dissents, in which ELDRIDGE, J. joins.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Maryland’s sex offender registration statute does not constitute punishment. The statute is, first of all, much more than a registration statute; rather it also contains broad, virtually unlimited, community notification provisions. Specifically, and particularly in light of its community notification provisions, I am persuaded that the punitive effect of the statute outweighs, and negates, any remedial purpose it has. I would hold, therefore, that registration pursuant to the sex offender registration statute constitutes punishment and, further, because *721the proof required for the court to order a defendant to register does not fall within the exception, established by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487-88, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2361-62, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 453-55 (2000), for the proof of the fact of prior conviction, that the relevant factual predicate to registration must be presented to a jury, which must make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
Jessie Lee Young, the petitioner, was convicted, pursuant to Md.Code Article 27, § 432 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.),1 of transporting, for prostitution purposes, the victim in this case, who was under eighteen years old. A separate statute, Md.Code art. 27, § 792 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.),2 requires defendants convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including § 432, and ordered by the court to do so, see § 792(a)(6)(vii), to register as sex offenders. § 792(c). For his conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, the maximum, with all but eight years suspended and five years supervised probation on release, a condition of *722which, consistent with the state’s request, was that he “register as a sexual offender.”3
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “ ‘any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. at 2355, 147 L.Ed.2d at 446 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1224 n. 6, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, 326 n. 6 (1999)). There, Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. 530 U.S. at 469, 120 S.Ct. at 2351, 147 L.Ed.2d at 442. Under New Jersey’s “hate crimes” law, a trial court could impose an extended period of imprisonment if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with the purpose to intimidate an individual or group based on an impermissible bias. Id. at 469-70, 120 S.Ct. at 2351-52, 147 L.Ed.2d at 442-43. Finding that the defendant acted out of racial bias, the trial court imposed a twelve year sentence, which was two years greater than the maximum for a second degree firearms possession offense. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its holding on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment: “taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to a ‘jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a *723reasonable doubt.’ Id. at 476-77, 120 S.Ct. at 2355-56, 147 L.Ed.2d at 447. The Court added:
“If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not— at the moment the State is put to the proof of those circumstances — be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.”
Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 2360, 147 L.Ed.2d at 451.
Although denominated a Registration of Offender Statute, § 792 is a great deal more; it is, as well, a community notification statute and a very broad one, at that. See § 792(g) and (j).
As we have seen, an “offender” must register with his or her “supervising authority,”4 if he or she violates one of the enumerated statutes and is ordered by the court to do so. See § 792(a)(6).5 For an offender sentenced in this State, that means on or before the date of release, or sentence, when the sentence results in immediate release. See § 792(e)(l)(i).6 An *724offender must register annually for ten years, see § 792(d), each year signing and returning the verification form sent to him or her by the Department of public Safety and correctional Services (hereinafter “the Department”). See § 792(h)(3).7 The offender, like all registrants, is required to send the Department written notice of his or her change of residence, within 7 days of the change occurring. See § 792(c)(3). The registration statement shall be signed and dated and include the offender’s name, address, a description of the crime for which he or she was convicted, the date of the conviction, the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred, a list of any aliases used, and the offender’s social security number. ' See § 792(e).8
Besides the registration requirements, the statute also contains provisions for giving notice to certain agencies, persons and the public. The supervising authority must send a copy of the registration statement, the registrant’s fingerprints, and a photograph of the registrant to the local law enforcement *725agency in the county or counties where the registrant will reside, work, or attend school. See § 792(f)(3). When the supervising authority is not a unit of the Department, it also must, within that five day period, send the registration statement to the Department, which is required to maintain a central registry. See § 792(h)(l)(i). The local law enforcement agency is then required, when the offender resides in a municipality that has a police department, to send the notice to the police department of the municipality.9
Section 792(j) addresses, inter alia, to whom copies of a registrant statement may be sent.10 The supervising authority must send a copy of the registration statement to the last known address of certain persons who have requested, in writing, notice about a specific registrant: the victim, or, if a minor, the victim’s parents or guardian; a witness who testified against the registrant in court proceedings; as well as “any individual specified in writing by the State’s Attorney.” *726See § 792(3). In addition, upon a request from an individual containing the name and address of the individual submitting the request and the reason for requesting the information, a local law enforcement agency shall send one copy of the registration statement of each child sexual offender and each sexually violent predator and may send a registration statement on file with the agency of registrants who are neither child sexual offenders or sexually violent predators. Moreover, “In addition to the notice required under subsection (g)(1)(h) of this section, the Department and a local law enforcement agency shall provide notice of a registration statement to any person that the Department or local law enforcement agency determines may serve to protect the public concerning a specific registrant if the Department or the agency determines that such notice is necessary to protect the public.” See § 792(7)(i).11 Section 792(6) provides:
“(6) The Department shall release registration statements or information concerning registration statements to the public and may post on the Internet a current listing of each registrant’s name, offense, and other identifying information, in accordance with regulations established by the Department.”
