(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
It appears that the majority wishes to extend the "noninnocent party doctrine,” which is applicable to dramshop actions under § 22, to actions brought under § 33. However, our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the rules applicable to these two sections, and the persons who may sue or be sued under each section, are different. See Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675; 377 NW2d 804 (1985), and Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 359-360; 439 NW2d 899 (1989). A dramshop action is based on §22, which is the exclusive remedy of designated third parties against licensees, while an action against a social host under § 33 is based on common-law negligence principles. Longstreth, p 696; Craig, supra. Justice Cavanagh, writing for the majority in Longstreth, stated:
Plaintiffs’ complaint is brought against social hosts, and is grounded on the violation of § 33 and not §22 of the act. Accordingly, the defendants’ reliance on several cases, holding that § 22 of the act is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy against licensees, is misplaced. Unlike § 22, § 33 is not restricted to the regulation of licensees. To the contrary, § 33 indicates that any person who violates its terms is guilty of a misdemeanor. [Longstreth, pp 684-685.]
Recently, our Supreme Court in Craig, supra, *10which was also authored by Justice Cavanagh, reaffirmed the noninnocent party doctrine as applicable to § 22, noting that the Legislature, while amending the rule several times, had not evidenced a contrary intent to the doctrine. It noted that the legislative history of the dramshop act reflected repeated efforts to narrow the liability of dramshop owners. Craig, p 357. It also determined that the noninnocent party doctrine applied to minors under § 22. Craig, pp 357-360. However, in Longstreth, our Supreme Court allowed an intoxicated minor plaintiff to maintain an action against his social host under § 33:
We recognize that our conclusion gives this underage plaintiff a remedy against his hosts which is not presently available under § 22 against licensees. In spite of the "growing number of cases” in other jurisdictions, an intoxicated person cannot sue licensees under § 22 for injuries in this state. See, generally, Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399-400; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). [Longstreth, p 696.]
The Supreme Court believed that the application of comparative negligence principles could lessen any perceived hardships of this rule. Longstreth, p 696.
Longstreth clearly sets forth the rules applicable to actions brought under § 33. Plaintiffs can maintain a cause of action under the statute, which prohibits a person from knowingly selling or furnishing alcoholic liquor to a person under twenty-one years of age, against persons who are social hosts. Longstreth, p 678. In addition, noninnocent minors may maintain a cause of action brought under § 33, because minors fall within the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. Longstreth, pp 693, 696. This Court has since extended the right of this cause of action to passengers of an *11intoxicated minor. Traxler v Koposky, 148 Mich App 514, 516; 384 NW2d 819 (1986).
This Court had not previously decided the issue of whether a third party who allegedly jointly, along with the social host, furnished alcohol to a minor, has a common-law cause of action against the social host, and the trial court in this case did not address this issue. However, clearly, any recovery, to the plaintiff in this case must be based on the rules applicable to § 33 and common-law negligence, including comparative negligence, and not those rules applicable to §22. The application of comparative negligence in this case would lessen or alleviate the perceived hardships and inequities of this situation.
Because the trial court did not address the parties’ arguments concerning the Bancrofts’ proposed defenses based upon the decedent’s allegedly wrongful conduct, this case should be remanded to the trial court where defendants may then assert these defenses. The trial court erred in granting summary disposition in this case since a cause of action against a social host on the part of an underage imbiber has been recognized by this Court, and under Traxler, this Court has recognized the cause of action on the part of a passenger of an underage imbiber. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s decision.