(dissenting). I agree that there was error with respect to the back pay order, but I cannot agree with the majority that the complaint of the commission did not give the VeederRoot Company, hereinafter called the plaintiff, actual notice that the commission was attacking department-wide discrimination.
The commission began this proceeding by transmitting Hilda Moe’s complaint, as more fully set forth in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, to the plaintiff. In her complaint, Hilda Moe specifically alleged department-wide discrimination by stating: (1) that on January 22, 1969, she asked the general manager of her department “why woman assemblers in my department were doing the same jobs as the men assemblers” yet were receiving less pay; (2) that the general manager “stated that there were a lot of things that men were supposed to do that women weren’t doing” but that “the things he then mentioned I [Hilda Moe] have not seen men doing”; (3) that the general manager refused to show her *334the men’s job classification after she had requested to see it; (4) that the men in her department were not doing “any different work than the women” were; (5) that in 1965 she had asked her supervisor when women would start getting the same pay as men, and that her supervisor replied, after consultation with a superior, that “[t]his company isn’t ready to pay women the same as men.”
The majority states that the complaint, fairly read, “was directed solely at sex discrimination as applied only to Hilda Moe,” because her complaint concluded with this statement: “On the basis of these two incidents and my past experience in this company, I feel I am being discriminated against because of my sex (female).”
Considering the complaint as a whole, the majority places undue emphasis on Mrs. Moe’s statement of personal aggrievement. This statement satisfies merely the requirement of § 31-127 that only those persons “claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unfair employment practice” may file a complaint with the commission. The rest of the complaint unequivocally alleges department-wide sex discrimination. As the hearing tribunal concluded, “by the filing of such complaint the Respondent was placed on notice of discrimination on the basis of sex, both as a result of the differential in pay, and with regard to the job classification system and as a result of her past experience in this Company. . . . [T]he scope of the charges include [sic] not only the differential in pay, but also attack [sic] the discriminatory system in effect at Veeder Root, and as such system was applied to Hilda Moe.”
Nine days of hearing were held in this ease, resulting in a transcript of over 700 pages. From the *335record, it is apparent that the hearing was geared to the issue of whether the plaintiff had maintained a department-wide classification system which discriminated on the basis of sex. This fact was understood by counsel for the plaintiff, who said in his opening statement: “What the Commission has to prove here to prevail is really a very narrow issue. They have to prove that the job of Assembler, Grade A, the lower rated job, has substantially the same amount of skill, effort and responsibility involved as the higher labor grade. ... We intend to demonstrate . . . that the jobs are far from the same as far as skill, effort and responsibility are concerned.”
Thus, much evidence was introduced pertaining to department-wide discrimination. Five women, assemblers A, testified to the substantial similarity of their jobs to the jobs of male assemblers B. Documentary evidence to the same effect was also received. The plaintiff produced evidence to show that the job classification system was bona fide. Moreover, the members of the hearing tribunal personally inspected department 99 in order to observe all the employees at work.
The plaintiff has not claimed that any of this evidence was irrelevant to the issues as limited by the complaint, nor has it ever made any objection to this evidence as being beyond the scope of the complaint. Moreover, at no time did the plaintiff request further specificity with respect to the charges. Bather, the plaintiff itself introduced evidence regarding its classification system in its defense.
Given the allegations of the complaint and the broad statutory powers vested in the commission by § 31-127 to proceed against any and all unfair labor *336practices, the failure of the plaintiff to seek to clarify the scope of the proceeding strongly suggests that it was aware that its job classification system was under attack. Indeed, neither in its brief to this court nor in its appeal to the Superior Court has the plaintiff ever claimed that it did not have adequate notice. It has argued only that notice should have been given to persons other than itself. This omission reinforces the conclusion that the plaintiff was on notice from the date of the complaint that its practice of department-wide sex discrimination was being challenged.
I believe that the conclusions of the majority run counter to the express provisions of the statute as well as the record. The commission on human rights and opportunities is the creature of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practice Act, §§ 31-122— 31-128 of the General Statutes. A reading of the express and unambiguous language of the act demonstrates that the commission acted properly in challenging department-wide sex discrimination. Section 31-1271 provides that on receiving the complaint *337of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unfair employment practice the commission may issue a complaint against that practice. The statute commands the commission to grant whatever relief is necessary to seek out and eliminate the discriminatory practices alleged. Mrs. Moe, however deserving of relief she personally may have been, was merely incidental to the main thrust of the action of the commission in this case. The commission is primarily authorized to seek the elimination of public wrongs, not the vindication of private rights. Indeed, Mrs. Moe was not even a party to this action. In fact, a different statute governs private actions for back pay in eases of sex discrimination. See General Statutes § 31-76. Pre*338sented with allegations of department-wide discrimination, the commission would have ignored its statutory responsibility had it merely sought to redress the individual grievance of Mrs. Moe.
For these reasons I dissent.
“[General Statutes] See. 31-127. procedure. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unfair employment practice may . . . file with the commission a complaint in writing under oath, which shall ... set forth the particulars thereof .... After the filing of any complaint, the chairman of the commission shall refer the same to a commissioner or investigator to make prompt preliminary investigation of such complaint and, if such commissioner or investigator determines after such preliminary investigation that there is reasonable cause for believing that an unfair employment practice has been or is being committed as alleged in such complaint he shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the unfair employment practice ... by conference, conciliation and persuasion. ... In case of failure to eliminate such practice, the investigator . . . shall certify the complaint and the results of his investigation to the chairman of the commission and to the attorney general. The chairman of the commission shall thereupon appoint a hearing tribunal of three members of the commission ... to hear such complaint and shall *337cause to be issued and served in the name of the commission a written notice, together with a copy of such complaint, . . . requiring the . . . employer . . . named in such complaint ... to answer the charges of such complaint at a hearing before such tribunal .... The case in support of the complaint shall be presented at the hearing by the attorney general, who shall be counsel for the commission .... The respondent may file a written answer to the complaint and appear at such hearing in person or otherwise, with or without counsel, and submit testimony and be fully heard. . . . If, upon all the evidence, the tribunal finds that a respondent has engaged in any unfair employment practice, it shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and file with the commission and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unfair employment practice and further requiring such respondent to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay, or restoration to membership in any respondent labor organization, as in the judgment of the tribunal will effectuate the purpose of this chapter. If, upon all the evidence, the tribunal finds that the respondent has not engaged in any alleged unfair employment practice, it shall state its findings of fact and shall similarly issue and file an order dismissing the complaint. The commission shall establish rules of practice to govern, expedite and effectuate the foregoing procedure. Any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed within ninety days after the alleged act of discrimination.”