As indicated, the petitioner was convicted of a violation of § 432, which carries a maximum sentence of ten years. He was ordered to register as a sexual offender as a condition of probation. There is, in addition, a separate statute prescribing registration by certain convicted persons under certain circumstances. The question that has been asked and, thus, must be answered is whether that additional requirement of registration, whether as a condition of probation or pursuant to the statute, is punishment. If it is, it seems clear to me that the petitioner’s sentence has been enhanced and that, therefore, he was entitled to have the evidence on the basis of *727which the registration decision was made evaluated by a jury under the Apprendi standard.12
At the outset, the majority acknowledges that the court ordered registration as a condition of probation, but argues only that it was pursuant to § 792; it does not argue, as the trial court apparently believed, see n. 3, that the registration was consistent with its authority to fashion conditions of probation. That is not surprising, since conditions of probation clearly are punishment. See Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 610, 471 A.2d 730, 735 (1984) (“It hardly can be contended that one who has been ordered to pay restitution, as a condition of probation, and is subject to revocation of that probation for failure to make payment, has not received punishment.”). The trial court also ordered that the petitioner obtain psychological treatment. Under the majority’s view, that also is not punishment, presumably because it is intended to be remedial.
Turning to the statute, I do not take issue with the test the majority ultimately adopts, and applies, in this case, although the cases on the basis of which it was formulated arose in much different contexts. Indeed, I have found only one case directly on point, see People v. Marchand, 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 687 (2002) and it, following the Supreme Court of California’s lead, see People v. Castellanos, 21 Cal.4th 785, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211, 217 (1999),13 as it had to, *728applied a -version of the “intent-effects” test for evaluating whether an act is punitive or remedial, concluding that sex offender registration does not constitute punishment or penalty within the meaning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Marchand, 98 Cal.App. 4th at 1065, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at 694. The Supreme Court of California held in Castellanos that, for ex post facto purposes, sexual offender registration was not punishment. 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d at 218. It is significant that neither court expressed an opinion as to the community notification provisions of the statute. Castellanos, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d at 218, n. 6 (“It does not appear that defendant is subject to the public notification provisions of section 290, subdivisions (m) and (n), and section 290.4, and we express no opinion regarding the effect, if any, that application of those provisions would have upon our analysis.”); Marchand, 98 Cal.App.4th at 1062, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at 692 (“it does not appear defendant here is subject to the public notification provisions of the sex offender registration statutes.... Thus, we need not address defendant’s argument that sex offender registration constitutes punishment because it ‘obviously carries substantial societal stigma.’ ”)
II.
The majority asserts that “[n]umerous courts have discussed the issue of whether the registration and notification provisions of sex offender registration statutes ... constitute punishment,” 370 Md. 686, 697, 806 A.2d 233, 239 (2002), concluding that “[t]he overwhelming body of this judicial precedent concludes that sex offender registration under these types of statutes is not punishment.” Id. at 697, 806 A.2d at *729239. This suggestion that there is a strong consensus on this issue is misleading.
