concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with that portion of the Court’s opinion that refuses to recognize or enforce the Dominican Republic divorce decree, for the reasons explained below I respectfully dissent from those portions of the Court’s opinion that address whether the plaintiff-husband was estopped to challenge the Family Court’s jurisdiction to hear and grant the defendant-wife’s application for a temporary restraining order and whether the Family Court properly, found him in contempt of that restraining order.
I
Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court holds that by filing for divorce here and swearing that he was a domiciled resident of Rhode Island for more than a year before initiating his divorce complaint, the plaintiff-husband was thereby “estopped from now challenging the jurisdiction of the Family Court of Rhode Island over * * * the subject matter of this controversy.” But because the husband’s actual domicile and residence immediately prior to his military posting to Rhode Island were in Illinois, the Family Court could not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his divorce complaint based upon either his false allegations of having been a domiciled inhabitant of Rhode Island or upon his wife’s domicile and residence here. See G.L.1956 § 15-5-12(a) (providing that the pre-service residence and domicile of any persons serving in the armed forces or merchant marine shall continue as their domicile and residence during their time of service). Moreover, the Family Court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the husband’s divorce complaint cannot be waived. Thus, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff-husband waived his right to challenge the Family Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over his divorce complaint, a determination that runs afoul of our own settled jurisprudence on this issue.
As I read § 15-5-12,2 satisfaction of the domicile and residence requirements of that statute are essential prerequisites to the Family Court’s ability to exercise its *741subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce complaints. Thus, a divorce plaintiffs satisfaction of these basic prerequisites for entertaining a divorce complaint cannot be waived. Cf. Coone v. Coone, 74 R.I. 232, 59 A.2d 850 (1948) (holding that husband whose only residence in Rhode Island was prompted by military posting could not avail himself of the statute’s jurisdictional grant, which was meant to apply only to those whose actual residence was in the state before their military service).
Section 15-5-12(a) confers subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Family Court over divorce complaints only when certain residence requirements are satisfied. As this Court has repeatedly held, “[a] challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction questions the very power of the court to hear the case. * * * [Such] a claim may not be waived by any party and may be raised at any time in the proceedings.” Pine v. Clark, 636 A.2d 1319, 1321 (R.I.1994). See also Kretzer v. Kretzer, 506 A.2d 81, 82 (R.I.1986) (holding that because “subject-matter jurisdiction is an indispensable ingredient of any judicial proceeding, it can be raised by the court sua sponte at any time, and it can be neither waived nor conferred by consent of the parties”). Thus, because the plaintiff-husband was not, in fact, a domiciled resident of Rhode Island, but of Illinois (where he resided immediately prior to his military posting to Rhode Island),3 the Family Court lacked jurisdiction over the wife’s request for a restraining order before she had filed and served her own counterclaim for divorce. And because the Family Court conducted no separate hearing before entering the restraining order in July 1997, the only basis for its entry of that order was a restraining-order application and hearing that occurred in June, before the court properly acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute via the wife’s counterclaim. As a result, the court improperly entered the restraining order, and thus, it could not have found the husband in contempt of that invalid order. Moreover, the husband retained the right at any time to challenge the Family Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in this case because the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court cannot be waived by the parties.
II
The Contempt Judgment
I also disagree with the majority’s determination that the Family Court did not err when it found the husband in contempt of the court’s restraining order barring him from proceeding with the Dominican Republic divorce petition. First, as previously discussed, the restraining order itself was invalid because it should not have entered at all based upon a hearing that occurred .before the court properly acquired jurisdiction over this dispute. Thus, the husband never should have been adjudged in contempt of an unlawful decree. See Durfee v. Ocean State Steel, Inc., 636 A.2d 698, 704 (R.I.1994) (stating that “ ‘[c]ivil contempt * * * is established when it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that a lawful decree was violated’ ”) (emphasis added). Second, in a contempt proceeding, the burden of proof is on the complainant to prove contempt, not on the alleged contemnor to prove he or she has not violated a court order. See Williams v. Williams, 429 A.2d 450, 454 (R.I.1981) (holding that “a complainant who seeks to invoke the court’s contempt power must make a prima facie showing of contempt by introducing proof * * * ”). And the burden of proof is a heavy one: that is, “ ‘clear and convincing evidence *742that a lawful decree was violated.’ ” Durfee, 636 A.2d at 704.
In this case, the Family Court found that the husband was in contempt of its restraining order barring him from pursuing the Dominican Republic divorce because, even though he obtained that divorce decree before it entered the restraining order, the husband let the Dominican Republic decree-, become final without taking any affirmative steps to prevent this event from occurring. According to the majority, “the record is silent and his appellate counsel was unable to assure us that no one acting on Paul’s behalf took any steps to secure the entry of the final decree.” The law of contempt is clear, however, that the burden was not on the husband but on the moving party (the wife) to show by clear and convincing evidence that the husband had acted to obtain the Dominican Republic divorce after the issuance of the restraining order. Id. A mere absence of proof on the husband’s part that no one acting on his behalf took any affirmative steps to enter the final decree was insufficient to find him in contempt, nor should he have been held in contempt merely by doing nothing and allowing the decree to become final. His conduct may well have been contemptible, but it was not contemptuous of the Family Court’s specific restraining order.
Conclusion
For these reasons, I would vacate the Family Court’s contempt judgment because it not only lacked the requisite evidence to find the husband in contempt, but it also lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the restraining-order application that formed the basis for the contempt finding. I would then remand this ease for further proceedings on the wife’s divorce petition.
. General Laws 1956 § 15 — 5—12(a) provides as follows: • -
“Domicile and residence requirements.— (a) No complaint for divorce from the bond of marriage shall be granted unless the plaintiff shall have been a domiciled inhabitant of this state and have resided in this state for a period of one year next before the filing of the complaint; provided, that if the defendant shall have been a domiciled inhabitant of this state and shall have resided in this state for the period of one year next before the filing of the complaint, and shall actually be served with process, the above requirement as to domicile and residence on the part of the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been satisfied and fulfilled; provided, however, the residence and domicile of any person immediately prior to the commencement of his or her active service as a member of the armed forces or of the merchant marine of the United States, or immediately prior to his or her absence from the state in the performance of services in connection with military operations as defined in subsection (c), shall, for the purposes of this section, continue to be his or her residence and domicile during the time of his or her service and for a period of thirty (30) days thereafter. Testimony to prove domicile and residence may be received through the ex parte affidavit of one (1) witness.”
. The mere fact that the husband swore to his residency in Rhode Island in his divorce complaint should not prevent him from showing that his assertion of a Rhode Island domicile was mistaken, and/or contrary to supervening federal law. Indeed, the military-service provisions of § 15-5-12(a) precluded the husband from filing for a divorce in this state because at all times material to this case he was still a domiciled resident of Illinois notwithstanding his military posting to Rhode Island.