(dissenting). The just progress of the law is needlessly retarded by the failure of judges to deal with modern-day realities as they find them. In today’s society, *254practically every man with any sense of responsibility carries suitable insurance coverage on the automobile he owns and operates.1 He does this not only to protect himself against the consequences of the neglectful operation of his automobile, but also because he wants to make certain that anyone injured by the neglect is fairly compensated for his injury. His insurance policy is in broad terms and covers injuries to others, including his passengers who may be dose friends and relatives and their wives and children. So long as the wives and children are those of his friends and relatives the insurance is effective, but under the majority’s holding here and in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N. J. 1 (1958), it becomes meaningless when his own wife and children are the injured. It seems to me that this result lacks the support of any sound reason or policy; it has been universally condemned in the thoughtful professorial and student writings on the subject. See Harper & James, The Law of Torts §§ 8.11, 13.4 (1956); Prosser, Law of Torts § 101 (2d ed. 1955); McCurdy, “Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation,” 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1930); Seavey, "Torts,” 1958 Annual Survey of American Law, p. 487; 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 561 (1959); 58 Colum. L. Rev. 576 (1958); 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 681 (1958); 38 Cornell L. Q. 462 (1953); 10 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 121 (1953); 39 Va. L. Rev. 389 (1953); 7 Wyo. L. J. 199 (1953); 2 De Paul L. Rev. 119 (1952); 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1208 (1951); 4 Vand. L. Rev. 377 (1951); 7 Fordham L. Rev. 459 (1938); 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 80 (1930); cf. 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 540 (1959); 33 St. John’s L. Rev. 310 (1959); 31 Temp. L. Q. 233 (1958); 3 Vill. L. Rev. 577 (1958); 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 346 (1958); 55 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1957); 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 368 (1957); 34 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 333 (1956); 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 610 (1956); 35 B. U. L. Rev. 205 (1955); 7 Okla. L. Rev. 238 (1954); *2552 Buffalo L. Rev. 166 (1952); 5 S. C. L. Q. 294 (1952); 5 Ala. L. Rev. 173 (1952); 6 U. Miami L. Q. 617 (1952); 1 Catholic U. L. Rev. 161 (1951); 26 Ind. L. J. 465 (1951); 22 Miss. L. J. 174 (1951); 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 225 (1951); 30 Ore. L. Rev. 86 (1950); 32 Marq. L. Rev. 289 (1948); 28 Geo. L. J. 430 (1939); 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1938); 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 294 (1936); 11 N. C. L. Rev. 352 (1933); 33 Colum. L. Rev. 360 (1933); 20 Calif. L. Rev. 342 (1932); 7 Notre Dame Law. 259 (1932); 16 Cornell L. Q. 386 (1931); 15 Minn. L. Rev. 126 (1930). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (Ct. App. 1932); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 1939); and Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 788, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (Sup. Ct. 1927), where Justice Crownhart had this to say in dissent:
“Times have, changed. Practically no business is now carried on without insurance to protect the owner against his negligence whereby his employees may be damaged. Practically all owners of automobiles protect themselves in the same way. Certainly all prudent men should guard against liability in such cases. Should a man think less of his own flesh and blood than of his employees or the stranger on the highway? And if he is thoughtful enough to insure against misfortune due to his negligence to the public at large, must the court step in and deny the infant member of his family the same chance in life as is possessed by the public? I think not.” 212 N. W., at p. 790
Nothing in the English common law precluded an action by a minor who had been wronged by his parent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 675; McCurdy, supra, at p. 1059; cf. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchand [1923] 35 Que. K. B. 5, 4 D. L. R. 913, reversed on other grounds, [1924] Can. Sup. Ct. 86, 4 D. L. R. 157 (1923); Young v. Rankin [1934] Sess. Cas. 499 (Scot. 2d Div.). And until the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1891), there was no ease in the United States which precluded such *256an action. In Hewlett the court refused to allow an unemancipated daughter to sue her mother for damages resulting from the alleged malicious imprisoning of the daughter in an insane asylum. It cited no authority for its holding but took the position that in the interests of the peace and tranquility of the family, a minor child should, as a matter of public policy, be prohibited from suing his parent for personal injuries. Later state court cases have followed the Hewlett decision, and in New Jersey Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532 (E. & A. 1935) held that in order to preserve the family relationship, a minor child may not sue for a personal wrong committed by his parent. The court there had no occasion to and did not deal with a complaint which alleged, as here, that the wrongdoing parent was fully covered by automobile liability insurance; it is perfectly clear that where there is such insurance the action cannot, in any realistic sense, be said to endanger the family relationship or offend any policy based on its preservation. Thus, in Lusk v. Lusk, supra, a unanimous court, following the lead of Chief Justice Peaslee’s opinion for the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, permitted an action by a minor daughter against her father for injuries sustained in a school bus which was owned and operated by the father; in the course of its opinion the court distinguished the ordinary parental immunity rule, saying:
“But a different situation arises where the parent is protected by insurance in his vocational capacity. The rule followed in the Securo Case concedes the commission of a civil wrong on the child by the parent, but palliates the wrong (in case of passive negligence) in the interest of parental discipline and control and of domestic harmony. A wise provision when so confined and where pertinent to the case. McCurdy, 43 Harv. L. R. 1079, § 5. But as was said in the case of Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 910, 71 A. L. R. 1055, ‘The law does not make fetishes of ideas,’ and we must not exalt this rule above ordinary common sense. A maxim of the common law (and of the ages for that matter) is when the reason for a rule ceases the rule itself ceases (eessante ratione legis cassat ipsa lex). There is no reason for applying the rule in the instant case. This action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the father. A recovery by her is no *257loss to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor of her recovery, but without hint of ‘domestic fraud and collusion’ (charged in some cases). There is no filial recrimination and no pitting of the daughter against the father in this case. No strained family relations will follow. On the contrary, the daughter must honor the father for attempting to provide compensation against her misfortune. Family harmony is assured instead of disrupted. A wrong is righted instead of ‘privileged.’ ” 166 S. E., at pp. 538-539
See Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, 150 A., at pp. 912, 913; Worrell v. Worrell, supra, 4 S. E. 2d, at p. 346; cf. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254, 257, 123 A. L. R. 1015 (Ct. App. 1939).
Those who still oppose personal injury actions by children against their fully insured parents generally recognize the total inapplicability of any policy based on the preservation of the family relationship, but urge instead the danger of fraud and collusion. As I noted in my dissenting opinion in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra, 27 N. J., at p. 15, there is opportunity for fraud and collusion in many legal proceedings, but our system of courts and juries is well designed to seek them out and the opportunity for fraud and. collusion clearly furnishes no just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions. Furthermore, as parents who seek to instill decent principles of integrity and ethics in their offspring will readily realize, there would be greater restraint and less danger of fraud and collusion between the minor child and his parent than there would be between the parent and his adult friends and relatives who admittedly may maintain actions when injured by the parent’s negligent operation of his automobile. In Rozell v. Rozell, supra, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected an attack on the right of a 12-year-old child to bring an action against his 16-year-old sister who injured him while driving an automobile covered by liability insurance; in the course of his opinion for the court Judge Rippey said:
“But I am unwilling to admit that sanction to the maintenance of such an action between brother and sister is any more of an incentive to fraud than when a similar action was sanctioned between *258husband and wife, between an emancipated son and his father, between grandmother and grandchild, between owner and guest, or between intimate friends. No warrant is found for any prediction that brothers and sisters will flock into the courts on fictitious claims through mere judicial recognition of the right of one to sue the other in personal injury eases. Common honesty inherent in the family unit presents an effective barrier. If it should appear that there is any foundation for the suggestion, a means of protection may be found in diligence on the part of the insurance carriers to ferret out and expose the fictitious claims and reliance may be placed on our courts and juries to detect and prevent a fraud.” 22 N. E. 2d, at p. 257
See Midkiff v. Midkiff, Va., 113 S. E. 2d 875, 878 (Ct. App. 1960); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1952); cf. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
The only other argument advanced against the child’s action worthy of mention here (see Prosser, supra, at p. 676; Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, 150 A., at p. 909) is that it may undermine parental authority and discipline. Whatever force this argument may have on other types of action, it clearly has no bearing on the type of action instituted in the instant matter. In Borst v. Borst, supra, 251 P. 2d, at p. 153, the Washington Supreme Court, in upholding an action by a minor child against his father for personal injuries sustained when the child was run over by his father’s automobile which was being operated for business purposes, had this to say:
“A second reason frequently advanced in support of the immunity rule is that actions by children against their parents tend to undermine parental authority and discipline. See Small v. Morrison, supra; Wick v. Wick, supra; and Mesite v. Kirchstein, supra. The field of parental control and discipline covers such matters as the maintenance of the home, chastisement, and no doubt other activities which need not here be delineated. But when the parental activity whereby the child was injured has nothing to do with parental control and discipline, a suit involving such activity cannot be said to undermine those sinews of family life. And even if such a suit should tend to impair family discipline in some degree, that would not seem to call for application of the immunity rule any more than in cases where the child sues to enforce a property right.” 251 P. 2d, at pp. 153-154
*259In Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1952), the court similarly held that a minor may maintain an action against his parent for injuries sustained as the result of the parent's negligence in the course of his business operations. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in an opinion by Judge Stewart, made the following pertinent comments:
“In these modern times, with the advent of the motor vehicle and the growing complications of business and industry and where in an industrial age we are living under changed conditions, it would seem a fantastic anomaly that in a case where two minor children were negligently injured in the operation of a business, one of them, a stranger, could recover compensation for his injuries and the other one, a minor child of the owner of the business, could not.
