concurring.
While I join in the result reached by the lead Justices, I respectfully differ with the reasoning concerning the Commonwealth’s agreement with Malcolm Tucker. In contrast to the view expressed by the lead opinion, I believe that the evidence of a pre-existing agreement between Tucker and the Commonwealth as reflected in the District Attorney’s 2003 deposition testimony constituted a factual predicate for Appellant’s claim that is distinct from either Tucker’s earlier statement regarding his subjective hope of favorable treatment at his sentencing hearing or the District Attorney’s subsequent testimony at that hearing.
The underlying principles governing Appellant’s claim were initially set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that due process is offended when the prosecution withholds favorable evidence to an accused that would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty imposed. See id. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Several years later, the Court extended this rule to embrace certain impeaching evidence, including that which might demonstrate witness bias. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). This determination relied in part on the Court’s prior decision in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), in which it observed that “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of *99a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”
In the present matter, the prosecutor apparently promised Tucker that he would personally appear and testify at his sentencing hearing and make his cooperation in Appellant’s trial known to the court. Tucker therefore would have had more than a subjective hope of receiving consideration. In my view, under Brady, Giglio, and their progeny, the Commonwealth should have revealed this information so the jury could have more completely assessed Tucker’s credibility.1 Indeed, the District Attorney directly acknowledged that Tucker’s testimony was an important factor in the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant. See Lead Opinion, op. at 1254 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tucker, Nos. 5163-90 & 2150-90, N.T., May 20, 1991, at 17-18). While I agree with the lead Justices that this case does not involve a promise of leniency or a plea agreement, the prosecutor’s promise to appear at Tucker’s hearing was clearly relevant to Tucker’s motivation to testify at Appellant’s trial. See Strong, 563 Pa. at 464, 761 A.2d at *1001172 (observing that “due process requires that any potential understanding between the prosecution and a witness be revealed to the jury”).2
The Supreme Court of Georgia addressed a similar question in Patillo v. State, 258 Ga. 255, 368 S.E.2d 493 (1988), where, in exchange for a witness’ testimony, two assistant district attorneys agreed to inform the judge who had previously revoked the witness’ probation in a separate matter that the witness testified favorably in the case at hand. In their discussions with this witness, the assistant district attorneys specified that they would not make a specific recommendation to the judge; rather, they would leave the decision to the judge whether or not to reinstate his probation. See Patillo, 368 S.E.2d at 497. The trial court determined that this evidence should have been disclosed by the prosecution, observing that “the state should have revealed the agreement no matter how non-promising the agreement was in terms of its prospects for the witness.” Id. at 498. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusion in this regard. See id. at 497. I find such analysis to be persuasive as the plain terms of Napue and Giglio require the disclosure of impeachment evidence. Accordingly, I believe that the district attorney’s agreement with Appellant, notwithstanding its “non-promissory” nature as to Tucker’s ultimate sentence, should have been disclosed.
That being said, in addition to discussing the agreement between the Commonwealth and Tucker in his 2003 deposition, the District Attorney also stated that his office routinely indicated its willingness to cooperate at sentencing -with poten*101tial witnesses who could provide valuable testimony. The lead opinion concludes that this effectively undermines Appellant’s assertion that he could not have discovered evidence of the agreement prior to 2003, reasoning that it would be unrealistic to conclude that a deal that was offered to everyone was not discoverable with the exercise of due diligence. I agree that the existence of such a policy would be fatal to Appellant’s claim, since it could presumably have been ascertained through due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(l)(i), (ii).3 Notably, however, the PCRA court did not make a specific factual finding regarding the existence of this policy. Indeed, since the PCRA court assumed the timeliness of Appellant’s petition and dismissed it without an evidentiary hearing, the record has been insufficiently developed to evaluate this question, or to assess the other timeliness issues involved in this case.
Given that the timeliness of Appellant’s petition implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court, a remand of this matter for further proceedings might generally be warranted. However, in light of the other substantial evidence offered against Appellant at trial, I would ultimately conclude that Appellant has not established the degree of prejudice necessary to obtain post-conviction relief, despite my belief that the Commonwealth should have revealed its agreement with Tucker. Accord Patillo, 368 S.E.2d at 498 (implementing a similar disposition based on the reasoning that the outcome of the trial would not likely have been different, as, inter alia, the agreement was of a non-promissory nature and the witness was otherwise impeached by the revelation of his own criminal record). This analysis also applies to Appellant’s assertion that the prosecutor impermissibly elicited false testimony by asking Tucker whether he had been offered any inducements to testify and failing to correct Tucker’s response that he had not. See N.T., August 16, 1994, *102at 414. The United States Supreme Court has observed that, “[ejven in eases of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, such as the knowing use of perjured testimony, we have required a new trial only when the tainted evidence was material to the case.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766, Napue, 360 U.S. at 272, 79 S.Ct. at 1178). In this regard, the Court explained that the effect of the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct on the trial (rather than the misconduct itself) constitutes the crucial inquiry for purposes of due process. See id. Therefore, assuming, arguendo, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction,4 I concur with the lead Justices that Appellant’s present claims do not give rise to a basis for relief.
