Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Bell:I disagree with the Court’s conclusion and the reasons given to support it.
Cilley created a revocable inter vivos life insurance trust dated May 19, 1936; his last will was dated January 28, 1956; he died April 15, 1958, The majority admit (a) that when Cilley created his trust in 1936 “issue” did not include an adopted child, and (b) that when his daughter Ruth 17 years thereafter adopted a child Cilley drew a new will the effect of which was to exclude the adopted child. It is clear that in his inter vivos trust and in his will Cilley wished and intended to exclude his daughter’s adopted child from his gifts to “lawful issue”. Has the legislature nullified and voided Cilley’s intent?
What are the facts? On May 19, 1936 Cilley executed and delivered to the Fulton National Bank of Lancaster a Life Insurance Trust Agreement which was simultaneously executed by the bank. Cilley simultaneously transferred and delivered to the bank the seven policies of life insurance on his life, which were set forth in and made a part of the Agreement. This Agreement pertinently provided that one-third of the proceeds of the life insurance policies were to be paid absolutely to Cilley’s wife Blanche, if Blanche, was liv*578ing at Ms death (as she was) ; it further provided that Blanche’s interest was to be irrevocable. With respect to the other two-thirds of the proceeds of the life insurance policies, the trust (which was declared to be revocable) provided for the payment by the Trustee of income to settlor’s son and daughter until their arrival at the age of 30 years and upon their respective deaths prior thereto, one-half of the income and principal was to be paid to the deceased daughter’s (or son’s) lawful issue, and in default of lawful issue to the survivor.
When the revocable inter vivos insurance trust was executed in 1936 and the insurance policies which were included therein were delivered to the Trustee in accordance with the terms of the trust, the law was clearly settled (as the majority concede) that the word “issue” did not include an adopted child: Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 77 A. 2d 290.
The majority opinion reaches its conclusion that “lawful issue” includes a child adopted 17 years thereafter by the settlor’s daughter under the theory that “the 1936 agreement did not constitute a present conveyance."* The majority reason that the 1936 Agreement became effective only at the settlor’s death, since it. dealt with policies tohich took effect only at settlor’s death. This, as we shall see, is contrary to many prior decisions of this Court, as well as to the Estates Act of 1947, as amended by the Act of July 11, 1957, §8, P. L. 792,
In McKean’s Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A. 2d 447, the Court said: “Prior to the Estates Act of 1947, this Court repeatedly decided that where a settlor, by his deed vests a present interest in the beneficiaries but reserves a beneficial interest [for life] and also a power to revoke or modify the deed in whole or part, such interests are not thereby constituted mere expectancies *579but are present vested interests: Dickerson’s Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 A. 64; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 A. 809; Dolan’s Estate, 297 [279] Pa. 582, 124 A. 176; Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 227; Lyon Trust, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 140, 63 A. 2d 415. See also: Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 57 (1) ; 43 Harvard Law Review p. 521; 78 University of Pennsylvania Law Review p. 626; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 57.1.”
That Court then rejected the contention of the settlor’s wife — which the majority opinion has now adopted — that the Estates Act of 1947 was applicable because the conveyance did not become effective until the death of her husband which occurred after the date of the Act.
It is clear under the prior decisions of this Court, and likewise within the meaning of the Estates Act of 1947, as amended in 1957, that the 1936 trust Agreement constituted a “conveyance” of assets at the time it was eceecided and the assets were delivered to the Trustee. The word “conveyance” is thus defined in Section 1(2) : “'Conveyance’ means an act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property, whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation.” The majority opinion admits that the 1936 trust Agreement was “a conveyance,” but holds that it Avas intended to be testamentary because the interests created therein took effect only upon the death of the testator. While the decisions of this Court all hold that the Agreement was not testamentary, it is immaterial under the Estates Act whether the conveyance is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation.
The majority opinion is based on the theory recognized in a (two line) per curiam opinion in Brown Estate, 384 Pa. 99, 119 A. 2d 513. The majority has apparently overlooked the fact that Brown Estate was *580changed by the Legislature which revived the former law and this revival was approved in Henderson Estate, 395 Pa. 215, 149 A. 2d 892. In Henderson Estate this Court held that an unfunded revocable inter vivos insurance trust is not testamentary and a surviving spouse has under the Estates Act, no rights in such a trust (created by the deceased spouse) and no right to any of the proceeds of a life insurance policy included in such trust.
In Henderson Estate the Court said (pages 225, 226, 228, 229) : “Since some doubt apparently remained on the question of whether the designation of beneficiaries in a policy of life insurance, or the creation of an unfunded revocable insurance trust was testamentary, the Estates Act of 1947 was further amended on July 11, 1957, in order to make clear that such acts were not testamentary. This was accomplished by adding a new section:
“ ‘Section 8. Designation of Insurance Beneficiaries Not Testamentary.
“ ‘The designation of beneficiaries of life insurance shall not be considered testamentary, regardless of whether the insurance contract designates the ultimate beneficiaries or makes the proceeds payable, directly or indirectly, to a trustee of a trust under a will or under a separate trust instrument which designates the ultimate beneficiaries, and regardless of whether any such trust is amendable or revocable, or both, or is funded or unfunded, and notwithstanding a reservation to the settlor of all rights of ownership in the insurance contracts.’ The Joint State Government Commission made the following comment: ‘This section would replace section 8 of the Estates Act which was omitted when the rule against accumulations was changed. It has two purposes. The most important is to make it clear that unfunded insurance trusts are not testamentary *581and to that extent the law as stated in Brown Estate, 384 Pa. 99 is changed. . . .’