Although the numerous state statutes do share certain general characteristics, several aspects of their administration, their registration requirements, and, particularly, their community notiilcation provisions, vary considerably. See generally Stephen R. McAllister, Megan’s Laws: Wise Public Policy or Ill-Considered Public Folly?, 7 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 17 (1998). For example, while some states limit disclosure to law enforcement, see, e.g., State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1992)(At the time of registering, the person shall sign a statement in writing giving such information as required by the director of the department of public safety. The sheriff shall fingerprint and photograph the person and within three days thereafter shall send copies of the statement, fingerprints and photographs to the criminal identification section within the department of public safety and the chief of police, if any, of the place where the person resides); State v. Costello, 138 N.H. 587, 643 A.2d 531, 533 (1994) (The sexual offender reports his or her current address annually to local law enforcement agency, which forwards it to the State Police for entry in the law enforcement name search system and is held confidential within the law enforcement community, with local law enforcement agencies being notified when the offender or permit public disclosure only on the basis of an individualized assessment of the risk of recidivism.), see Artway v. Attorney of the State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (3rd Cir.1996); see also Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1269-70 (2nd Cir.1997), or as necessary to protect the public concerning a specific registrant, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir.1999), others have posted all sex offenders’ information on the Internet. See, e. g., Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.2001), cert. granted, - U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 1062, 151 L.Ed.2d 966 (2002). Because Maryland’s sex offender registration statute permits broad public disclosure but does not provide for an individualized risk assessment, the majority’s reliance on cases upholding more narrowly tailored statutes is misplaced.
*730Moreover, although many courts have determined that registration requirements and notification of law enforcement do not constitute punishment, far fewer have examined the closer issue of whether community notification does. See, e.g., Castellanos, supra, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d at 218; Marchand, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 1062, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at 692; Artway, supra, 81 F.3d at 1248; Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir.2000) (declining to rule, on habeas corpus, on the constitutionality of the community notification provision of the registration statute, the issue not having been raised or decided by the State court). In fact, many of the decisions discussed by the majority predate the enactment of broad community notification provisions, which did not become widespread until the federal government expressly encouraged their adoption, or do not include analysis of the issue because the challenges brought were not yet ripe for consideration.
In Artway, for example, cited by the majority, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to consider whether the community notification provisions of New Jersey’s sex offender statute constituted punishment. See 81 F.3d at 1248. Whether the registrant’s personal information would be publicly available depended on how he was classified under New Jersey’s “Registrant Risk Assessment Scale,” as well as on a future decision of the Prosecutor’s Office. Id. The court reasoned that notification under the statute involved a contingency that rendered too speculative the prospect of hardship from the denial of review. Nonetheless, in discussing and, ultimately, upholding the statute’s registration requirements, the Artway court frequently drew a distinction between the registration requirements and the notification provisions, making clear that whether the registration information would be made publicly available was a significant factor in determining whether the statute was punitive.14
*731Courts have been more likely to find the community notification provisions of a sexual offender registration statute punitive when those notification provisions permit, or mandate, broad public disclosure of registrant information. See, e.g., Kansas v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 2508, 138 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1997), is one of the earlier examples. Under the Kansas Sex Offender Registration Act, the community notification provisions authorized public inspection of sex offender records at police departments and contained no affirmative restrictions on dissemination. Thus, it permitted newspapers or others to disseminate the information as broadly as they pleased. The Kansas Supreme Court held the community notification provisions of the Kansas statute had a punitive effect and, therefore, was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. In reaching that result, it applied the factors formulated in Kennedy v. *732Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), whether: (1) the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) it historically has been regained as a punishment; (3) it requires a finding of scienter; (4) its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) it lacks an alternative purpose to which it rationally may be connected; and (7), the statute appears excessive in relation to an existing alternative. Id., at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. at 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d at 661.
As to the first factor, holding that the registration provisions did not constitute punishment, Myers, 260 Kan. at 695, 923 P.2d 1024, the court addressed the community notification provisions, concluding:
“However, we must also consider the provision in K.S.A. 22-4909 that the registered information is open to public inspection in the sheriffs office. Although 22-4909 does not impose any affirmative dissemination requirements on the authorities, it imposes no restrictions on anyone who inspects the information. The information could be routinely published in the newspaper or otherwise voluntarily disseminated by anyone. The practical effect of such unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or employment. We find that the KSORA public disclosure provision does impose an affirmative disability or restraint. Unrestricted public access to the registered information leaves open the possibility that the registered offender will be subjected to public stigma and ostracism.”
