dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because Richard Gmerek and Charles Artz (Petitioners) have not met their burden to prove that the Lobbying Disclosure Act (the Lobbying Act), 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1303-1311, is unconstitutional and because the Majority’s reasoning is flawed, I cannot join the opinion of the Majority.
Our beginning point must be that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 263, 269 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). If a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which renders it constitutional and one of which renders it unconstitutional, we must construe it so as to render it constitutional. Prichard v. School District of Willistown Township, 394 Pa. 489, 147 A.2d 380 (1959); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 689 A.2d 974, 985 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997)(“the court notes that it is compelled to construe a statute in a manner which is constitutional.”). Petitioners here mount a challenge to the constitutionality of the Lobbying Act, arguing that the Lobbying Act violates the separation of powers because it necessarily regulates the practice of law, contrary to the Supreme Court’s exclusive right to do so. See Petitioners’ Petition for Review at ¶¶ 27-30. Thus, the Petitioners must therefore show that the Lobbying Act necessarily regulates the practice of law.
Petitioners allege that the Lobbying Act is unconstitutional because its provisions violate the constitutional separation of powers by infringing on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys. The Petitioners concede that the General Assembly may supplement but not supplant the Supreme Court’s rules governing the conduct of attorneys engaged in the private practice of law. Petitioners’ Brief in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Petrs. Main Brief) at p. 16. The Petitioners further allege that specific provisions of the Lobbying Act supplant rather than supplement the rules governing the conduct of attorneys. This concession by Petitioners, that the General Assembly may supplement but not supplant the Supreme Court’s rules governing the conduct of attorneys and the rule of construction that we must interpret statutes if possible in such a way as to render them constitutional, English v. School District of Robinson, 358 Pa. 45, 54, 55 A.2d 803, 809 (1947) establishes the Petitioners’ burden of proof herein. That burden is to prove that the Lobbying Act supplants the Supreme Court’s rules governing attorney conduct, i.e., that the Lobbying Act is irreconcilable with or contrary to the Supreme Court’s rules.
The Supreme Court’s rules governing the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice in the bar of this Commonwealth are the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made effective April 1, 1988. 204 Pa.Code § 81.4
Petitioners point directly to Section 1309 of the Lobbying Act and assert that it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s sole power to discipline attorneys. Section 1309 of the Lobbying Act is entitled “Penalties” and provides that failures to comply with the Lobbying Act can include civil fines and penalties including prohibitions on lobbying for up to five years. Section 1309(e) provides that intentional violations of the Act subject a lobbyist to being prosecuted for a misdemeanor of up to the third degree. Petitioners argue that Section 1309 purports to empower the State Ethics Commission to decide who may practice law as a lobbyist. Petrs. Main Brief at p. 24.
Petitioners’ contention is readily answered by P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 555 Pa. 149, 723 A.2d *1266174 (1999), wherein the Supreme Court made clear that a law which does not specifically aim at regulating the class of attorneys and which makes certain actions illegal for all individuals some of whom may be attorneys does not infringe on the Supreme Court’s right to discipline attorneys. Here, Petitioners are essentially arguing that because of their status as attorneys, they must be exempt from having to comply with the Lobbying Act because it regulates the practice of law. I fail to see how Petitioners’ argument is, in any legally significant way, different than the appellant’s argument in P.J.S. The appellant in P.J.S. was a solicitor for a city and also conducted a private law practice. In his private law practice, he agreed to represent the city’s insurer in a private tort suit filed against the city. The State Ethics Commission launched an investigation against the appellant based upon a potential conflict of interest between his role as solicitor and his private representation of the city’s insurance company in the tort suit. The appellant sought a declaratory judgment that the Ethics Commission’s investigation of and its application of the Ethics Act to him violated the separation of powers because the Ethics Act and the Ethics Commission’s actions sought to regulate appellant’s conduct as an attorney. The Supreme Court rejected appellant’s contention and stated: “[t]o hold, as appellant suggests, that the mere status of ‘attorney’ exempts one from meeting the necessary professional regulations which flow from whatever position one holds in addition to that of an ‘attorney’ is absurd.” P.J.S., 555 Pa. at 158, 723 A.2d at 178.
