(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join in the reasoning and holdings of parts i-iii of the lead opinion. However, because I find that a striking favored worker fully disabled by a supervening event is not entitled to a reinstatement of benefits unless he shows that he would have returned to work but for the supervening event, I write separately.
i
The purpose of the worker’s compensation act *268"is to provide compensation for disability resulting from an occupational injury.” Lynch v Briggs Mfg Co, 329 Mich 168, 171; 45 NW2d 20 (1950). In furtherance of this basic policy, this Court crafted the favored work doctrine, which permits an employer to offer a partially disabled employee work that he is physically capable of performing (at equal or greater preinjury wages) in lieu of providing worker’s compensation benefits. Hood v Wyandotte Oil & Fat Co, 272 Mich 190, 193; 261 NW 295 (1935); Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 182; 312 NW2d 640 (1981).1
The primary purpose of the doctrine is that of mitigation. It allows an employer to reduce or completely eliminate compensation payments by providing work within the injured employee’s physical capacity. At the same time, it encourages the employee to return to productive employment rather than to remain idle, thus also serving a rehabilitative function.[2]
In accordance with the principles of mitigation, "if physically able to perform the favored work” *269an employee may not refuse such work and still be awarded compensation. Lynch, supra at 172.3
Thus, a favored work employee who refuses to perform favored work because of his participation in a strike forfeits his right to compensation. Pigue v General Motors Corp, 317 Mich 311; 26 NW2d 900 (1947). The Pigue Court explained:
In the case at bar plaintiff could have continued his employment under the same terms and condi*270tions as existed prior to going out on strike. The incapacity of plaintiff to earn wages during this period was not occasioned by his previous injury, but by the intervention of a labor union of which he was a member. Employment for plaintiff was available under conditions existing prior to the strike. Plaintiff is thus in the position of having refused employment until those conditions were modified. Plaintiff’s employment did not cease by reason of any overt act upon the part of his employer or because of his inability to work by reason of his accidental injury.
Decision in this case is based upon the fact that work was available to plaintiff by his employer; that plaintiff was physically able to perform such work, but declined to do so because of a strike called by a labor union of which he was a member. [Id. at 318-319.]
The lead opinion would hold that this forfeiture of benefits during a strike is only a "temporary suspension of benefits” during the refusal to work. Ante at 248. It also would find that if a worker fails to request or accept an offer of favored work within a reasonable time, the forfeiture of benefits becomes permanent. Ante at 250, 255. This is so because "[a]n employer should not have to continuously bear the burden of initiating a renewal of favored work, nor should the employer be forced to hold favored positions open indefinitely.” Ante at 250. Hence, the lead opinion correctly concludes "that an employee who has ceased to perform existing favored work should establish a good-faith willingness to accept or resume favored work that remains available in order to restore eligibility for benefits. Additionally, this willingness should be expressed within a reasonable period in order to be effective.” Ante at 250. I agree.
Furthermore, as recognized by the lead opinion, the reasonableness standard must apply to both *271parties to maintain the integrity of the favored work doctrine. Ante at 248-250, 254. See also Bower, supra at 182-185; Russell v General Motors Corp, 172 Mich App 627, 632; 432 NW2d 738 (1988).4 Hence, a favored employee’s unreasonable delay in accepting an oifer of employment relieves an employer of liability. See, e.g., Russell, supra at 632.5
*272In the instant case, the application of these principles denies Nederhood relief. Although this Court may examine the wcab’s findings of law, absent fraud its findings of fact are conclusive if any competent evidence on the record supports those findings. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861).6 The wcab found that Nederhood was performing favored work and voluntarily left that work to participate in the strike. The wcab also found that defendant’s hiring of permanent replacement workers did not constitute a de facto withdrawal of its offer of favored work, and that the union’s proposals to return to work were merely negotiating tactics, not bona fide offers to return. Similarly, Nederhood failed to show that a replacement worker had taken his job, or that he could not find employment as a replacement worker. To the contrary, the record reveals that several former union members became replacement workers.7 Moveover, most important, the wcab found that Nederhood never approached defendant to regain his job — in other words, he failed to tender an offer to accept a favored posi*273tion once he voluntarily left favored work. In short, Nederhood failed to present a prima facie case. Thus, the lead opinion would appropriately deny Nederhood relief.
