(dissenting). I dissent. I believe that the trial court’s order modifying the property settlement provisions of the parties’ 1986 divorce judgment should be affirmed.
A review of the record in this case indicates that the defendant himself, by his inexcusable delay, deceit, and general uncooperativeness in complying with the original divorce judgment, occasioned the necessity for modification. Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to trigger the "extraordinary circumstances” test for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” This provision empowers the trial court to vacate judgments whenever extraordinary circumstances make it necessary to achieve justice and the substantial rights of other parties in the matter in controversy are not affected. Kaleal v Kaleal, 73 Mich App 181, 189; 250 NW2d 799 (1977), citing 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 189.
Such extraordinary circumstances existed in this case, and there are no other parties in the matter in controversy whose rights will be affected. In the original divorce judgment dated July 16, 1986, defendant had been ordered to pay $80,000 to plaintiff on or before October 20, 1986, and "to pay *627and to hold plaintiff harmless from any liability for any encumbrances against the marital residence so that plaintiff would own same free and clear of any such encumbrances or liens.” The record clearly shows that it was defendant’s failure to meet these obligations which resulted in plaintiff’s motion to appoint a receiver to administer the sale of defendant’s parcel of Macomb County real estate, which motion the trial court granted in its November 10, 1986, order.
It further appears that plaintiff tried to work cooperatively with defendant to aid him in meeting his obligations, but that defendant persisted in vexatious and gamesmanlike fashion to continue his delays. Plaintiff’s cooperative attitude resulted in the trial court’s subsequent suspension of receivership on two specific conditions: (1) that defendant pay to plaintiff $40,000 by May 3, 1987, and (2) that defendant "completely discharge any lien existing on the former marital residence in favor of the Michigan National Bank” and, upon the sale of any of defendant’s business interests, "make a substantial payment to reduce the principal owing to Michigan National bank ... in the event of his enability [sic] to fully pay and discharge said obligation.” (Emphasis added.)
In spite of plaintiff’s efforts to cooperate with defendant so that he could more easily meet his obligations, defendant continued to further delay. Defendant did not pay the $40,000 by May 3, 1987, thereby causing plaintiff to request reinstatement of the receivership. Plaintiff’s motion was rescheduled five times but the hearing never occurred. It was only after plaintiff’s considerable efforts to accommodate defendant that plaintiff finally petitioned the court to modify the order regarding receivership and judgment of divorce, which matter was heard on December 9,1987.
*628By the time of the hearing on December 9, 1987, plaintiff had finally paid the $80,000 which he had originally been ordered to pay by October 20, 1986, more than one year earlier. In the meantime, however, defendant had sold one of his business interests—approximately eight out of twenty acres of real estate—for one million two hundred fifty thousand dollars. From this sale defendant received $300,000 cash, with the balance to be paid in annual installments over the next three years.
Upon the sale of this property, defendant was in possession of the $300,000 needed to pay off plaintiff’s mortgage, which amount he was obligated to pay under the terms of both the original divorce judgment and the order suspending receivership. However, defendant persisted in his pattern of evasion and failure to pay, this time asserting that he did not know when or if he could pay off the mortgage, and that he was only obligated to make a "substantial payment.” By the time the matter was heard on December 9, 1987, defendant had apparently become so confident in his evasive conduct that his lawyer even asserted that there was "no such thing as [defendant’s] agreement to remove the mortgage,” only "an agreement to make a substantial payment.”
On these facts, it seems inconceivable that the trial court was impotent to further invoke its equitable powers by entering a modification order. In my view, defendant’s conduct qualified as "extraordinary circumstances” meriting relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). The trial court was empowered to hear the motion if it was made within a reasonable time. MCR 2.612(C)(2). The facts of this case show that the motion was brought within a reasonable time.
The trial court acted properly within its powers. I would affirm the trial court’s fair and equitable modification of the divorce judgment.