Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue (Department), Barton Fields, a former Secretary of the Department, James Schemer, a former Secretary of the Department and Karl Ross, former Deputy Secretary for Fiscal Policy Analysis for the Department (collectively, Commonwealth), appeal from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County that granted Nan Smolow, Kim Verrichia and class representative taxpayers’ (collectively, Taxpayers) motion for voluntary discontinuance of the class action filed by Taxpayers and Taxpayers their attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. We reverse.
FACTS
On May 16, 1988, Taxpayers filed a civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 challenging a Department *613policy regarding sales tax on automobile rebates received by a consumer when purchasing a new motor vehicle.2 However, three weeks before the filing of this class action suit, on April 28, 1988, then Deputy Secretary Ross issued a letter to the Pennsylvania Automotive Association (PAA) as a result of PAA’s request for clarification of the Department’s auto rebate taxation policy. The need for clarification resulted from differing types of rebates.3 A problem existed with using the term “rebate” to include both purchase discounts and true rebates, i.e. cash refunds. The Department determined that since purchasers were assigning their rebates to the dealer in increasing numbers with the practical effect of lowering the price they paid for the vehicle, the rebate amount could be subtracted from the purchase price, thus lowering the amount of Pennsylvania sales tax for the transaction, provided that the rebate was assigned at the time of sale. This revision did not affect the amount of sales tax due on the purchase of a new vehicle where the manufacturer mailed rebates to the purchaser following the sale. Similarly, this revision did not change the amount of sales tax due for a vehicle transaction involving dealer discounts or rebates.
Moreover, the revision did not change the fact that, in reality, a manufacturer’s rebate cannot be given before or at the time of sale. Rather, it still can only be issued after the sale. It is the pre-April 28, 1988 policy of the Department that Taxpayers’ complaint challenges.4
*614Taxpayers’ complaint asserts that Sections 201(g)(1) and (2) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (Tax Code), Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 7201(g)(1) and (2), and the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Regulation at 61 Pa.Code § 33.2 (Regulation 300), provide that discounts such as on-the-spot cash discounts, wholesaler’s discounts and trade discounts — the type of transaction that was affected by the Department’s April 28, 1988 revision — which effectively establish a new sales price and which do not occur after the sale, should be deducted in computing the purchase price when determining the amount of sales tax. Taxpayers’ complaint further asserts that pursuant to Section 202(a) of the Tax Code, 72 P.S. § 7202(a), Pennsylvania’s six percent sales tax was erroneously calculated on the full purchase price of all new motor vehicles, before deducting the discounts. Taxpayers assert that contrary to the Tax Code and Regulation 300 the Commonwealth, acting under color of state law, maintained the custom, policy and practice of collecting a six percent sales tax on the discounted portion of the purchase price of a new motor vehicle. Taxpayers contend this action was “arbitrary, capricious, confiscatory, discriminatory, unreasonable and wholly without justification or authority, thereby depriving [Taxpayers] of their property without due process and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.... ” (8a~9a).
Taxpayers’ complaint also contends that a class action is the proper manner to proceed in this cause of action because: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical; (2) common questions of law and fact exist as to each member of the class; (3) representative Taxpayers’ claims are typical of the claims of all other class members; (4) the class is manageable; (5) individual suits by individual class members would result in varying and inconsistent adjudications; and (6) the expense of litigation favors a single class action instead of individual or separate actions.
*615Shortly after this lawsuit was filed, the Commonwealth requested that the action be stayed pending the disposition of other actions filed by Verrichia and Smolow.5 Despite this stay, the Commonwealth began issuing refunds of improperly collected sales tax beginning in July 1988 through October 1989. On April 20, 1990, the stay of this action was vacated because of the final disposition in Smolow I and Smolow II. The Commonwealth filed preliminary objections which the trial court denied without opinion on November 12,1990. The Commonwealth, after answering the complaint, then moved for judgment on the pleadings, on the basis that an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials which seeks payment of monies from the state treasury is barred by Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). On April 1,1991, the trial court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, again -without opinion.
On June 17, 1991, the trial court conducted a class certification hearing and entered an order certifying the class which, on September 26, 1991, was amended to include only the period from May 16, 1986 forward. The class certification *616order also provided for notice to almost two million members of the class as defined.6 Enclosed in all motor vehicles owners license renewal packets was the notice stipulated to by the parties which provided:
NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
A class action lawsuit was filed on May 16,1988 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County ('Verrichia, et al v. Commonwealth, et al, No. 88-3983-17-5) alleging that the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue and its officials wrongfully collected sales tax on the purchase price of new motor vehicles before deducting the amount of manufacturers’ rebates or discounts received at the time of sale. Plaintiffs allege that this violated their constitutional rights and the rights of all other persons who were similarly affected.