II
Like Nederhood, Zimmerman forfeited his entitlement to benefits when he participated in the strike. Zimmerman failed to show any evidence that he or the union ever offered to return to favored work. Again, like Nederhood, Zimmerman also failed to present any evidence showing that his position was taken by a replacement worker, or that he would have been unable to obtain another comparable position. Hence, Zimmerman is not entitled to benefits.
Nevertheless, considering the "remedial nature of worker’s compensation, the certainty and extent of the total disability, the length of the refusal to perform favored work at the time of the heart attack, and the fact that Zimmerman’s heart attack did not arise out of his refusal to perform favored work [and] that a contrary result would require a permanent forfeiture of benefits on the basis of his original cessation of favored work,” without providing him a reasonable time within which to express his willingness to return, the lead opinion would hold that he is "entitled to wage loss benefits as of February 4, 1982, the date upon which his heart attack rendered him physically unable to perform favored work.” Ante at 258.
The lead opinion’s holding misconstrues the supervening event doctrine and the worker’s compensation act by granting Zimmerman a windfall. It correctly notes that the "basic rule of law ... is that a supervening event causing cessation of an employee’s favored work will not *274terminate his right to benefits as long as the event is not under the employee’s control or attributable to him.” Bower, supra at 187. This is so because " '[a]n independent, intervening event, which follows a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, does not alone justify the denial, suspension, reduction, or increase of disability benefits for a continuing work related injury.’ ” Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332, 354-355; 279 NW2d 769 (1979) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Hence, the favored work doctrine does "not require compensation benefits to be automatically revived upon the happening of an intervening nonindustrial event which disables a favored-work employee .... Rather, . . . such an event [does] not preclude the payment of compensation for a prior injury.” Flynn v General Motors Corp, 162 Mich App 511, 517; 413 NW2d 444 (1987). Thus, to obtain benefits under the supervening act doctrine, a claimant must show that he "was already performing favored work for his original employer and a supervening independent event rendered him unable to continue.” Bower, supra at 187.8
Zimmerman, however, was not performing favored work when he suffered the heart attack, but was voluntarily participating in a strike. There is no evidence that Zimmerman would have crossed the picket line had he been healthy, and a legal bar denied Zimmerman benefits at the time of his disability. This Court, therefore, must assume that even without the heart attack he would not have worked for defendant while the strike continued. Furthermore, he has failed to present any evidence that he would have returned to his position *275after the decertification of the union. Thus, Zimmerman’s disability is irrelevant to his ability to receive benefits because he would have been ineligible for such benefits if he had not had the heart attack. Because the burden is upon Zimmerman to show that he is entitled to benefits in such circumstances, and he failed to produce any evidence that he would have returned to work despite the strike and consequent decertification of the union, Zimmerman is not entitled to benefits. Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 425-426; 145 NW2d 40 (1966); Flynn, supra at 517.
On the other hand, if his union had returned to work, the wcab or the hearing referee could have fairly assumed he would have joined the union and he would be entitled to benefits. Because the union’s actions could fairly have been impugned upon Zimmerman if it had returned to work, he would have been entitled to recover benefits beginning on the day the union returned to work, but no sooner.9 Nevertheless, this was not the case *276with Zimmerman. In short, Zimmerman is not entitled to a windfall simply because of his unfortunate heart condition.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J. Levin, J.(separate opinion). I agree with the author of the lead opinion that 1981 PA 200,1 codifying the favored work doctrine, should guide decision.2 As set forth in that opinion, § 301(5)(a), added by the 1981 legislation, provides that if disability is established, and "an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from a previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan employment security commission and the employee refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is no longer entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act during the period of such refusal.”3
The last clause, "during the period of such refusal,” is inconsistent with the view that refusal of work results in a permanent forfeiture of worker’s compensation benefits. This clause is also inconsistent with the view that, because it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to keep those positions open beyond the point that it announced that the jobs would be filled by permanent replace-*277merits,4 Nederhood may not recover worker’s compensation benefits.
While the needs of the employer may justify the employer in not keeping the offer open beyond a reasonable time, the need of the employee to participate in a strike may justify his refusal to work during a strike. The disabled worker is nevertheless disabled, and, as set forth in the 1981 legislation, can properly be denied benefits only "during the period of such refusal,” without good and reasonable cause, of a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from a previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan Employment Security Commission.
