State Ex Rel. Koch v. Vanderburgh Probate Court

ACHOR, J.

This is an orginal action for a writ of prohibition and mandate growing out of proceedings to appoint a guardian of relator’s Indiana estate brought in the Vanderburgh Probate Court.

The Indiana proceedings were instituted by Dorothy *140Farrow Schrader contemporaneously with proceedings filed for the appointment of a guardian of relator’s person and estate in Florida. The law firm of Bates and Hancock entered an appearance in the Indiana proceedings for relator and her son who was also served with process in the case. The appearance of said attorneys was challenged by Kahn, Dees, Donovan and Kahn, attorneys for petitioner below on the basis of Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno. §4-3611 (1946 Repl.).

Bates and Hancock, as evidence of their authority, introduced a signed and sealed but undated document entitled: “Answer to the Petition for Appointment of Guardian of the Estate of Minnie F. Koch.” In opposition to this showing petitioner below, Dorothy Farrow Schrader, by her said attorneys, introduced the record of the Florida proceedings in which the Florida court found relator incompetent and appointed a guardian of both her person and her Florida estate. On the basis of these orders and the admission of Bates & Hancock that they had no authorization from the Florida guardian, the respondent court determined that Bates & Hancock were without authority to represent relator and entered an order denying their right to appear and directed the relator be represented by the Vanderburgh County prosecutor together with an attorney selected by the Florida-appointed guardian.

Relator here seeks to have the latter order vacated, on the ground that counsel have made a prima facie showing of their authority to represent relator and that respondent court therefore is without authority to deny their right to appear. A temporary writ of mandate and prohibition was issued.

The determination of this case hinges upon the right of the court to determine the propriety of the appearance of the firm of Bates & Hancock on the basis of the record in the Florida court. Several considerations *141of law and public policy are important in reaching a proper result in this case.

One: The appearance of said attorneys Bates & Hancock constituted a prima facie showing of authority. Anthony v. Dickey, Judge (1947), 225 Ind. 502, 76 N. E. 2d 253; Gatewood v. Board of Comrs. of Hamilton Co. (1949), 119 Ind. App. 297, 86 N. E. 2d 298.

Two: It is the policy that law should be liberally construed in guardianship proceedings to allow the presentation of a defense on behalf of the alleged incompetent who may be totally unable to make his own defense or to formally authorize a law firm to make such a defense. This policy finds support under analogous circumstances where the law declares a policy of liberality relative to attempts to restore the right to exercise control over property to the owners thereof. Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno. §8-148 (1953 Repl.) provides in relevant part:

“Any person may file a petition on behalf of the ward, to have him adjudicated competent. . . .”

Three: The complaint in the primary action in the trial court specifically alleged that “there is no guardian of the person or estate of said Koch in this or any other state.” Thus, the introduction of such evidence, without first amending the pleadings in the action, was improper because it necessarily had the effect of defeating petitioner’s own cause of action.

Four: We are here confronted with a disparity of parties and subject-matter between the Indiana and Florida proceedings, which disparity prevents the application of the full faith and credit doctrine. Here, under the pleadings, the Indiana proceeding is independent of, rather than ancillary to, the *142Florida litigation. Further, if the Florida decree were considered applicable, it could only settle the question of competency. The issue as to whom letters of guardianship should be granted in this state remains to be determined. It may well be to relator’s interest that the issue be litigated by attorneys of her choosing.

The temporary writ hereinbefore issued is therefore made permanent.

Arterburn, C. J., Landis & Myers, JJ., concur.

Jackson, J., dissents, with opinion.