Plaintiffs seek damages for all persons in the class for the excess amount of sales tax paid, i.e. 6% of the rebate or discount plus interest.
Sales tax on new motor vehicles is now collected based on the purchase price after deduction of rebates or discounts received at or before the sale. Refunds will be issued to persons who submit a signed written request with proof of overpayment pursuant to the law.
The Class. On June 17, 1991 the court certified the following class:
All persons who purchased a new motor vehicle subject to the Pennsylvania sales tax on or after May 16, 1986 who received or who were credited with a manufacturer’s discount or rebate at or before the time of sale, where Pennsyl*617vania collected a sales tax calculated on the purchase price before deducting such rebate or discount.
Decision Binding on the Class. If you are a member of this class, you will be bound by the court’s determination in this case unless you file a written notice with the Prothonotary of Bucks County, Bucks County Court House, Doylestown, PA. 18901 no later than March 31, 1993 that you want to be excluded from the class.
Claims for Tax Refunds. You may identify yourself as a member of this class and you may apply for a tax refund by submitting a claim to the Department of Revenue with the following: (a) name and address of purchaser; (b) a copy of the original invoice showing the purchase priced and the amount of the rebate; (c) proof of payment of sales tax; and (d) this claim card signed by yourself and including your social security number. Send the claim to the PA Department of Revenue, Board of Appeals, Department 281021, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA. 17128.
Only those persons submitting the required information will be eligible for a refund. No refunds will be -issued until final disposition of the action and order of the court.
Claim Submission Deadline. Claims must be postmarked no later than March 31, 1993.
(Emphasis added).
On March 7, 1992, Taxpayers filed a motion for voluntary discontinuance pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1714, contending that the class notice to which the Commonwealth stipulated effectively resolved all issues of liability based upon the language in the notice that, “Refunds will be issued to persons who submit a signed written request with proof of overpayment pursuant to the law.” Taxpayers also petitioned for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1716.
The trial court heard conflicting testimony from the parties concerning whether or not the Commonwealth had admitted liability by stipulating to the language of the Notice of Class Certification. The trial court held that the Commonwealth had conceded liability in stipulating to the Notice. The trial *618court further found that only after the filing of Taxpayers’ cause of action and as a result of the efforts of representative Taxpayers did the Commonwealth stop taxing manufacturer’s rebates and agree to pay the cash refunds to class members who submitted proof of overpayment. The trial court established a common fund for refunds totaling approximately $31.5 million.
The trial court also determined that as prevailing parties, Taxpayers were entitled to attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,880 plus costs of $70,088.07 from the common fund “generated by the efforts of their counsel” or, alternatively, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Commonwealth now appeals.7
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in: 1) allowing Taxpayers to maintain this action because Taxpayers failed to exhaust administrative remedies; 2) failing to apply the doctrine of Will v. Michigan; 3) certifying this action as a class action; and 4) awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Taxpayers’ counsel.
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The Commonwealth cites considerable case law to support its proposition that no claim can be maintained for deprivation of property without due process, i.e., a § 1983 action, if a plain and adequate administrative remedy exists to recover the property. The Commonwealth asserts that because the individual taxpayers had opportunity to recover the overpayment of the sales tax as individuals, as did Smolow, Verrichia and over 12,000 others, with rights of appeal,8 that a plain and adequate remedy for relief exists through the ad*619ministrative process and the judiciary.9 The Commonwealth now argues that having had the opportunity to seek recovery of the tax, Taxpayers may not maintain the § 1983 action, and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections and motion for judgment on the pleadings and in eventually certifying the class.
While in Smolow I, this Court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Supreme Court in Murtagh v. County of Berks, 535 Pa. 50, 634 A.2d 179 (1993), did not require the taxpayer to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action. Smolow I and Murtagh appear conflicting, but upon careful analysis Smolow I and Murtagh can be reconciled.
In Murtagh, the taxpayers, representing a class of recent purchasers of real estate who had not exhausted their administrative remedies, filed an amended complaint against various local governments. The taxpayers asserted that the local governments had adopted a discriminatory “Welcome Stranger” policy in reassessing only the newly acquired real estate, thus violating their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The taxpayers also asserted that because the reassessments were done under color of state law, the local government violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court held it had jurisdiction but we reversed, holding that the taxpayers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the taxpayers *620were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before instituting their § 1983 action because the “Welcome Stranger” policy was de facto discriminatory. However, the Tax Code and Regulation 300, applicable here, and also at issue in Smolow I and Smolow II, were not de facto discriminatory because the law applied uniformly to all purchasers of automobiles that received rebates.10 Thus, Murtagh does not control, because the Tax Code and Regulation 300 at issue here are not de facto discriminatory. Therefore, we hold that Taxpayers had an adequate administrative remedy as stated in Smolow I, which- precludes their filing of or maintaining a § 1983 cause of action.