Petitioners’ argument here is the same as was appellant’s argument in P.J.S. Moreover, Petitioners’ argument that prohibiting them from lobbying will, in effect, end their practice of law because it will end their lobbying is unpersuasive. It assumes, without demonstrating how, their practice of law, the conducting of legal analysis and the rendering of legal opinions and advising clients based thereon will be ended simply because they cannot provide gifts or gratuities to legislators and agency personnel or directly communicate with such persons or indirectly communicate with those persons for the purpose of influencing them to take legislative or administrative action (which by definition does not include adjudicative action) See 65 Pa.C.S. § 1303 (defining lobbying and direct and indirect communication and administrative action). The attorney who lobbies is no different than an attorney who, being both a realtor and a lawyer, is disciplined by the Board of Realtors and is prohibited from practicing as a realtor. Such an attorney-realtor would not be heard to complain that his or her legal practice as a realtor- has been terminated by the Board of Realtors in contravention of the Supreme Court’s authority to discipline him or her. The Commission’s potential disciplining of a lobbyist who also happens to be an attorney does not necessarily prevent such an attorney who acts as a lobbyist from appearing before adjudicative bodies, from being hired to offer legal opinions or legal analysis, or from preparing legal documents. Instead, the Lobbying Act only prohibits lobbying as that activity is defined therein. Therefore, the Commission’s ability to discipline lobbyists does not infringe on the Supreme Court’s right to discipline attorneys.1 1
*1267The Majority reasons that there are acts that may be performed by lawyers and non-lawyers, viz., vindicating the right of one to petition the government. When performed by lawyers these neutral acts become the practice of law and are therefore solely within the province of the Supreme Court to regulate because these acts constitute the practice of law. Thus, the legislature’s attempt to regulate the performance of these neutral acts when performed by lawyers constitutes an infringement on the Supreme Court’s exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law and hence violates the separation of powers. The Majority includes in the definition of vindicating the right of petitioning the government when performed by attorneys, the utilizing of technical competence to analyze legal problems and the instructing and advising of clients in regard to the law so that the clients may properly pursue their affairs and be informed of their rights and obligations. Maj. op. at p. 1259. I would readily concede that such activities by attorneys constitute the practice of law. But the Majority fails to inform us as to how these activities are covered by the Lobbying Act. The Majority simply ignores the definition of lobbying which is what the Lobbying Act at issue covers.2 The Majority fails to *1268demonstrate how a lawyer’s providing a legal opinion to a client as to the legality of proposed regulations or the meaning of- a law or a proposed law and the lawyer’s advice to the client as to the client’s righte to petition the government is a “direct communication” to a state employee or official or is an “indirect communication” i.e., an effort to encourage the client to take action, the purpose or foreseeable effect of which is to directly influence legislative action or administrative action. See Section 1303 of the Act defining lobbying and direct communication and indirect communication. The Majority seems to hold that a lawyer’s mere providing of legal information or legal analysis is, as a matter of law, to be deemed to be an effort to encourage the client to take action and thus constitutes lobbying. In doing so, the Majority fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that the Lobbying Act specifically provides that “[t]his chapter is not intended to govern professional activities which do not include lobbying and which are properly the subject of regulation by the judicial branch of government....” Section 1302(b).
Thus, the Majority has simply failed to demonstrate that the Lobbying Act regulates the practice of law. But even if the Lobbying Act did incidentally regulate -the practice of law, it does not follow that such incidental regulation of the practice of law is unconstitutional. For “the doctrine of separation of powers does not contemplate total separation of the three branches of government, and some powers may overlap. The lines of division are often indeterminate and incapable of exact definition.” Grant v. GAF, Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 137, 608 A.2d 1047, 1060 (1992), aff'd, 536 Pa. 429, 639 A.2d 1170 (1994), citing Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977); Lloyd v. Fishinger, 529 Pa. 513, 605 A.2d 1193 (1992). Thus, even if the Lobbying Act incidentally regulates the conduct of an attorney in the practice of law, it does not necessarily follow that the Act is unconstitutional. In P.J.S., the lawyer at issue therein was being investigated by the Ethics Commission for a violation of the Ethics Act for representing the insurer of the city in a tort suit while at the same time acting as a solicitor for the city. The lawyer’s conduct which the Commission sought to investigate and regulate in P.J.S., was, unlike here, unquestionably and quintessentially the practice of law, i.e., representing clients before an adjudicative body. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in P.J.S. that such did not infringe on the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, reasoning that
[t]he jurisdiction of this court is exclusive in the sense that it applies equally to all members of the Bar of Pennsylvania. The exclusive jurisdiction of this court is infringed when another branch of government attempts to regulate the conduct of attorneys merely because of their status as attorneys. However, the jurisdiction of this court is not infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those persons happen to be attorneys.
