concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
In my view, if the concept of an intelligent guilty plea is to have any meaning in an attempted murder context, then a defendant must be aware that the State would have to prove that he specifically intended to kill the victim. Without more, a defendant's admission to a factual basis that would support an attempted murder conviction is wholly insufficient in this regard.18 As did Judge Sullivan in Howse, *977"I find it strange indeed that a guilty plea may be accepted without the information as to specific intent required to be given a jury being imparted to the defendant whether by trial court advisement or otherwise." Howse, 672 N.E.2d at 445 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The trial court gave Patton no such advisement here. Consequently, I concur in result as to the majority's reversal of Patton's attempted murder conviction and remand for a new trial In all other respects, I fully concur in the majority's opinion.
. The Howse majority observed that "[the intent to commit murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm." Howse, 672 N.E.2d at 444. It is important to note, however, that this point of law was culled from a case in which the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted murder conviction, not the validity of a guilty plea. See Allen v. State, 575 N.E.2d 615, 616 (Ind.1991). A defendant may deliberately use a deadly weapon with the intent to intimidate or injure another person or even in a reckless manner; for this reason, I believe that a defendant cannot intelligently plead guilty to the more serious crime of attempted murder *977without being aware of the corresponding specific intent to kill.