The "period of such refusal” is, of course, a question of fact. The burden of showing refusal of work should be borne by the employer because the offer of favored work is in mitigation of damages, in the form of worker’s compensation benefits, otherwise payable by the employer.
When the union’s representative offered to return the entire work force to work in January, 1982, that was in effect an offer on behalf of the favored workers to return to work. While the employer was not obliged to accept that offer, it should not be heard thereafter to assert that a particular injured worker, Nederhood, declined favored work unless it clarifies the situation by reoffering favored work to the injured worker, Nederhood, separately and apart from whatever was going on between the employer and the union, and other workers, at whatever wage the employer chooses to offer the particular injured worker. If the employer here had done so, and Nederhood had refused the offer, it would then be clear that, after the union’s offer to return the entire work *278force to work in January, 1982, Nederhood had declined an offer of favored work at a definite wage.
In all events, the burden should be on the employer to show refusal of favored work from and after September 23, 1982, when Nederhood filed a petition for hearing before the Bureau of Worker’s Disability Compensation. By filing that petition, Nederhood formally notified the employer that he was seeking a renewal of payment of worker’s compensation benefits under the worker’s compensation system. It was, or should have been, incumbent on this employer, claiming an offset in mitigation of damages on the basis of an offer, and the availability, of favored work, to show that it had, uncomplicated by the strike, the negotiations with the union, the interests of other workers (injured and uninjured), or other factors, made an offer of favored work to Nederhood after September 23, 1982, and that he had turned down the offer.
I join in reversal of the Court of Appeals in Zimmerman. I would also, for the reasons stated, reverse the Court of Appeals in Nederhood and remand to the wcac for the entry of an award of compensation to Nederhood, who was found to have been partially disabled. Under the circumstances that three justices would affirm in Nederhood with the result that Nederhood would be denied compensation, and three would remand for further proceedings, and remand would provide Nederhood with an opportunity on remand to recover worker’s compensation benefits, I join in remand to the wcac.
The favored-work doctrine is a purely judicial creation. Favored, or light, work can be loosely defined as less strenuous post-injury work. Wages from favored-work may be used as a setoff against an employer’s compensation liability, MCL 418.361(1); MSA 17.237(361)(1), but favored-work wages do not establish an earning capacity, and when such wages cease, they neither suspend nor bar compensation. Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332; 279 NW2d 769 (1979).
The rehabilitation function of the favored work doctrine should not be forgotten, for "[i]n many instances from the highest motives of desire to rehabilitate the employee and restore him as a wage-earning member of society, some employers have retained injured employees in new jobs within their capacity to perform.” Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 423; 145 NW2d 40 (1966). Even without such high motives, favored work fosters rehabilitation by encouraging partially disabled persons to reintegrate into the workplace.
The favored work doctrine is nothing more than the logical application of the axiomatic principle of mitigation to the worker’s compensation scheme. As Justice Campbell noted, "[i]t has always been considered incumbent upon any person subjected to injury to use such means as are reasonably in his power to make the evil consequences as light as possible.” Chandler v Allison, 10 Mich 460, 474-475 (1862). See also Cubit v O’Dett, 51 Mich 347, 350; 16 NW 679 (1883). A failure to mitigate by the injured party bars recovery, therefore, " 'for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided.’ ” Shiffer v Gibralter School Dist Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 190, 197; 224 NW2d 255 (1974), quoting McCormick, Damages, § 33, p 127 (emphasis omitted).
The principle of mitigation is a thread permeating the entire jurisprudence. It is not solely a "breach of contract” or "commercial” doctrine; it is part of the much broader principle of "avoidable consequences.” [Shiffer, supra at 197.]
The rights protected by the mitigation doctrine are not just those of contracting parties, commercial litigants, tort victims or tortfeasors but, rather, the rights of all society: "Legal rules and doctrines are designed not only to prevent and repair individual loss and injustice, but to protect and conserve the economic welfare and prosperity of the whole community.” [Id. at 198, quoting McCormick, supra.]
Hence, mitigation is fully applicable in the employment context. See, e.g., McClelland v Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 NY 347, 358; 169 NE 605 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J., concurring) ("The obligation of the master is merely to pay whatever damages have actually been suffered, and these exclude damages that a servant, acting reasonably, would have diminished or avoided”). In the favored worker context, therefore, "interruptions of work caused by voluntary actions of the employee, such as abandonment of work to participate in a strike, failure to return without explanation at the end of a leave of absence, failure to notify the employer of medical restrictions, or discharge because of gambling or drunkenness, results in a forfeiture of benefits.” Bower, supra at 188 (citations omitted).