Id. at 695-96, 923 P.2d 1024.
The court also determined that the statute promoted both retribution and deterrence, explaining:
“Registration has an obvious deterrent effect. A registered offender is more likely to think twice before committing another sex offense when the person knows that the local sheriff already has the offender’s name on a list. We acknowledge the statement in [United States v.] Ursery, [518 U.S. 267, 292, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, *733570 (1996) ], that “the purpose of deterrence ... may serve civil as well as criminal goals.” The stigma that will accompany public exposure of the registered information could be viewed as a form of retribution. We find that the KSORA public disclosure provision may have both a deterrent and retributive effect. However, the nonpunitive purpose of the statute cannot be accomplished without informing the public that a sex offender is in its midst. If the statute limited public disclosure to that necessary to protect the public, then its deterrent effect could be viewed as incidental to its nonpunitive purpose. Unlimited public access to the registry provides a deterrent or retributive effect that goes beyond such purpose.”
Id. at 696, 923 P.2d 1024.
To the court, however, “the excessive scope of public disclosure of registered information” was the key factor in its determining that the community notification provisions were punitive. Id. at 696-97, 923 P.2d 1024. Recalling the specter of “that most famous badge of punishment: the Scarlet Letter” id. at 697, 923 P.2d 1024 (quoting Artway, 81 F.3d at 1255,) in which it was observed: “There can be no outrage ... against our common nature, — whatever be the delinquencies of the individual, — no outrage more flagrant than to forbid the culprit to hide his face for shame; as it was the essence of this punishment to do,” (quoting Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 63-64 (Random House 1950)), it held:
“For Myers, KSORA’s disclosure provision must be considered punishment. We hold that the legislative aim in the disclosure provision was not to punish and that retribution was not an intended purpose. However, we reason that the repercussions, despite how they may be justified, are great enough under the facts of this case to be considered punishment. The unrestricted public access given to the sex offender registry is excessive and goes beyond that necessary to promote public safety.”
Id. at 699, 923 P.2d 1024.
More recently, in Doe v. Otte, supra, the 9th Circuit found punitive the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. That stat*734ute required convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement authorities and authorized public disclosure of information in the sex offender registry. Implementing regulations provided that Alaska would, in all cases, post the information from the registry for public viewing in print or electronic form, so that it can be used by “any person” “for any purpose.” Alaska Admin. Code tit. 13, § 09.050(a) (2000). Thus, like the Kansas statute, the Alaska law allowed unrestricted public access to the registration information, regardless of risk, by providing for posting the sex offender’s name, physical description, street address, employer address, and conviction information, along with a color photograph, on the State’s Department of Public Safety website on the Internet. Applying the Mendozctr-Martinez test, the court held:
“the effects of the specific provisions of the Alaska Act provide the ‘clearest proof that, notwithstanding the legislature’s non-punitive intent, the statute must be classified as punitive for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes. Four of the seven factors favor this result.[15] Two factors, particularly, demonstrate that the effect of this particular statute is to increase the penalty the law provided at the time Doe I and Doe II’s offenses were committed. First, there is the substantial disability- imposed by the Act. The registration provisions, which require in-person registration at a local police station where registrants must provide detailed information four times each year for life in the case of some defendants, and annually for 15 years in the case of others, are extremely burdensome. This disability is exacerbated by the public notification provisions that plaintiffs’ uncontradicted evidence demonstrates exposes all registrants to world-wide obloquy and ostracism. Second, unlike the sex offender registration and notification statutes upheld by the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits, as well as by this Circuit in Russell, the Alaska statute is excessive in relation to its non-punitive purpose. An offender cannot escape the Act’s *735grasp no matter how clearly he may demonstrate that he poses no future risk to anyone, and no matter how final the judicial determination that he has been successfully rehabilitated; in short, under the Alaska statute, the requirements relating to disclosure of a past offense are not related to the risk posed. Furthermore, that the Act applies only to offenders who have been convicted of committing a crime and that it serves retributive and deterrent ends [16] provides additional support for our conclusion that the Alaska statute is punitive.”
