Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Belt :Defendant Stinger admitted that he falsely answered the following question in his written application for an insurance policy: “Have you or anyone in your household ever had a suspension, revocation or refusal of any automobile license or permit to drive?” Stinger answered this question “No” and it was so marked in the application. We quote from the Opinion of the trial Judge:
“. . . This question and answer appear in the application, wherein the following statement appears just above Stinger’s signature: ‘I hereby declare the facts stated herein to be true and request the Company to issue the insurance, and any renewals thereof, in reliance thereon.’
“The policy of insurance, including a ‘Supplement’ page was introduced in evidence. Plaintiff relies heavily on Declaration No. 10 as being crucial in this ease: ‘During the past two years, with respect to the named insured or any member of his household, . . . nor (2) has any license or permit to drive an automobile been suspended, revoked or refused.’
*542“The policy provides that the policy is issued iu reliance upon the Declarations on the Supplement page; and on the last page appears the following: ‘11. Effect of Policy Acceptance. By acceptance of this policy the named insured agrees that the Declarations on the Supplement Page are his agreements and representations and that this policy embodies all agreements relating to this insurance, existing between himself and Allstate and any of its agents.’
“Stinger’s testimony as to the asking and answering of the questions on the application is somewhat conflicting. At first, he indicated that the agent had asked each question as printed (the agent so testified) ; but when Stinger was asked what the agent had asked in reference to revocation of his license, he replied: ‘In reference to my license he asked me if I or anybody in my family had had my license revoked or suspended, I think within a period of two years, for being in an auto accident, and I replied no.’ ”
Stinger’s license Avas in fact revoked" for over two months in 1956 because he Avas an incompetent driver and was confined to a mental institution. The language in the insurance policy and in the application for the policy required no legal learning to interpret its meaning, it was so clear and plain and simple that a twelve year old child could not have misunderstood it.
Moreover, the majority opinion has overlooked another controlling factor, namely, the trial Judge sitting as a jury found the following facts in favor of plaintiff and there was overwhelming evidence to support these findings, namely:
“At the first hearing, plaintiff proved that the defendant’s answer to the foregoing question was false, *543and that he knew it was false* .... The evidence offered at the second hearing substantiates plaintiff’s assertion that such information was material to the risk, and that the defendant would not have secured a policy of automobile insurance from the company had he revealed his background of mental illness which was within a period of two years prior to his application for the policy.”
Furthermore, the majority have, in my judgment, misapprehended the recent case of Kizirian v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 383 Pa. 515, 119 A. 2d 47. In that case this Court entered judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, holding that inquiries by an insurer as to prior medical or hospital attendance of an applicant for life insurance are material to the risk and false answers thereto permit the insurer to avoid the policy. The Court in an opinion which cited many cases said (page 520) :
“ ‘Where it affirmatively appears, from sufficient documentary evidence [or from plaintiff’s admissions or both], that the policy was issued in reliance on false and fraudulent statements, made by or on behalf of the insured, as where false answers are shown to have been given by the insured under such circumstances that he must have been aware of their falsity, the court may direct a verdict or enter judgment for the insurer.’
“Under the facts in this case it is clear from the hospital records, as well as from plaintiff’s admissions that the insured made false and fraudulent statements which were material to the risk and thus prevent recovery on the policy. There is no merit in plaintiff’s contention that the false statements were inadvertent and the concealments unintentional and consequently these questions should be left to the jury; nor was there any duty upon the Insurance Company, under the facts *544in this case, to investigate and determine for itself the truth or falsity of the material statements made by the insured.”
I would hold (1) that plaintiff, as well as all parties, have an adequate and more appropriate remedy at law and the facts present no justification for a declaratory judgment: Wirkman v. Wirkman Co., 392 Pa. 63, 139 A. 2d 658; Eureka Casualty Co. v. Henderson, 371 Pa. 587, 92 A. 2d 551; Capital Bank and Trust Company’s Petition, 336 Pa. 108, 6 A. 2d 790; Lifter Estate, 377 Pa. 227, 103 A. 2d 670; (2) if a declaratory judgment proceeding is allowed the Mankos are proper parties; (3) where no fraud or mutual mistake is alleged and proved, Stinger cannot avoid his admittedly false representation which was obviously a very material inducement to the issuance of the policy, by oral testimony which varies or contradicts or negates the written instruments. Stinger admits that his answer was false and, we repeat, a child twelve years old would have known (if he had made it) that it was both material and false. If the law permits a party to a written instrument to “explain away” and circumvent or nullify language which is plain, clear and unambiguous, by allegations or testimony that he didn’t understand it, or he misunderstood it, or it was explained “different” to him, what is the use of having a written contract or a written application if it can be thus changed, contradicted and nullified. And what happens to the parol evidence rule which until now was both clear and well established, viz: Where a written agreement is not ambiguous and where no fraud, accident or mutual mistake is averred and proved, parol evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral representation or agreement which varies, modifies or conflicts with a complete written agreement, is inadmissible in evidence: Amour Estate, 397 Pa. 262, 154 A. 2d 502; *545Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A. 2d 85; Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Kline, 368 Pa. 516, 84 A. 2d 301; Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A. 2d 255; Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 63 A. 2d 9; Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791; Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, 154 A. 127; O’Brien v. O’Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 66 A. 2d 309; Russell v. Sickles, 306 Pa. 586, 160 A. 610.
I strongly dissent.
Mr. Justice Benjamin E. Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.Plaintiff introduced in evidence a certificate of tie Secretary of Revenue showing suspension of Stinger’s license on February 23, 1956 to April 30, 1956 because be was an “incompetent operator”.
Underlining ours.