P.J.S., 555 Pa. at 158, 723 A.2d at 178. Nothing could be clearer than that holding and the fact that the Lobbying Act is a regulation aimed at conduct applied to all persons where some of those persons happen to be attorneys. Thus, as in P.J.S., the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to govern attorneys is not infringed here.
*1269Petitioners also argue that Section 1307 of the Lobbying Act conflicts with RPC Rule 1.5(c). Section 1307(a)(1) prohibits anyone from compensating a lobbyist, principal or an individual to engage in lobbying contingent in whole or in part upon any of the following: “(i) Passage or defeat, or approval or veto, of legislation, (ii) Occurrence or nonoccurrence of an administrative action.” Section 1307(a)(2) prohibits any lobbyist or principal or individual from agreeing to engage in lobbying contingent in whole or in part on the above two bases. Rule 1.5(c) of the RPC provides that “A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) [not relevant here] or other law.” (emphasis added). Petitioners maintain that the Lobbying Act is in conflict with the RPC inasmuch as contingent fees which are permitted by the RPC are forbidden by the Lobbying Act. However, a simple reading of the two texts reveal that they are not in conflict. The Supreme Court’s language in Rule 1.5(c) specifically contemplates that other law may regulate contingent fee agreements. Section 1307 of the Lobbying Act is just such law. As Section 1307 of the Lobbying Act does not supplant Rule 1.5(c), it does not unconstitutionally infringe on the Supreme Court’s power to regulate attorneys.
Petitioners’ reliance on Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d 1291 (1984) is misplaced. In Heller, we held that the statute at issue therein, which purported to regulate the fees of plaintiffs’ attorneys in medical malpractice actions was unconstitutional. However, Rule 1.5(c) with its provisions that explicitly contemplates that other laws may govern contingent fees was not in effect at the time. Rather, the Code of Professional Responsibility contained the operative rules governing attorney conduct at the time of the Heller decision. This Court in Heller did not reference any section of the Code of Professional Responsibility which parallels Rule 1.5(c) providing that “other law” may also govern fees of attorneys, and thus, Heller which did not address the issue of whether statutory provisions governing contingent fees is irreconcilable with Rule 1.5(c) is not controlling here.3 Thus, Petitioners have not met their burden to prove the Lobbying Act supplants the Supreme Court’s rules governing the ethical conduct of attorneys.
Next Petitioners take issue with Section 1305(c) of the Lobbying Act which requires that a “registrant [i.e., a registered lobbyist or registered principal] shall retain all documents reasonably necessary to substantiate the reports to be made under this section for four years from the date of filing the subject report.... [which] shall be made available for inspection” upon request by the Attorney General or the State Ethics Commission. The reports which Section 1305(c) refers to are explained in Section 1305(b). These reports require that a principal in the first instance and a lobbyist, if the principal fails to do so, file quarterly reports listing the names of all lobbyists by whom the lobbying is done, and the general subject matter being lob*1270bied plus a single aggregate good faith estimate of the total amount spent for personnel and office expenses related to lobbying plus the names and positions and each occurrence when a State official or employee receives from a principal or lobbyist anything of value. See generally Section 1305(b). Furthermore, a lobbyist must sign the report which was prepared by a principal attesting to the validity of the report to the best of the lobbyist’s knowledge. Section 1305(b)(4). A lobbyist shall submit a separate report if the lobbyist engaged in lobbying activities which were not contained in the reports filed by the principal. Section 1305(b)(6).
The Petitioners allege that “[g]iven that these reports require the attorney lobbyist to disclose the identity of the client, expense reports, and the ‘general subject matter or issue being lobbied’.. .the documents that an attorney can be compelled to disclose include all of the substantive communications between attorney and client concerning the subject matter being lobbied.” Petrs. Main Brief at p. 20. Petitioners allege that the requirement to keep such records as may be necessary to support the reports violate Rule 1.6 of the RPC which provides that a “lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures which are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation....” Petitioners allege that the attorney client privilege is violated by the Lobbying Act.