Id. at 993-94 (citing Hendricks, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2082, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 515 (1997)) (footnote omitted).
Other courts have expressed concern regarding the broad dissemination of sex offender registry information. In Doe v. Attorney General, 425 Mass. 217, 680 N.E.2d 97 (1997), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed an injunction against enforcement of that State’s sex offender registration statute. The statute provided:
“Any person who is eighteen years of age or older, upon the verification of his age and identity, shall receive at no cost from the [criminal history systems board] a report which indicates whether an individual identified by name, date of birth or sufficient personal identifying characteristics is a sex offender as defined in section one hundred and seventy-eight C, the offenses for which he or she was convicted or adjudicated, and the dates of said convictions or adjudications. Any records of inquiry shall be kept confidential; provided, however, that the records may be disseminated to assist any criminal prosecution.”
*736Despite a disclaimer in the law,17 the court upheld the injunction, observing that the statute “contained no explicit remedial or regulatory purpose. Any adult, merely by presenting identification, may obtain sex offender registry information from the board for any reason or for no reason at all. The ... disclosures under § 1781 are not limited to serving some worthy public purpose.” Id. at 99. Turning to the question whether disclosure of the plaintiffs sex offender registry information imposed punishment in a constitutional sense, the court rejected the State’s argument that there is no evidence that the plaintiff would be harmed by the disclosure, pointing out:
“The possibility exists, however, that a person with no remedial motive 'will obtain sex offender registry information and reveal it to the plaintiffs detriment. The potential harm to the plaintiff in his employment or in his community, or both, from the use of such information for other than personal protection is substantial. Once the plaintiff is harmed, at best it will not easily be remediable.”
Id. at 100.
A similar concern is reflected in the due process challenge to Internet posting mounted in Doe v. Lee, 132 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Conn), aff'd, Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2nd Cir.2001), cert. granted Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, — U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 1959, 152 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2002). Pursuant to Connecticut’s sex offender registry act, registry information is required to be made available to the public in a number of ways: at the central registry during regular business hours; at local law enforcement agency offices during business hours; and over the Internet. In addition, the Department of Public Safety must annually remind the State’s media that the regis*737try exists and provide them with information on how to access it. The database containing the registry information is uncategorized, that is, not differentiated on the basis of individual dangerousness.18 The court found the plaintiffs due process claim meritorious, explaining:
“Plaintiff prevails on the due process claim because the State has not provided him with any opportunity to challenge the stigmatizing allegation, implied by his inclusion in the publicly available registry, that he is a dangerous sex offender. The implied allegation, which plaintiff contends is false, arises from the undifferentiated nature of the registry, in which dangerous and nondangerous registrants are grouped in a single classification and no information is provided regarding any registrant’s dangerousness. Because there can be no doubt that some registrants are dangerous, Connecticut’s single classification falsely suggests that nondangerous registrants are a threat to public safety. In addition to falsely stigmatizing nondangerous registrants, the CT-SORA alters their legal status under state law.”
Id. at 62 (footnote omitted). But see Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.2000), (upholding the Utah sex offender registration and notification statute, which, like the Alaska statute, makes the state’s entire sex offender registry accessible on the Internet). Id. at 1247-48.19
III.
The majority adopts the “intent-effects” analysis gleaned from Hendricks and United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 568 (1996), which *738incorporates the Mendoza-Martinez factors. In its application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to Maryland’s Registration of Offenders statute, the majority concedes that it imposes an affirmative restraint on registrants, stating that “particularly in light of the community notification provisions ... [b]eing labeled as a sexual offender within the community can be highly stigmatizing and can carry the potential for social ostracism.” 370 Md. at 713, 806 A.2d at 249. The majority also concedes that the statute applies to behavior that is already a crime, see id., and acknowledges that it promotes deterrence. Id. at 715, 806 A.2d at 250. Nonetheless it concludes that the statute is “not excessive in relation to its remedial purpose,” id., concluding that it “serves the important nonpunitive goal of alerting law enforcement and the community to the presence of sexual predators who may reoffend.” Id. It reasons that the statute’s provisions “are narrowly tailored to effectuate the goal of protection of the public from sex offenders.” Id.