“The Unfunded Revocable Insurance Trust. . . . The trustee was merely the depository of the policy, with no obligation or active duties until after Henderson’s death. Premiums were paid by Henderson, the settlor, and not by the trustee. The settlor reserved the right to amend the trust and to change the trust beneficiaries, which he did, as above set forth. He likewise reserved the right to revoke the trust but never exercised this right.
“The trustee was a mere custodian, the trust was a mere shell. When the trust was created in 1952 or amended in 1953, it was a ‘conveyance of assets’ within-the meaning of §11 of the Estates Act, and under Brown Estate, supra, the widow would have been entitled to one-half of this unfunded insurance trust under her election to take against her husband’s will and against this conveyance, if no changes had been made by the above-mentioned Legislative Acts of 1956 and 1957. . . . However . . . the Legislature had clearly stated ... in 1957 that the designation of beneficiaries of life insurance shall not be considered testamentary regardless of whether the proceeds were payable to a named third party individual or to a testamentary trustee, or to an inter vivos trustee, and regardless of whether the trust was amendable or revocable or both, or funded or unfunded.
“The persons who were named by Henderson on October 28, 1957, as beneficiaries under the provisions of this insurance trust acquired whatever rights they had at that time. Since the trust was merely a revocable shell, they acquired only an expectancy. . . . While this unfunded insurance trust was a ‘conveyance of assets’ within the meaning of §11 of the Estates Act of *5821947, it is clear . . . that under §8 of the 1957 Amendment to the Estates Act of 1947 Henderson’s unfunded insurance trust was not testamentary.”
It is clear beyond any doubt that the revocable trust Agreement of 1936 (1) was a valid inter vivos Agreement which under the decisions of this Court became then and there immediately effective and (2) that it was not testamentary in character for the two-fold reason (a) that the gift in favor of Blanche Gilley was expressly stated to be irrevocable even though it was not intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment until after Gilley’s death, and (b) that Henderson Estate and §8 of the Estates Act of 1947 as amended on July 11, 1957 control.
Moreover the majority concede that the effect of Gilley’s 1956 will (he died in 1958) was to exclude this adopted child from gifts to issue. Gilley’s actual intent was therefore clear, namely, he did not wish adopted children to share in his inter vivos trust or in his will. However, the majority take the position that the Estates Act of 1947, even when amended in 1957, nullified and voided the settlor’s actual intent under the theory that the trust Agreement of 1936 did not become effective until the settlor’s death in 1958. In conveyances effective after January 1, 1948 an adopted child was presumed — by virtue of §14(3) of the Estates Act of 1947 — to be included in the word “issue” unless the settlor expressly or by implication otherwise provided. The majority further assert that settlor must have intended the word “issue” to include an adopted (in 1953) child because the trust Agreement of 1936 provided:
“Thirteenth : It is . . . agreed that this Indenture shall be revocable at any time during his life by the Honor, except as to the provision in favor of Blanche E. Gilley in paragraph Third hereof, which shall be ir*583revocable, and that no interests of any kind shall vest in any parties under this Indenture until the date of the death of the Donor, and said Donor subject to the foregoing exception may revoke, alter or modify this Indenture, in whole or in part, at any time by any instrument in writing, executed and delivered to the Trustee.”
The majority opinion states that the pivotal question is the effective date of the conveyance. Was it 1936 when the trust Agreement was made, or was it 1958 when the settlor died? Section 21 of the Estates Act provides (page 111) : “Section 21. Effective Date.— This act shall take effect on the first day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty-eight . . . shall apply only to conveyances effective on or after that day. As to conveyances effective before that day, the existing Laws shall remain in full force and effect.”
In the first place the majority’s interpretation is refuted by the prior decisions of this Court which are hereinabove cited or quoted, and in the second place it is refuted by the fact that settlor’s wife Blanche was given under the 1936 trust Agreement an irrevocable interest even though it did not vest or take effect until Cilley’s death. Moreover the word “vest” has always had a number of meanings, depending upon its context. Cf. Phillips’s Estate (No. 1), 205 Pa. 504, 55 A. 210. We believe it was not used in this context in its technical sense of vesting in interest (as the majority interpret it) especially since, we repeat, Blanche’s interest, while contingent, was irrevocable. However, it is immaterial whether the word “vest” was or was not herein used in its technical sense of vesting in interest, because the gifts to “lawful issue” were technically not vested interests but “mere expectancies,” — Henderson Estate, supra — and therefore as the settlor correctly said did not vest until his death. We believe that *584in this context the settlor used the words “no interests of any kind shall vest in any parties under this Indenture,” to mean that “no absolute indefeasible right shall be acquired by his children or lawful issue” until his death, and thus make certain beyond any legal doubt that he had a right to change or revoke the gifts to his children or lawful issue at any time he desired.
I would affirm the decree of the Orphans’ Court which held that the adopted child was not included in the words “lawful issue” and was not entitled to any share in the property included in the 1936 trust Agreement.
Italics throughout, ours.