(dissenting). We granted leave to appeal in these cases to decide whether, contrary to MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2),1 two defendants can be charged with possession of one short-barreled shotgun when each defendant had in his possession, one of two component parts of the short-barreled shotgun. The majority holds that possession of a prohibited firearm is not limited to actual possession, but may include both construc*484tive and joint possession by defendants acting in concert. The majority further holds that the fact that a firearm was temporarily inoperable does not preclude prosecution for its possession since the statute expressly prohibits such possession.
Although the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion is based on sound legal principles, the present state of the law as set forth in MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2) and MCL 750.222(d); MSA 28.419(d), requires that I disagree. Accordingly, I would hold that under MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2) the defendants may not be prosecuted for possession of a short-barreled shotgun if, upon apprehension of the defendants, the firearm in question is unassembled with the relevant parts in possession of different persons, rendering the firearm inoperable.
i
The principal statute examined today criminalizes the manufacture, sale, and possession of short-barreled shotguns and rifles. MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2). Defendant Hill was charged with possession of a shotgun under circumstances which revealed that the gun in question was unassembled and, thus, inoperable when he and his codefendant Medley were apprehended.2
In 1978, the Legislature amended MCL 750.222(d); MSA 28.419(d) to include, inter alia, the definition of a shotgun. Hence,
"[sjhotgun” means a firearm designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and *485made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single function of the trigger.
Despite the policy arguments which weave the phrases "evil sought to be remedied,” "broad construction” and "legislative intent” throughout the majority opinion, essentially, the majority has rewritten the statute, adding a clause which provides that possession of unassembled firearms also may give rise to criminal prosecution. By taking this step, the majority contravenes the well-settled rule that "penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed.” 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 59.03, p 11.
Federal courts, in 26 USC 5845(d), have been specifically provided with an avenue through which prosecution may take place when dealing with facts similar to those at bar:
The term "shotgun” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of projectiles (ball shot) or a single projectile for each pull of the trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may be readily restored to fire a fixed shotgun shell. [Emphasis added.]
Irrespective of the statute’s character as an excise tax provision, federal courts utilize this definition to uphold convictions of defendants for *486possession of unassembled shotguns.3 See United States v Woods, 560 F2d 660, 664-665 (CA 5, 1977) (the fact that a weapon when found was in two pieces was immaterial to the conviction for possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, where only a minimum of effort was required to make it operable).
Additionally, in terms of other states’ statutes, the California Legislature defines the term "short-barreled shotgun” as follows:
As used in this section, a "short-barreled shotgun” means any of the following:
A firearm which is designed or redesigned to fire a fixed shotgun shell and having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.
A firearm which has an overall length of less than 26 inches and which is designed or redesigned to fire a fixed shotgun shell.
Any weapon made from a shotgun (whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise) if that weapon, as modified, has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.
Any device which may be readily restored to Gre a Gxed shotgun shell which, when so restored, is a device deGned in subparagraphs (A) to (C), inclusive. [California Penal Code, § 12020(c)(l)(A)-(D). Emphasis added.]_
*487Michigan plainly has no comparable statutory clause or provision within its legislation on this subject. Furthermore, expressly included within the title paragraph of then HB 4972 is the phrase, "to define crimes,” which, in my view, is an unambiguous declaration by the Legislature that what was then written was what was intended to be applied. I cannot presume that our Legislature intended to adopt the additional clause. I, therefore, believe it imprudent for our Court to read or write added language into the Michigan statute. "For us to supply the fatally missing words would not be permissible judicial construction but judicial legislation of the boldest kind. However desirable the change might be ... it is still one for the legislature to make by using appropriate language where it is needed. It lies without our province to do so for it.” Ross v Fisher, 352 Mich 555, 559-560; 90 NW2d 483 (1958).
ii
The majority’s frequent citation of Court of Appeals decisions supporting its position overshadows the singular reference to In re Vaughn, 160 Mich App 236; 408 NW2d 85 (1987), lv den 428 Mich 922 (1987), in n 14. Unlike the decisions cited, the Court in In re Vaughn held that individuals who each possess parts of one completely disassembled short-barreled shotgun may not be convicted of the offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun where the separate parts by themselves are incapable of being fired. Id. at 238-239.
Although this Court is not specifically bound by this analysis, I think the majority is remiss in failing either to completely discuss the view presented in In re Vaughn, or to at least acknowledge the split. Thus, as the decision in Vaughn is *488consistent with the well-settled rule that penal statutes are to be narrowly construed, it is my view that until the Legislature speaks otherwise, In re Vaughn represents the appropriate analysis and resolution of this issue.
hi
Finally, the majority presents an interesting but incomplete discussion and application of the "constructive possession” theory. People v Davis, 101 Mich App 198, 202; 300 NW2d 497 (1980), is cited for the proposition that "[o]ne has constructive possession if one has proximity to the article together with an indicia of control.” Following this citation, the majority first restates the elements of constructive possession, by summarizing, "a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant,”4 ante, pp 470-471, and then completely neglects to apply the stated elements to the facts at bar.
I agree with Davis that constructive possession requires proximity as well as some objective indicia of control. Unfortunately, when applying these elements to our facts, the latter factor is missing. Although the defendants indeed had proximity to one another, there is no proof either through the testimony of the officers or from an objective review of the facts, that either defendant exercised control over the other or over that which was in each of their possessions namely, the pieces of the shotgun. Thus, it is my opinion that the constructive possession theory, though valid when applicable, cannot resolve the issues presented here._
*489CONCLUSION
Until such time as the Legislature amends the statutes at issue today, a defendant may not be prosecuted for possession of a short-barreled shotgun under MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2) if, upon apprehension of the defendant, the firearm in question is unassembled with the relevant parts in possession of different persons, rendering the firearm inoperable. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the charges against the defendants.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Archer, J.(1) A person shall not manufacture, sell, offer for sale, or possess a short-barreled shotgun or a short-barreled rifle.
(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the sale, offering for sale or possession of a short-barreled rifle or a short-barreled shotgun which the secretary of the treasury of the United States of America, or his delegate, pursuant to USC title 26, section[s] 5801 through 5872, or USC title 18, sections 921 through 928, has found to be a curio, relic, antique, museum piece or collector’s item not likely to be used as a weapon, but only if the person selling, offering for sale or possessing the firearm has also fully complied with the provisions of sections 2 and 9 of Act No. 372 of the Public Acts of 1927, as amended, being sections 28.422 and 28.429 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
As indicated on page 468 of the lead opinion, the charges against defendant Medley were dismissed.
But see 18 USC 921 of the National Firearms Act which provides:
(5) The term "shotgun” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single pull of the trigger.
(6) The term "short-barreled shotgun” means a shotgun having one or more barrels less than eighteen inches in length and any weapon made from a shotgun (whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise) if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.
The majority cites People v Terry, 124 Mich App 656; 335 NW2d 116 (1983), which, though dealing with a firearm, did not address the situation presented at bar, i.e., unassembled firearms.