DOCTRINE OF WILL v. MICHIGAN
Although we could end our discussion at this point, we feel obliged to discuss the Commonwealth’s most persuasive argument, that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of Will v. Michigan. In Will v. Michigan, an employee filed a claim against the Michigan Department of State Police and the Michigan Director of State Police in his official capacity, alleging that both parties had denied the employee a promotion for an improper reason in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Circuit Court dismissed the employee’s action and the Supreme Court affirmed. Reaffirming what it held in Monell v. New York City, Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a state is not a “person” -within the meaning of § 1983. The Supreme Court, however, also held that state officials acting in their official capacity are also not “persons” under § 1983 because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official’s office.” Id. 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d at 58.11
*621In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), the Supreme Court further developed Will’s holding and allowed a state official in his personal capacity to be sued in a § 1983 action. In Hafer, employees filed a § 1983 action against Hafer, Pennsylvania’s Auditor General, seeking money damages against Hafer in her personal capacity. The district court dismissed the employees’ action under Will, but the Third Circuit reversed on this issue. The Third Circuit held that while Hafer’s power to hire and fire derived from her position, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in her personal capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed.
In an attempt to eliminate the confusion about the distinction between personal-capacity and official-capacity suits, the Supreme Court in Hafer described official-capacity suits as another way of pleading an action against the governmental unit of which the officer is an agent of that unit. Thus, the official-capacity suit is treated as a suit against the state. In these situations when an official sued in this capacity dies or leaves office, the successor automatically assumes the role in the litigation. Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 361-62, 116 L.Ed.2d at 309, citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, 121 (1985) (citation omitted). Therefore, in an official-capacity suit the only immunities available to the agent are those immunities available to the governmental unit. Id.
Personal-capacity suits differ in that they seek to impose individual liability upon the official for actions taken under “color of state law.” Id. Thus, in personal-capacity suits one must show that the official was acting under “color of state law” when the deprivation of a federal right occurred. The plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental “policy or custom,” but then officials, *622sued in this personal capacity, may assert the personal immunity defenses such as reasonable reliance on the existing statute and regulation. Id. However, the plaintiff may not merely plead against the official as an individual, the plaintiff must also seek damages against the individual.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), the estates of three students who died at Kent State University in May 1970 sought damages from the governor of Ohio and other state officials in the federal district court. The district court dismissed the complaints on the theory that although brought against state officials in their personal capacities they were in substance actions against the state and, therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment.12 The Supreme Court, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), rejected this view, stating that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Scheuer also held that the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply where a plaintiff seeks damages from the public treasury. That is, where the action is one against the public treasure, it is in reality against the state and the Eleventh Amendment would bar the action in federal court.
In the case before us, Taxpayers made individual claims against two secretaries of the Department and a deputy secretary. The initial action was brought only against Secretary Fields, but his successor, Secretary Scheiner, was later added. Further, Taxpayers present no evidence that they sought damages from the officials as individuals. Taxpayers sought only damages from the coffers of the Commonwealth. In fact, Smolow’s counsel stated that he was requesting “to be paid by the Commonwealth out of this so-called $31,000,000 common fund.” (376a) (Emphasis added).
*623As was stated in Will, a personal-capacity suit is more than a “mere pleading device.” Therefore, because Taxpayers’ action followed successive secretaries of the Department and because nowhere in the pleadings or record did Taxpayers seek damages personally from Defendants Fields, Schemer or Ross, we hold that the alleged personal-capacity actions were mere pleading devices and not true personal-capacity causes of action. Our holding is compelled by the holdings in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Because no § 1983 action can be brought against the state or a state official in his official capacity, Will, and that no true cause of action was brought against the state official defendants in this case in their personal capacity, Taxpayers had no § 1983 cause of action, ab initio.
Because we must examine whether a cause of action exists before granting a class action, Lillian v. Commonwealth, 467 Pa. 15, 354 A.2d 250 (1976), Stevenson v. Department of Revenue, 489 Pa. 1, 413 A.2d 667 (1980) and Smolow I, and because we hold that there was no valid § 1983 cause of action here, the trial court erred in certifying the class.13
Accordingly, we reverse.14
*624 ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 1994, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.
. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
*613Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State, ..., subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....
. Taxpayers had written the Department in 1987, stating that the Department’s policy was improper.
. For example, some rebates are applied up-front to the purchase price to effect a purchase discount. When the rebate is used as a cash bonus, it is not taxable. On the other hand, when the rebate money is given to the purchaser after the sale, it affects neither the purchase price nor the amount of sales tax.
. Following the April 28, 1988 clarification letter and subsequent press release, the Department’s Board of Appeals (Board) began receiving *614petitions for refunds of sales tax paid on rebates received at or before the time of the sale although the Commonwealth did continue to receive some sales tax on rebates until July 1988, after the lawsuit was filed.
. In Smolow v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 324, 547 A.2d 478 (1988), aff'd per curiam, 521 Pa. 534, 557 A.2d 1063 (1989) (Smolow I), Smolow filed a petition for review and for class certification in our original jurisdiction. The petition sought refunds, injunctive relief and/or a writ of mandamus restraining the Department and treble damages under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.2. We held that Smolow had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and thus, because the action was not maintainable in our original jurisdiction, it could not proceed as a class action. The Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam.
Smolow v. Commonwealth, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 276, 570 A.2d 112 (1990) aff'd per curiam, 527 Pa. 371, 592 A.2d 40 (1991) (Smolow II), concerned a class action Smolow filed with the Board to collect the overpaid sales tax. The Board granted Smolow’s individual claim, but denied the request for class certification. The Board of Finance and Revenue reached the identical result. Smolow appealed to this Court. We also denied class certification, holding the right to sue for refund of taxes erroneously paid was a personal right of the individual grieved which could not be maintained as a class action. We specifically held that there must be a substantive cause of action which permits the procedure of a class action to be used. “Only if there is such a cause of action may a class be certified.” Id. at 296, 570 A.2d at 122. The Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam.
. Taxpayers assert that the Commonwealth is barred in the instant case from challenging the class certification because it did not appeal from the order defining the class and approving the class notice. This assertion is meritless. An order denying class certification is a final appealable order, Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975), but an order granting a class certification is not a final appealable order because the order neither disposes of the entire case nor puts the appellant out of court because of the claim. See, e.g., Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978). Thus, the Commonwealth could not have appealed from this order.
. Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Mirror Printing Co. v. Altoona Area School Board, 148 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 168, 609 A.2d 917 (1992).
. See discussion of Smolow II at n. 1.
. The Tax Code permits a taxpayer to petition the Board within three years of the payment of the tax. Section 253(a) of the Tax Code, 72 P.S. § 7253(a). An unsatisfied taxpayer may then appeal to the Board of Finance and Revenue. Section 254 of the Tax Code, 72 P.S. § 7254. Thereafter, an aggrieved individual has the right of de novo review to this Court, Section 255 of the Tax Code, 72 P.S. § 7255, with an appeal as of right to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pa.R.A.P. 1101(a)(2). This is the procedure Taxpayers followed in Smolow II. Smolow was granted a refund claim, but denied the request for class certification. On de novo review to this Court, we held that while the Commonwealth could not defeat a class certification by proffering an individual refund to Smolow, the right to sue for refund of taxes erroneously paid was a personal right of the individual aggrieved and could not be maintained as a class action. The Supreme Court affirmed.
. See Transcontinental Gas Line Corp. v. Commonwealth, 153 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 60, 620 A.2d 614 (1993).
. Will also held, however, that a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not *621treated as an action against the state. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2311, n. 10, 105 L.Ed.2d at 58 n. 10 (citation omitted).
. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
. We are concerned that the initial certification of the class by the trial court may have misled some individuals who were improperly taxed to forego filing a petition for refund of taxes within the three-year statute of limitation set forth in 72 P.S. § 7253(a). Although we now reverse the trial court’s grant of class certification, we believe that the trial court’s order granting certification does equitably toll the running of the statute of limitations. The Commonwealth thus should process the forms submitted by Taxpayers under the Notice of Class Certification as if they were timely petitions for refund of taxes improperly paid. See generally American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974).
. Because of our disposition in this case, we need not address the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial court’s certification of the class based upon the allegation that the Commonwealth conceded liability in stipulating to the Notice of Class Certification. We also need not address the challenge to the trial court’s granting of attorneys’ fees and costs to Smolow’s counsel because counsel was not successful in either securing a class which allows fees pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1716 or in stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which allows attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Pechner, Dorfman, Wolffe, *624Rounick & Cabot v. Insurance Department, 46 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 641, 407 A.2d 100 (1979).