I am hard pressed to discern how the majority can suggest that the statute is narrowly tailored. Unlike the statutes involved in most of the cases relied upon by the majority, Maryland’s sex offender registration statute permits broad public disclosure of registration information. In addition to dissemination of the registration statements to local enforcement agencies, for further dissemination, in the case of certain registrants, to the County school superintendents, and to the Department as the Central depositary, the supervising authority must send a copy of the registration statement to certain persons, including the victim, a witness who testified against the registrant, and “any individual specified in writing by the State’s Attorney.” See § 792(j)(3). In addition, it must meet the requests under § 792(j)(5)(i)(l) and may comply with those under § 792(j)(5)(i)(2). The Department or any local law enforcement agency, when they determine it to be necessary to protect the public, is required to give notice of a registration statement to anyone that they determine may serve to protect the public concerning a specific registrant. See § 792(7)(i). And, as we have seen, “[tjhe Department shall *739release registration statements or information concerning registration statements to the public and may post on the Internet a current listing of each registrant’s name, offense, and other identifying information, in accordance with regulations established by the Department.” See § 792(6). During the pendency of this decision, the Department has begun posting registration information on the Internet. This information includes the registrant’s name, picture — if available, exact home address, category of offense, and a description of his crime.
This is very broad community notification. In fact, it is reminiscent of the broad notification provisions found to be punitive in Myers and Otte. The reasoning of Myers and Otte, therefore, apply with equal force to this case. While our statute may not be so broad as either of the statutes invalidated in those cases, it comes closer to them than to any other statute to which the Court has been referred or of which I am aware, save one: Femedeer v. Haun, supra, by whose reasoning, I simply am not persuaded.
Like the Kansas Supreme Court and the 8th Circuit, I am satisfied that the Maryland sex offender statute imposes an affirmative disability on the registrants, promotes retribution and deterrence, and is excessive in relation to its remedial purpose. Critical to this conclusion is the breadth of the community notification provisions. It is that which causes the affirmative disability or restraint. As the majority recognizes, deterrence is an impact of registration. The Supreme Court of Kansas is correct, however, in recognizing that broad community notification may give the statute a retributive effect. And when there are virtually no restrictions on the dissemination of the registration statements, there is little relation, or effect, to the remedial purpose of the statute. I would hold, applying the “intent-effects test,”20 as does the *740majority, and adopting the reasoning of Myers and Otte, that § 792 is punitive.
In the case sub judice, petitioner’s classification as an offender was governed solely by the definition of “offender” in § 792(a)(6), which turned only on his conviction for an enumerated crime, involving a victim under the age of eighteen and the fact that the court ordered the registration. We have no idea, because the trial judge did not make an explicit finding on the record, as to why the petitioner was ordered to register as an offender. It may have been because of the victim’s age, but it may have been for some other, less obvious reason. All we know for sure is that the trial court sought to impose as a condition of probation that the petitioner register as a sex offender.21 In any event, whatever the basis for the court’s order requiring petitioner to register, I submit that basis should have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At the very least, that would consist of the victim’s age.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge ELDRIDGE joins in the views herein expressed.
. Article 27, § 432 was repealed and re-enacted by 2001 Md. Laws 674. See Md.Code art. 27, § 428 (2001 Supp.). Section 432 provided:
"Anv person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, by any means of conveyance, through or across this State, any person for the purpose of prostitution, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice or compel the person to become a prostitute, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years; any person who may commit the crime in this section mentioned may be prosecuted, indicted, tried and convicted in any county or city in or through which he shall so transport or attempt to transport the other person.”
