Plaintiff and appellant, Sioux Valley Hospital Association (Hospital), appeals from an order granting summary judgment to the defendant and appellee, Tripp County (County). By way of this action, Hospital seeks reimbursement for hospitalization expenses for an alleged indigent patient whose residence was Tripp County, South Dakota. The trial court below granted summary judgment based on the fact that Hospital failed to notify County of the patient’s hospitalization within fifteen days of admittance as required by SDCL 28-13-34. We affirm.
On August 22, 1984, a premature baby boy was born in the Gregory County Hospital. The parents of this boy are alleged to be indigent. Immediately after birth, the boy was flown to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and admitted to Sioux Valley Hospital at 11:55 p.m. on August 22, 1984. Gregory County Hospital records indicated that the parents were residents of Gregory County, South Dakota. The records also indicated that the parents’ mailing address was Rural Route, Dixon, South Dakota. Dixon is • a town in Gregory County.
On August 23, 1984, Sioux Valley Hospital personnel sent a notice as required by SDCL 28-13-34 to Gregory County. Gregory County officials received the notice and replied on September 4, 1984, by sending an Application to Apply for Assistance. On September 5, 1984, a social worker at Sioux Valley Hospital met with the parents to help them complete the application and answer any questions they may have. At that time, the social worker was informed by the parents that Gregory County was not their proper county of residence. Hospital then sent out a notice dated September 5, 1984, this time to Tripp County. This notice was filed by the Tripp County Auditor on September 7, 1984.
The total hospital stay stretched from August 22, 1984, to October 11, 1984. The total expenses for the hospitalization were nearly $20,000. County first raised the fifteen-day notice issue when it filed its motion to dismiss this action on September 30, 1985.
Hospital offers three arguments in an attempt to avoid this somewhat draconian application of SDCL 28-13-34. Initially, Hospital claims that they complied with the fifteen-day notice provision of SDCL 28-13-34. Secondly, Hospital contends that even if the fifteen-day time limit was not met, it should be tolled by Hospital’s filing of notice with the incorrect county. Thirdly, Hospital claims County should be equitably estopped from asserting the notice provisions of SDCL 28-13-34 with respect to the hospitalization costs incurred after County received actual notice of the hospitalization. We hold that these arguments are not persuasive.
In our recent decision, St. Paul Ramsey v. Pennington County, 402 N.W.2d 340 (S.D.1987), we had occasion to discuss a county’s liability under the statutory scheme for reimbursement of medical expenses for indigent residents. In that case, we stated:
It is well settled in South Dakota that, ‘the obligation to support poor persons results not from the common law, but from statutes providing for their care from public funds.’ Sioux Valley Hospital Association v. Davison County, 298 N.W.2d 85, 86 (S.D.1980); State of North Dakota v. Perkins County, 69 S.D. 270, 273-274, 9 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1943); Hamlin County v. Clark County, 1 S.D. 131, 45 N.W. 329, 331 (1890). ‘No liability exists for reimbursement for relief furnished unless there is a statute authorizing the reimbursement or the relief is furnished pursuant to the request of someone having authority to act.’ Davison County, supra, quoting Perkins County, 69 S.D. at 274, 9 N.W.2d at 501.
St. Paul Ramsey, supra, at 342.
SDCL 28-13-34 requires that within fifteen days after admittance, a hospital must give notice of the hospitalization to the patient’s county of residence. In determining how to calculate this fifteen-day period, we look to SDCL 2-14-14, which states:
*521The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last is a holiday and then it also is excluded.
Fractions of a day are to be disregarded in computations which include more than one day, and involve no questions of priority.
Hospital contends that under this statute the fraction of August 22 should be disregarded and that the computation should begin on August 23. Hospital further reasons that August 23 should then be excluded since it is the first day of the period of computation. Thus, Hospital would have us read SDCL 2-14-14 to allow it a total of seventeen days to file notice with the county auditor.
A correct application of the statute requires us to begin the computation on the first day of admission, that being August 22. Under the statute, we would then exclude August 22 and begin counting the appropriate number of days. This computation leaves Hospital one day short of compliance. Hospital’s contention that August 22 should be excluded because the patient was only admitted for a fraction of a day is untenable. The language of SDCL 2-14-14 directing that “fractions of a day are to be disregarded” is misinterpreted by Hospital. That portion of the statute simply tells us that days are to be considered as one time unit and not broken down into smaller time segments. This prevents confusion surrounding a situation where a patient was admitted in the morning but the required notice was not given until the afternoon on the final day of the notice period. Without the provision directing us to disregard fractions of a day this afternoon filing would be too late. It is clear under SDCL 2-14-14 that the computation of the time period is to begin with the day the patient is admitted.
