dissenting.
Patricia Lenart suffered a mid-term termination of her employment because of her inadequate teaching performance, as documented by the school principal who communicated his findings to her. That for-cause termination was facially governed by the just-cause provision of the CNA which provides an arbitration remedy. Nevertheless, three of our colleagues have concluded that Lenart’s individual contract, providing for discharge on 60 days notice, *516trumps the CNA. I disagree. The only relevant issue is whether a fair reading of the CNA requires arbitration in these circumstances. If so, any contrary provision in the individual contract, however advantageous, must yield. Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354, 378, 774 A.2d 476 (2001) (noting collective agreements prevail over individual agreements and, when there is conflict, individual agreements may not be enforced). That is the gravamen of Article IV of the CNA: “If an individual contract contains any language inconsistent with this Agreement, this Agreement during its duration shall be controlling.” The reason is obvious. Collective agreements are designed “to supersede the possible terms of individual agreements of employers with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.” Lullo v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409, 428, 262 A.2d 681 (1970). Thus, any approach that favors an individual contract over a conflicting CNA provision would undermine the goals of collective negotiations and cannot be countenanced.
More importantly, our law has undergone a sea-change that compels arbitration here. In Camden Board of Education v. Alexander, a majority of this Court held that, under then-existing legal principles, there was no presumption in favor of arbitration when determining the scope of arbitrability in public-employee contracts. 181 N.J. 187, 203, 854 A.2d 342 (2004). Since that time, the Legislature has dramatically amended the controlling statute — N.J.S.A 34:13A~5.3 — to provide for a presumption in favor of public sector arbitration. See L. 2005, c. 380, § 1 (effective Jan. 12, 2006). The statute now explicitly contains such a presumption:
In interpreting the meaning and extent of a provision of a collective negotiation agreement providing for grievance arbitration, a court or agency shall be bound by a presumption in favor of arbitration. Doubts as to the scope of an arbitration clause shall be resolved in favor of requiring arbitration.
[N.J.S.A 34:13A-5.3 (emphasis added).]
That unequivocal command by our elected representatives requires that I break with our concurring colleagues in this case. This is precisely the situation contemplated by the words of the *517statute. Yet, our three colleagues fail to suggest how the instant facts overcome the presumption by which we are bound. The most that can be said of their parsing of the CNA and the individual contract is that it is one interpretation, but not the only one. An equally, if not more persuasive argument can be advanced to the contrary: that the CNA was negotiated in the face of the pre-existing Board policies; that it provides grievance arbitration for disciplinary actions; that a specific exclusion was negotiated for end-of-term non-renewals; that no such exclusion for mid-term dismissals for cause was negotiated; and that therefore the grievance arbitration procedure was intended to apply.
At the very least, doubt has arisen regarding the scope of arbitrability; therefore, that doubt must be resolved in favor of arbitration. The statutory command could not be clearer. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. Accordingly, I would resolve the dispute over Lenart’s mid-term contract termination by remanding the case for grievance arbitration.
Justices ALBIN and WALLACE join in this opinion.
For affirmance — Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO, and HOENS — 3.
For reversal — Justices LONG, ALBIN, and WALLACE — 3.