. Md.Code art. 27, § 792 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.) was repealed and reenacted by 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 10, § 2, effective October 1, 2001, and codified at Md.Code §§ 11-701-11-702 and 11703-11-721 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.). By Md. Laws, ch. 221, also effective October 1, 2001, § 11-702.1, pertaining to the retroactive application of the registration law, was added.
. The transcript of the sentencing reflects that the court sentenced the petitioner as follows:
"It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you, Jessie Lee Young, be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections to be confined under this jurisdiction for a period of ten years. You are to be given credit for 246 days that you have already served. And the Court is going to suspend all but eight years, and when are released, you are placed on five years supervised probation.
"Part of that probation, sir, you must register as a sexual offender, you are to have no contact with the victim in this case, Jessie McGregor, and her sister, Felicia Green. You are to take whatever psychological treatment as required by your probation officer, and you are to pay the cost of these proceedings.”
. The meaning of the term ‘‘Supervising authority” varies depending upon the offender’s sentence and where he or she is housed or by whom supervised. Thus, the supervising authority may be the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, the administrator of a local detention center, the sentencing court, the Director of Parole and Probation, the Director of the Paluxent Institution, the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the like. See § 792(a)(13).
. Although "offender” is included within the definition of "registrant” and a registrant is required to register with the supervising authority upon certain occurrences, without any mention of a court order, given the specific requirement of a court order in § 792(a)(6), it appears that it is the court order that triggers the registration, not the mere qualification as an offender.
. Failure to register is a separate misdemeanor. Section 792(Z) provides:
“A registrant who knowingly fails to regisler or knowingly provides false information of a material fact as required by this section is *724guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than $5,000 or both.”
. For persons in other statuses, the registration period may be for life and require more frequent registration than annually:
"(5) The term of registration is:
* * * —
“(ii) life if:
"1. The registrant has been determined to be a sexually violent predator in accordance with the procedures described in subsection (b) of this section;
"2. The registrant has been convicted of a violation of any of the provisions of §§ 462 through 464 B of this article; or ”3. The registrant has been previously required to register and has been convicted of any offense listed in subsection (a)(2)(6), or (11) of this section.”
§ 792(d)(5). A sexually violent predator must register every 90 days. § 792(d)(4).
. Where the registrant is a non-resident child sexual offender, offender, sexually violent offender or sexually violent predator, in this State for employment or educational purposes, see § 792(a)(7), this information also must include the registrant’s place of employment or "place of educational institution or school enrollment.”
. Section 792(g) contains provisions pertaining to the registration statements of child sexual offenders and sexually violent, offenders. As to the former, in addition to sending notice to the Department, the local law enforcement agency "shall send written notice of the registration statement to the county superintendent of schools in the county where tire child sexual offender will reside." See § 792(g)(1)(h). The county superintendent, in turn, must send written notice of the registration statement "to those principals of the schools within the supervision of the superintendent that the superintendent considers necessary to protect the students of a school from a child sexual offender. See § 792(g)(2).
As to sexually violent predators, § 792(g)(3) provides:
“(3)(i) Every 90 days, the local law enforcement agency shall mail a verification form, which may not be forwarded, to the last reported address of a sexually violent predator.
“(ii) Within 10 days after receiving the verification form, the sexually violent predator shall sign the form and mail it to the local law enforcement agency.
“(iii) Within 5 days after obtaining a verification form from a sexually violent predator, a local law enforcement agency shall send a copy of the verification form to the Department.”
. Section 792(j)(1) defines what a registration statement consists of for purposes of this section: "a copy of the completed registration form and a copy of a photograph of the registrant, but need not include the registrant’s fingerprints.”
. The Department and local law enforcement agency is charged with establishing procedures for carrying out the notification requirements of this section. See § 792(7)(ii).
. The majority holds, in any event, that the registration requirement does not enhance the petitioner’s sentence, as a matter of fact. 370 Md. at 716, 806 A.2d at 251. I do not agree. As we have seen, the maximum sentence for a violation of § 432 is ten years. That sentence does not include any registration requirement. Consequently, once it is determined that the registration statute is punitive, imposing a registration requirement pursuant to § 792 is additional punishment that enhances ihe maximum sentence for the underlying offense, whatever the amount of actual jail time imposed.