Hospital next contends that since it acted in good faith and filed notice with what it believed to be the proper county the time period for filing should be tolled. Hospital analogizes this situation to the case where a plaintiff files suit in the wrong venue only to have the statute of limitations run prior to realizing the error. This analogy misses the mark. In situations where the case has been improperly venued, the defendant still receives notice of the pending action. County in this case received no notice prior to the running of the statutory period. We agree with Hospital that they did not sleep on their rights. We must note, however, that through no fault of its own, County did not receive the notice required by our legislature. “A hospital must furnish notice to the county following emergency hospitalization in compliance with SDCL 28-13-34 ... before the county is liable for the costs of emergency hospitalization.” Sioux Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Jones County, 309 N.W.2d 835, 837 (S.D.1981). Hospital made the error, not County.
In Roane v. Hutchinson County, 40 S.D. 297, 300, 167 N.W. 168, 168 (1918), this court held
that the obligation of a county to furnish care and relief for poor and indigent persons ... is purely statutory, and there is no statute law in this state authorizing the payment by the county for services voluntarily rendered by any one in caring for such poor in the absence of an express or implied contract made, in the manner provided by law, with the proper county officers binding and obligating the county to pay for such services.
SDCL ch. 28-13 governs poor relief. Section 16 provides that the county commissioners shall have the oversight and care of the poor. Section 32.1 requires certain filings prior to NON-emergency hospital assistance. Section 33 establishes liability of the county for emergency hospitalization “as hereinafter expressly provided.” Section 34 then goes on to provide that “there shall be no liability on any county for the [emergency] hospitalization unless within fifteen days from the admittance ... notice ... is filed with the auditor of the county.” At issue is the expenditure of public funds. There is no provision in the statute for the county commissioners to expend funds to pay any portion of the hospitalization in this case.
*522Finally, we address the equitable estop-pel argument raised by Hospital. A careful review of the record indicates that Hospital pleaded an action at law only and did not include a request for equitable relief. Furthermore, we do not find evidence in the record that would indicate that Hospital raised the equitable estoppel argument before the trial court. Since this oversight was not brought to our attention by County, and since the equitable estoppel issue was completely briefed by the parties, we will address the issue.
Initially, we must point out that “estoppels against the public are little favored and should be used sparingly.” City of Rapid City v. Hoogterp, 85 S.D. 176, 179, 179 N.W.2d 15, 17 (1970). This court has dealt with estoppel actions against municipal corporations in the past, but this is the first time we have been called on to review an estoppel argument against a county. We find that the cases involving municipal corporations are persuasive and virtually indistinguishable from cases involving a county. As we stated in Hoog-terp, estoppels “are applied against municipal corporations with caution and only when exceptional circumstances demand their application to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at 179-80, 179 N.W.2d at 17.
While a good argument can be made for the injustice of allowing County to escape possible liability for expenses involving a nearly nine-week hospital stay, this is not enough. “This court recently ruled that mere municipal acquiescence is not sufficient to permit an estoppel. Some affirmative action must have been taken upon which the other party acted in reliance and substantially changed his position.” Northwestern Public Serv. v. City of Aberdeen, 90 S.D. 627, 637, 244 N.W.2d 544, 549 (1976). That holding was once again reaffirmed in Sioux Falls Const. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454, 459 (S.D.1980). Hospital points to no affirmative action on behalf of County upon which Hospital acted in reliance and substantially changed its position. As we said in St. Paul Ramsey, supra, at 343, “Country] further contend[s] that [Hospital’s] equitable arguments are best reserved for the legislature, since [Hospital’s] ability to recover the costs is entirely governed by statute. We agree.”
We recognize that the result of this decision is harsh, but under the laws as written by the legislature we have no choice but to affirm the grant of summary judgment for County.
HENDERSON, J., and FOSHEIM, Retired Justice, concur. WUEST, C.J., and SABERS, J., dissent. MILLER, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court did not participate.