Ordinarily tort actions by minor children against their parents in normal, harmonious families would be rare indeed because of the natural concern of the parents to adequately provide and care for their children, and where such actions were brought there would be a strong indication that there was no harmony or domestic felicity in the family involved to be disturbed.
It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an unemancipated child to bring an action against his parent concerning the child’s property rights yet to be utterly without redress with reference to injury to his person.
It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of reason, logic or law such a situation can exist or how it can be said that domestic harmony would be undisturbed in one case and be upset in the other.” 103 N. E. 2d, at p. 748
Contract and property actions between minors and their parents are admittedly maintainable in New Jersey as elsewhere throughout the country. See In re Flasch, 51 N. J. Super. 1, 29 (App. Div. 1958), certification denied 28 N. J. 35 (1958); Alling v. Alling, 52 N. J. Eq. 92 (Ch. 1893); Keeney v. Henning, 58 N. J. Eq. 74 (Ch. 1899); Prosser, supra, § 101; Harper & James, supra, § 8.11. As the court indicated in the Signs case, it is indeed difficult to justify a judicial approach which readily permits a child to sue his parent where a contract or property right is involved yet disables him from suing where a greater right — “the right of physical integrity” — is involved. Cf. Albertsworth, *260“Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts,” 10 Cal. L. Rev. 461, 478 (1922).
In addition to the high court decisions such as Signs v. Signs, supra; Borst v. Borst, supra; Lusk v. Lusk, supra; and Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, there are many instances in which courts, displaying awareness of the general harshness and injustice of the parental immunity rule, have departed from it upon slight variations. Thus in Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N. E. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1956), the complaint alleged that the defendant injured his minor children (who were passengers in his car) when he willfully, recklessly and wantonly drove his car “at an excessive rate of speed on a foggy night, when travelling was difficult because of the wet pavement.” The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held that the action was maintainable because of the charge of “willful and wanton misconduct” (see Tabor v. O’Grady, 61 N. J. Super. 446, 451 (App. Div. 1960)); many other cases have reached a comparable result although it seems evident that the arguments generally advanced in favor of parental immunity, if they were valid, would be equally valid in the situation described in the Nudd case. See Emery v. Emery, supra; Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N. Y. S. 2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affirmed 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (App. Div. 1950); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S. E. 2d 152 (Ct. App. 1952); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (Ct. App. 1951). In Davis v. Smith, 253 F. 2d 286 (3 Cir. 1958), the court held that Pennsylvania’s parental immunity rule did not preclude an action by a minor child against the estate of his deceased father; in Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Super. 272, 154 A. 2d 242 (Super. Ct. 1959), the court held that Connecticut’s doctrine of parental immunity did not extend to a stepfather who voluntarily stood in loco parentis; in Brown v. Cole, *261198 Ark. 417, 129 S. W. 2d 245, 122 A. L. R. 1348 (Sup. Ct. 1939), the court held that the Arkansas doctrine of parental immunity did not extend to an adoptive parent; and in Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948), the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that it was for the jury to determine whether a minor daughter, who was injured as the result of her father’s negligent operation of his automobile, could maintain an action against him on the theory that she was emancipated although she was unmarried and lived at home with her father without paying for bed and board. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N. J. Misc. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
Outmoded legal doctrines are rarely overturned abruptly for courts seem to prefer to erode them gradually by differentiation, exception and ultimately extinction. See Cloyes v. Delaware Tp., 23 N. J. 324, 329 (1957); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N. J. 29, 37 (1958); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, 378 (1960); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N. J. 172 (1960); cf. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N. J. 353 (1960), commented upon in 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 (1960). All this court is now called upon to hold is that a father who carelessly and negligently injures his passenger child while driving his fully insured automobile is not immune from a legal action on the child’s behalf. It seems to me that fair and just application of the fundamental common law duty of due care, with tort liability for its breach (see Collopy, supra, 27 N. J., at p. 32), clearly calls for such a holding; accordingly, I would reverse and remand the matter for trial.
Mr. Chief Justice Weintratjb and Mr. Justice Schettino join in this dissent.
For affirmance — Justices Burling, Francis, Proctor and Hall — 4.
For reversal — -Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs and Schettino — 3.
Departmental figures indicate that between June 1, 1959 and April 30, 1960, 93.33% of all New Jersey registrants were insured.