dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court, upholding the decision of the IHSA.
It is well established that courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary associations, except in such cases as fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The decisions of the tribunals of an association with respect to its internal affairs will, in the absence of mistake, fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, be accepted by the courts as conclusive. Lee, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 559, 673 N.E.2d at 1139; Proulx, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 787-88, 466 N.E.2d at 624.
Lee was a contract case, involving a contract between a 12-year-old, his parents, and the Amateur Hockey Association of Illinois. It is not entirely clear how we have jurisdiction of the present case, which does not involve an action between contracting parties. See Clements v. Board of Education of Decatur Public School District No. 61, 133 Ill. App. 3d 531, 533, 478 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (1985) (much uncertainty exists as to the nature of the legal interest which a student has in order to seek relief from the courts against alleged unfairness in the administration of school athletic programs). Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that the courts should provide some limited review of the decisions of the IHSA. I agree that the trial court properly considered this case under the rules set out above.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of those rules, its conclusion that “[w]e are not convinced that attending a dinner meeting and watching a videotape constitute the exercise of ‘undue influence’ pursuant to IHSA’s handbook.” 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1108. The majority ignores the rules it cites and not only conducts a de novo review of the proceedings before the IHSA Board, but would literally retry the case as if the IHSA proceedings had not occurred. The majority would simply substitute the courts for the IHSA Board. See Lee, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 560, 673 N.E.2d at 1140. Absent fraud or collusion, or that the defendants acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously, the IHSA must be permitted to enforce its rules and orders without interference by the courts. Robinson, 45 Ill. App. 2d at 286, 195 N.E.2d at 43.
There was evidence in the present case that Coach Aubrey at Streator asked the Montses if they would like for him to approach Coach Peterson at Pontiac about the possibility of Isaac playing at Pontiac. The Montses gave their approval, Coach Aubrey contacted Coach Peterson, and the Montses scheduled a dinner meeting to discuss the possibility of Isaac’s transfer to Pontiac. The dinner meeting took place, Coach Peterson played the videotape, and thereafter the Montses decided to transfer Isaac to Pontiac. The IHSA was entitled to conclude, based on this evidence, that there was “influence exerted by school personnel upon a prospective student or a prospective student’s family related to athletic participation,” within the meaning of the IHSA’s bylaws. The IHSA’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and there is no evidence of fraud or collusion. The IHSA’s decision must be respected.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the IHSA’s denial of the request for a court reporter was arbitrary. No one has cited any authority for the proposition that the IHSA was required by its rules or any other regulation to transcribe these hearings. The hearing before the IHSA Board was not a court proceeding.