidence, but there is no specific number ofyears beyond which prior bad acts are no longer relevant to the issue of intent. See Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). The Eighth Circuit applies a reasonableness standard to determine whether a prior offense occurred within a relevant time frame for purposes of Rule 404(b). United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1998). In the case at bar, approximately fourteen years had elapsed between appellant’s 1988 convictions and his February 2002 arrest. As the Eighth Circuit has applied the reasonableness standard and deemed seventeen and thirteen-year-old offenses to be acceptable, see Thompson, supra; Engelman, supra, I believe that use of appellant’s fourteen-year-old convictions is also reasonable.
Finally, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Carter v. State, 295 Ark. 218, 748 S.W.2d 127 (1988). This determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. Here, appellant’s prior convictions and the present offenses involved the intent element relating to the illegal substances. Thus, the probative value of the prior convictions was high. Furthermore, I cannot say that the probative value was substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice as the trial court gave cautionary instructions when admitting the evidence.
Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may be admissible with a proper cautionary instruction by the court. Abernathy v. State, 325 Ark. 61, 925 S.W.2d 380 (1996). In this case, the trial court gave the jury two limiting instructions regarding the imper-missibility of considering appellant’s previous convictions as propensity evidence. I believe that the trial court carefully precluded the admission of certain possibly prejudicial aspects of appellant’s prior convictions. Based upon the foregoing analysis, I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the admission of the 1988 convictions for a limited and proper purpose.
Vaught, J., joins.