A reasonableness test is applied to the actions of employees when determining whether they are entitled to worker’s compensation benefits. Bower, supra at 182. Originally, this Court adopted the reasonableness doctrine to protect workers from unjust results in the context of the favored work doctrine:
Forfeiture is a drastic remedy. If the statute specifically requires that reasonableness not be taken into account, the courts must obey, no matter how unjust the result. But in the instant case, the doctrine to be applied, even though developed in a statutory context, is a judicially created one. Therefore, consistent with our approach to the common law, we refuse to consider application of the harsh forfeiture penalty without an assessment of the parties’ reasonableness. [Id. at 184.]
The Court of Appeals has divided over whether the reasonableness standard applies to the actions of employers. See, e.g., Hartsell v Richmond Lumber Co, 154 Mich App 523, 535-536; 398 NW2d 456 (1986) (holding that the reasonableness standard is inapplicable); id. (MacKenzie, P.J., dissenting) (approving of reasonableness standard for an employer’s conduct); Russell, supra at 632, and Derr v Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 195 Mich App 333, 335; 489 NW2d 183 (1992) (holding that the reasonableness of an employer’s actions should be evaluated).
The better view is to apply the reasonableness standard to the actions of employers:
It must be remembered that it is the employee’s unreasonable refusal which triggers the initial forfeiture of benefits. There comes a point after which it is unreasonable to think that such employee might someday accept the offer that was originally spurned. It is at that point that a company should be permitted to withdraw its offer with no fear of disadvantage. [Russell, supra at 632.]
The obvious [corollary] to [Bower] is that the reasonableness of an employer’s withdrawal of an offer of favored work must also be considered in determining whether benefits should be awarded. I fail to see how the mitigation or rehabilitation purposes underlying the favored work doctrine are served by *272deciding, as the majority does, that an offer of favored work must be left open without limit even though, as here, the worker has clearly demonstrated utter disinterest in returning to his employer’s workplace. [Hartsell, n 4 supra at 535-536 (Mackenzie, J., dissenting).]
" 'We do not weigh the evidence. The weighing scale is in other hands and, even if we think it out of balance, we cannot re-weigh.’ ” Pulley, supra at 424, quoting Hood, supra at 194. See also Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 262-263; 484 NW2d 227 (1992); Thornton v Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162; 79 NW2d 457 (1956).
Furthermore, because many different positions may constitute favored work, see, e.g., Markey v SS Peter & Paul’s Parish, 281 Mich 292, 299-300; 274 NW 797 (1937) (noting that odd-lot work may be favored work); Evans v United States Rubber Co, 379 Mich 457, 465-466; 152 NW2d 641 (1967) (noting that an ordinary job regularly performed by healthy individuals may be favored work), an alteration in job classifications may not have affected his ability to obtain favored work.
In other words, "the employee was already performing favored work for his original employer and a supervening independent event rendered him unable to continue.” Id. See also Lynch, supra at 172.
29 USC 159(a) mandates that representatives of collective bargaining units are "the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . .” Hence, bargaining outside the bona fide union representatives subverts federal labor standards:
The [National Labor Relations Act] guarantees to all employees the right to bargain collectively through their chosen representatives. Bargaining carried on by the employer directly with the employees, whether a minority or majority, who have not revoked their designation of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained .... [Medo Photo Supply Corp v Nat’l Labor Relations Bd, 321 US 678, 684; 64 S Ct 830; 88 L Ed 1007 (1944).]
Hence, the actions of plaintiffs’ union are presumptively attributable to plaintiffs for their actions during a strike unless they in some fashion refute their union.
In the instant case, the union struck and was broken. The union never accepted a current offer of defendant, and eventually was decertified. Both Zimmerman and Nederhood were bound by their *276union’s decisions unless they chose to quit the union or cross the picket line. Neither did. Hence, they refused favored work and continue to do so. Of course, once the union was decertified, either plaintiff could have inquired regarding favored work, but failed to do so for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, they forfeited their benefits.
Effective January 1, 1982.
Brickley, J., ante, p 247.
MCL 418.301(5)(a); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(a).
Brickley, J., ante, p 255.