. A majority of the court applied a test that considered "whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature’s contrary intent,” but declined to apply the multifactor test enunciated in Kennedy *728v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), for determining whether a nominally civil penalty should be reclassified as criminal, had to be applied in the ex post facto context, People v. Castellanos, 21 Cal.4th 785, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211, 217 (1999), which is the test a minority of the court would have applied.
. Contrasting the notification provisions of the New Jersey statute with the registration requirements, the Artway court offered the follow*731ing explanation of why the challenge of the notification procedures was not ripe for judicial review:
“The notification procedures, on the other hand, involve dissemination of potentially devastating information to undetermined numbers of private citizens. Because these private citizens are not part of the trained state law enforcement mechanism, we are less certain how they will react. For instance, the one study in the record chronicles a number of incidents of harassment at the hands of private citizens as a result of the State of Washington’s notification law, but records no incidents on the part of law enforcement. We also lack concrete record evidence about what [petitioner]’s future dangerousness classification will be, on what facts the classification will be determined, and who will be notified....”
81 F.3d at 1250. Disagreeing wilh the petitioner's argument that the registration requirements constituted punishment, the court emphasized that his notification challenge was not being decided, stating as follows:
"[Petitioner] marshals strong reasons that notification would have devastating effects. In addition to the ostracism that is part of its very design, notification subjects him to possible vigilante reprisals and loss of employment. And unlike the mere fact of his past conviction, which might be learned from an employment questionnaire or public records, notification under Megan’s Law features the State’s determination — based overwhelmingly on past conduct — that the prior offender is a future danger to the community. We reemphasize, however, that as forceful as [petitionerj’s arguments seem to be, the issue of notification is not ripe at this time.”
Id. at 1266.
. The three factors favoring a finding that it was non-punitive were historical treatment, scienter and there being a non-punitive alternative.
. The bases on which the court determined that the Alaska statute was retributive were the Act’s onerous registration obligations, specifically, the duration of the Act’s reporting requirement. Requiring the sex offenders to report quarterly to their local police stations may be analogized, the court opined, to the duty imposed on other defendants, after conviction, to report regularly to a probation officer or to comply with the conditions of supervised release. The registration duration of fifteen years applies to even non-aggravated offenses.
. The statute also provided:
"All reports to persons making inquiries shall include a warning regarding the criminal penalties for use of sex offender registry information to commit a crime or to engage in illegal discrimination or harassment of an offender and the punishment for threatening to commit a crime under the provisions of section four of chapter two hundred and seventy-five.”
. According to the court, “By undifferentiated [it] mean[t] a system like Connecticut’s, which places all registrants in one class for notification purposes — ‘sex offender’ — without attempting any individualized assessment of their dangerousness or likelihood of reoffense. One commentator has termed systems without individualized risk assessment ‘compulsory’ registries.” Doe v. Lee, 132 F.Supp.2d at 59 n. 3.
. Unlike the Alaska statute, the Utah database does not include employer names and addresses. See id. at 1247.
. I assume, without deciding that the legislative intent in enacting the sex offender registration statute was not punilive, but remedial. It should be noted, however, that there are significant indicia that suggest the contrary. As the petitioner points out, the statute was codified in *740the criminal code and recodified in the criminal procedure code. Also the legislative history, because great pains were taken by its sponsors to insulate the statute from an ex post facto challenge, is supportive of a statute that is punitive.
. Section 432 does not require proof of the age of the person transported as an element of the crime. The petitioner very well could have been convicted even if the jury believed the victim was older or accepted his defense that he thought she was older. Thus, there is force to the petitioner's argument that whether the victim was under eighteen was before the jury a disputed, albeit largely objective, fact in this case. The determination of that ''fact” was not submitted to the jury for decision beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the jury convicted petitioner of transporting a person for tire purposes of prostitution, the jury was presented with conflicting evidence as to that person’s age and the issue was never presented to the jury for a finding of fact.