However, Petitioners fail to take cognizance of the fact that the administrative rules which interpret the Lobbying Act specifically provide that “the following need not be reported: ... (iii) The specific contents of any communication or the identity of those with whom the communications take place, (iv) The contents of privileged communications, such as those between attorney and client or doctor and patient.” 51 Pa.Code § 35.1(g)(iii-iv).4 Moreover, the Lobbying Act permits lobbyists to maintain their records of lobbying separate from records of their other professional activities.' 51 Pa.Code § 35.2(b). Thus, the Lobbying Act does not require Petitioners to break the attorney-client privilege nor does it necessarily conflict with Rule 1.6 of the RPC. To the extent that Rule 1.6 requires that a lawyer keep all information regarding the representation of a client confidential, such rule permits disclosures which are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. In situations where a client is retaining an attorney to act as a lobbyist, given the Lobbyist Act, the client must, be impliedly authorizing disclosure of that information and only that information which is necessary to comply with the Lobbyist Act but only to the extent that such does not violate the attorney client privilege. Moreover the Comment to RPC 1.6 provides that a “lawyer may not disclose such information [relating to representation of a client] except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” (emphasis added). Here the Lobbying Act is such other law requiring the limited disclosure of some information relating to the representation of a client. Furthermore, Rule 1.6(c) of the RPC specifically provides that a
lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the representation of a client] to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
*1271(2) to prevent or rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer’s services are being or had been used.
The Lobbying Act requires a principal to disclose his employment of a lobbyist and the amounts paid for the lobbyist, and in the event that the principal fails to do so, the lobbyist is required to do so. To the extent that the principal’s failure to comply with the Lobbying Act is fraudulent or criminal, Rule 1.6(c) permits the lawyer-lobbyist to reveal that which the Lobbying Act requires. The Petitioners’ attack specifically focuses on the requirement of Section 1305(c) to keep records which could substantiate the reports required to be made by the Lobbying Act. The documents necessary to substantiate the reports required seem to be composed of billing statements and invoices. Thus, disclosure of such would not violate the attorney client privilege and does not necessarily conflict with Rule 1.6 of the RPC. See Leach v. Quality Health Services, 162 F.R.D. 499 (E.D.Pa.l995)(lawyers’ billing records are not generally within the attorney client privilege); Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir.1940)(identity of client of an attorney is not privileged); United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F.Supp. 361 (W.D.Pa.1975)(same). To the extent that there is any question regarding whether a particular document is required to be produced and whether it falls within the attorney client privilege, the Lobbying Act does not bar the assertion of the privilege and thus the question may be litigated.5 Again, because Petitioners fail to show that the Lobbying Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct are irreconcilable, this issue does not provide a basis upon which to declare the Lobbying Act unconstitutional.6
Notwithstanding the fact that Petitioners have utterly failed to carry their burden of proving that the Lobbying Act is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s rules governing attorneys, the Majority declares the Lobbying Act unconstitutional. Because the Majority errs in its logic in doing so, I cannot join the Majority opinion and do, therefore, dissent.
President Judge DOYLE and Judge LEADBETTER join this dissent.. My position here is not at odds with my position in Shaulis v. State Ethics Commission, 739 A.2d 1091 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), wherein I joined Judge McGinley’s concurring and dissenting opinion. Therein Judge McGinley reasoned that Shaulis was being deprived of her right to practice law in contravention of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to supervise the practice of law, because the Commission purported to prevent her from acting as a legal advocate in quasi-judicial proceedings before the agency she was formerly employed by. While the practice of law may not be susceptible of ready definition, I think that the practice of law of necessity encompasses the appearance by a licensed attorney in a representative capacity before an adjudicative body (as opposed to a policy milking body) on behalf of a client. It is not as clear to me that the appearance of a *1267licensed attorney before a policy making body encompasses the practice of law such as to infringe on the Supreme Court's authority to discipline lawyers, anymore so than when the Board of Realtors disciplines a realtor who happens to be an attorney.
I did not join the Majority's dicta in Shaulis wherein the Majority stated:
[Wjhere an attorney purports to render professional services to a client, whether or not those services relate to activities which in and of themselves may not constitute the practice of law, the attorney’s conduct is regulated by the Supreme Court.
Shaulis, 739 A.2d at 1105, quoting Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Assoc. v. Thornburgh, 62 Pa.Cmwlth. 88, 434 A.2d 1327, 1331, n. 7 (1981), aff'd. without opinion, 498 Pa. 589, 450 A.2d 613 (1982).
