concurring.
It is well-settled Texas law that a judgment is void “only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., — S.W.3d -, -, No. 04-0269, 2006 WL 662740, at *4 (Tex. Mar. 17, 2006) (quoting Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990) (emphasis added)).
Here, it is readily apparent that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the July 16, 2006 judgment because appellee, Edward Jackson, did not send prior notice of the judgment to the executive director of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission as required by section 410.258 of the Texas Labor Code. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.258(a) (Vernon 2006) (party seeking judicial review of administrative decisions of orders concerning workers’ compensation must file proposed judgment by certified mail with Workers’ Compensation Commission not later than 30th day before court is scheduled to enter judgment.). A judgment entered or settlement approved without complying with the requirements of section 410.258 “is void.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.258(f) (Vernon 2006). A trial court obviously does not lose plenary power after entering such a void judgment.
Accordingly, in appellate cause number 01-04-01157-CV, I concur in the judgment of the court affirming the trial court’s October 4, 2004 judgment. I would further deny Metropolitan Transit Authority’s Petition For Writ of Mandamus, which was filed in cause number 01-04-01128-CV in “an excess of caution.”