Justice BAER joins this concurring opinion. Justice TODD.I join the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court in its result, as I agree Appellant has failed to establish his Post *103Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition was timely filed. My reasoning somewhat differs, however.
Contrary to the lead opinion’s characterization, I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Saylor in his concurring opinion that “the evidence of a pre-existing agreement between Tucker and the Commonwealth as reflected in the District Attorney’s 2003 deposition testimony constituted a factual predicate for Appellant’s claim that is distinct from either Tucker’s earlier statement regarding his subjective hope of favorable treatment at his sentencing hearing or the District Attorney’s subsequent testimony at that hearing.” Concurring Op. at 1. Nevertheless, Appellant was obliged to prove why, with the exercise of due diligence, he could not have obtained Castor’s deposition testimony prior to 2003. As Appellant does not assert, let alone prove, that he could not have sought, or that he sought and was denied, such discovery prior to this time, he fails to fulfill the due diligence requirement. For this reason, I agree with the lead opinion Appellant has failed to establish his PCRA claim falls within any of the timeliness exceptions to the PCRA, and that his PCRA petition was, therefore, untimely filed.
. I recognize that courts have differed in the application of Giglio in the context of less formal arrangements between government agents and cooperating witnesses. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1129, 1152-57 (collecting cases and discussing problems in the application of Giglio). Several courts have narrowly construed Giglio as only requiring the disclosure of explicit agreements. See, e.g., Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710 (11th Cir.1999); Moore v. Zant, 682 F.Supp. 549 (M.D.Ga.1988). Other courts, however, have interpreted the case as mandating the disclosure of inducements that do not rise to the level of express offers. See, e.g., Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir.1979); Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 739 N.E.2d 670 (2000); People v. Diaz, 297 Ill.App.3d 362, 231 Ill.Dec. 523, 696 N.E.2d 819 (1998). I favor the latter approach, as I believe that it constitutes a more effective means of addressing the credibility/impeachment concerns that underlie the Giglio holding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 Pa. 455, 469, 761 A.2d 1167, 1175 (2000) (observing that a tentative commitment from a prosecutor might be more likely to encourage false testimony from a cooperating witness than a firm promise, since the witness will have a greater incentive to curry favor with the prosecutor if a specific agreement has not yet been reached).
. Indeed, the District Attorney acknowledged that such agreements are relevant to a witness' credibility: "[Wjhenever I have had situations where I have sources like this testifying, you always bring that out in the direct evidence, what the situation is that he’s expecting to get as a result of testifying, because you've got to explain to the jury what, you know, what potential motives he might have to be biased in our favor or whatever.” Oral Deposition of Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Oct. 28, 2003, at 59. When the District Attorney was asked whether this particular agreement was placed on the record, he indicated that, "I probably put it on the record at the — when he testified. It was — it has always been my practice to bring that out in court, say it right there on the record." Id. at 58.
. I also differ with the lead opinion’s use of the term "newly discovered evidence” in referencing Section 9545(b)(l)(ii), see Lead Opinion, op. at 1252-53, as I believe that the use of this short-hand is unnecessary and confusing in light of this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264 (2007).
. This Court has not directly addressed whether Pennsylvania courts may forego the resolution of a complex jurisdictional matter in favor of a disposition based on the clear-cut merits of an underlying substantive issue. Traditionally, however, the federal courts could exercise such “hypothetical jurisdiction” pursuant to Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 2775 (1976) (permitting federal courts to "reserv[ej difficult questions ... of jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party”). This practice was significantly curtailed in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), which held that, at least in the context of Article III jurisdictional questions, the exercise of such jurisdiction was improper. Notably, though, the Steel Company decision did not specifically preclude the application of "hypothetical jurisdiction” in cases that did not implicate Article III. As such, several intermediate federal courts have continued to exercise such jurisdiction in situations involving statutory, rather than constitutional, jurisdictional matters. See, e.g., Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139 (1st Cir.2007), Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.2004), Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402 (3d Cir.2003). In my view, this approach constitutes a reasonable means of insuring judicial economy in cases involving clearly meritless claims, and, furthermore, it comports with this Court's similar practice of permitting the resolution of waiver issues through reference to the merits of an underlying claim. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 304 n. 13, 865 A.2d 761, 779 n. 13 (2004).