. The closest the Majority comes to addressing how the Lobbying Act governs activities which constitute the practice of law is at pp. 1260-61 when they note that the Lobbying Act governs a lawyer’s participation in an administrative proceeding of an agency. The Majority, noting that "administrative proceeding” is not defined in the Act, goes on to construe the term to include instances when the administrative agency acts in an adjudicatory capacity. The Majority thus concludes that the Lobbying Act regulates attorneys who represent clients before the agency in their role as an advocate before an adjudicative body. The flaw in the Majority's construction of the term is that it ignores two rules of construction. In contravention of the rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, the Majority ignores the context of the term. The rule of construction "noscitur a sociis ” is a rule providing that a word or phrase is known by its associates or by its context. L.B. Foster v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 705 A.2d 164 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), allocatur denied, 557 Pa. 633, 732 A.2d 617 (1998). The complete context of the provision at issue is that the Lobbying Act's registration and reporting requirements do not apply to "[a]n individual who limits lobbying activities to preparing testimony and testifying before a committee of the legislature or participating in an administrative proceeding of an agency.” The Majority reasons that although this provision exempts attorneys appearing before agencies acting in their adjudicative capacities, it must mean that the rest of the Lobbying Act applies to attorneys who appear before administrative agencies acting in their adjudicative capacities. However, the application of the rule "noscitur a sociis,” leads to the conclusion that "participating in an administrative proceeding” means only those who prepare testimony and testify before administrative agencies which are conducting hearings to solicit input when considering proposed rules or formulation of regulatory policy. It is plain to me that this provision exempting such lobbyists who limit their activities to preparing testimony and testifying before the legislature or agencies from reporting requirements applies to witnesses before committees and agencies considering policies and not when agencies are acting in their adjudicative capacities. See Section 1303 of the Lobbying Act, defining "administrative action” to mean essentially the agency’s consideration of a regulation or proposed regulation and the development of a guideline or statement of policy. Furthermore, that one whose lobbying activity is limited to appearing as a witness before committees or agencies would be exempt from the Lobbying Act's registration and reporting requirements does not lead to an absurd result contrary to the Majority's *1268assertion. Such a lobbyist-witness does his lobbying in a public forum for all to see and the legislature could reasonably conclude that such lobbying need not be further disclosed than it already is, i.e., publicly appearing before the legislature or a committee or an agency testifying on the record.
Finally, to the extent that the phrase is equally capable of the construction I suggest as well as the construction which the Majority espouses, the rule of construction compelling us to construe a statute as constitutional if at all possible compels my construction. Prichard v. School District of Willistown (where a statute may be construed in both an unconstitutional way and a constitutional way, we are to construe it in a constitutional way).
. Neither do I find Petitioners' reliance on Lloyd v. Fishinger, 529 Pa. 513, 605 A.2d 1193 (1992) controlling. That decision was a 3-3 split decision which does not constitute mandatory precedent. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971). Moreover, although the Superior Court held in Lloyd v. Fishinger, 380 Pa.Super. 507, 552 A.2d 303 (1989), aff'd by an equally divided court, 529 Pa. 513, 605 A.2d 1193 (1992) that the legislature’s statute regarding contingent fees was unconstitutional, I note that the suit therein was initiated at a time when the Code of Professional Responsibility was in effect and not the current RPC. Although the decision of the Superior Court came down at a time when the RPC was in effect, the Superior Court did not reference Rule 1.5(c) in its decision. Thus, the Superior Court did not address the issue which is dispositive here. Moreover, I note that this court is not bound by Superior Court precedent. Weriz v. Chapman Township, 709 A.2d 428, 433 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), aff'd, 559 Pa. 630, 741 A.2d 1272 (1999).
. Petitioners question whether resort may be had to administrative rules for the resolution of constitutional questions regarding a statute. See Petrs. Main Brief at p. 20. ("[w]ith-out citing any authority for the proposition that constitutional infirmities can be corrected by administrative rulemaking...”). It is well settled that resort may be had to administrative interpretations of statutes in order to resolve questions as to the meaning of statutory provisions to determine whether the statute violates the constitution. Stephens v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Nursing, 657 A.2d 71, 76 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Foster, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 562, 624 A.2d 274 (1993).
. Thus, Petitioners’ assertion that “the very existence of a contract or subcontract may be privileged” (Petrs. Main Brief at p. 22), may be litigated and resolved in the normal course and does not serve as a basis to invalidate the Lobbying Act.
. While in their Petition for Review, the Petitioners identify five provisions of the Lobbying Act as being unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers, in their motion for summary judgment and main brief they only argue the three issues I address above. Accordingly, the other two issues are waived. The other two issues involved 65 Pa.C.S. § 1310(a) requiring that lobbyists pay a biennial filing fee of $100 to the commission and 65 Pa.C.S. § 1307(b) prohibiting lobbyists from serving as an officer for a political candidate’s political committee or a candidate's political action committee.