dissenting.
Since I believe the evidence in the record clearly establishes the existence of a valid and unpaid promissory note, I respectfully dissent. The record in the present case reveals that Yanoff held a valid purchase money mortgage, executed by Muncy, to secure a promissory note for $90,000. The record further reveals, and the parties agree, that Yanoffs mortgage had priority over the Trust’s lien and that Muncy had not completely paid the note. R. at 239, 266. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Yanoff is not entitled to recover any of the debt because Yanoff had not “established the balance owed on the mortgage” or the other terms of the promissory note. Slip op. at 6. I disagree.
As the majority notes, a party may enforce an instrument, even when he no longer has possession of it, provided he demonstrates the terms of the instrument and his right to enforce it. I.C. § 26-l-3.1-309(b). In the present ease, the majority determines that, notwithstanding the mortgage document, the amortization schedule and Muncy’s testimony, Yanoff failed to establish the terms of the note. Specifically, the majority relies on Muncy’s testimony that he made payments outside the amortization schedule to conclude that the balance on the note could not be accurately determined.
However, I believe that the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish the balance remaining on the loan. It is undisputed that the mortgage in the present case secured a $90,000 promissory note from Muncy to Yanoff, which was to be re-paid over 120 months. According to Muncy, the annual interest rate on the note was 10 percent. R. at 257. At the hearing, Muncy also testified, and his amortization schedule shows, that he began making monthly payments of $1,189.36 on the promissory note in June, 1989. R. at 250, 280 Before defaulting, he made seventy-one monthly payments on the note, leaving a balance of $47,685.79. R. at 274, 280. Additionally, Muncy testified that he made principal payments on the note of $5,000 in August, 1990, and $10,000 in April, 1991.3 R. at 254, 280. Nothing in the record indicates that Muncy paid off the *771remainder of the note.4 In sum, the evidence clearly establishes the beginning balance of the note, the interest rate, the number and amount of payments and the dates of the payments. As a result, the trial court was able to determine the minimum balance owed on the promissory note and should have awarded Yanoff that amount.5
In the interests of justice, this court has often said that form should not be exalted over substance. See, e.g., Binninger v. Hendricks County Bd. of Zoning Comm’rs, 668 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (“Rather than exalt form over substance, this Court will uphold its long-standing policy that ... justice should not be defeated by technicalities”). By acknowledging the existence of a valid debt, but denying Yanoff recovery on the grounds that he has not established its exact terms, the majority does precisely that. I would reverse the judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate the interest and principal due on the promissory note and find a priority in favor of Yanoff in such an amount.
. Although Yanoff contests whether Muncy made all the claimed principal payments, he presented no evidence to dispute Muncy’s testimony. Therefore, for purposes of computing the minimum balance remaining on the note, I presume that Muncy made all the payments to which he testified.
. Muncy also claims that he is due a credit against the debt for $15,900 in expenses he paid for roof and ceiling repairs. However, while Muncy testified that Yanoff agreed to reduce his debt for roof repairs, he admitted that Yanoff did not agree to credit his account for ceiling repairs. R. at 269. Additionally, according to the mortgage, Muncy agreed to "maintain the property in its present condition of repair....” R. at 236. Due to this conflicting evidence, whether Muncy would be entitled to a credit for the roof and ceiling repairs is a question for the fact-finder.
. I also note that prior to the foreclosure hearing, Muncy and Yanoff entered into an agreed judgment, which the trial court approved on January 12, 1996, in which Muncy admitted that he still owed Yanoff $45,000 on the promissory note, $2,500 in attorney fees and $3,600.28 in real estate taxes. R. at 154-156. Although the trial court later determined that the Trust was not a party to the agreement and, therefore, not bound by its terms, Muncy was a party to the court-approved agreement. As a result, I would find that Muncy was estopped from testifying that he was not sure of the balance on the note or suggesting that he was due further credits because his assertions were contrary to his admissions in the court-approved judgment. See Abex Corp. v. Vehling, 443 N.E.2d 1248, 1255 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (seller estopped from denying that it entered into a binding agreement with buyers since seller contended in its complaint that buyers breached contract). However, even assuming that the agreed judgment was inadmissible, the evidence in the present case is sufficient to calculate the minimum balance owed on the note.