This is an appeal from a judgment refusing to enjoin an alleged violation of the zoning ordinance of the City of Carmel-By-the-Sea.
The facts are undisputed. Carmel has adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance regulating the use of private property within the city. Respondents Doud and Watson are the owners of an L-shaped parcel of land 12,000 square feet in area. The property has a frontage of 40 feet on Scenic Road and formerly had a frontage of 80 feet on Del Mar Avenue. In 1952 the city vacated and closed Del Mar Avenue in the vicinity of respondents’ property, and access to the parcel from the west is now denied, leaving only the 40-foot frontage on Scenic Road to provide access.
Respondents applied to the city’s board of adjustments for a use permit under which their property would be divided into three building sites for residential purposes, each 40 feet by 100 feet. One of these, lot 4A, would front on Scenic Road to the east. Since there is no access from the west because Del Mar Avenue has been closed, the two westerly lots, 4B and 4C, would be reached by a private road easement 10 feet wide along the southerly side of the 100 foot length of lot 4A. This casement would run to contiguous easements, each 17 feet by 30 feet, at the easterly ends of lots 4B and 4C. These easements would afford entry to the garages on lots 4B and 4C.
The board granted respondents a use permit and thus established three building sites on the property. An appeal *64to the city council followed, as permitted by the zoning ordinance. After hearing, the council divided two to two on the issue presented. The fifth member of the council deemed himself disqualified and did not vote. Since three votes are required to overrule or modify the action of the board, that action remains effective. Appellant’s suit for an injunction followed.
The trial court concluded that the use permit was properly issued, and that it was not invalidated by its reliance upon a private road easement as a means of ingress and egress.
Section 1305.2 of the Carmel zoning ordinance establishes the requirements for single family building sites. Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of that section are not here relevant. Subdivision (d), describing a permissible B-l building site, reads: “Any other parcel of land having an area of not less than 4000 square feet provided the Carmel Planning Commission has issued a Use Permit, authorizing the use of such parcel as a Building Site in the manner provided by Article 10 of this Division.” This section specifically governs the use permit here sought. Appellant urges the applicability of section 1333. But subdivision (a) of the latter section authorizes the board to allow uses “hereinbefore expressly permitted upon” permit. It is clear that subdivision (k), to which appellant points, does not limit a use authorized, with permit, by section 1305.2, but applies only to use permits not expressly authorized by earlier sections.
The real question here is whether the private road easements are to be considered parts of the lots, or are to be excluded in determining lot area. If they are considered part of the lot area, each lot contains 4,000 square feet as required by section 1305.2(d). If they are not considered part of the lot area, each lot is too small to meet the requirement.
Of course, use permits may be granted only as authorized by the ordinance (56 Cal.Jur.2d, Zoning, § 161). Here, the ordinance requires, as conditions precedent to such grant, findings that the granting of a permit will not adversely affect the general zoning plan or the character of the neighborhood, and will not be injurious to the public health, safety or welfare. Such findings were made in this ease. These findings are supported. The police and fire chiefs stated to the board that the development would not hamper the work of their departments.
The board also found, as required by the ordinance, that *65special circumstances exist under which undue hardship would be inflicted by strict adherence to the ordinance. It found that Del Mar was closed in 1952 because of mutual agreement of the bordering property owners and the city council that public access should be denied, but that the council intended that private access to the westerly portion of respondents’ land be afforded.
Significant here is the testimony at trial of the city building inspector, who said it was his practice to include private easements in computing lot area in all eases. He testified to issuance in 1946 of building permits for two lots, each of which contained 4,000 square feet only by including an easement strip in lot area.
Although contemporaneous and practical construction of an ordinance or statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect cannot alter its true meaning (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66, 74 [187 P.2d 686]), it is entitled to great respect (Christensen v. Thurber, 120 Cal.App.2d 517, 519 [261 P.2d 312]). Respondents owned this land in 1952, when Del Mar Avenue was closed. At that time, the administrative construction had been followed for at least six years, and lends credence to the board’s finding of mutual agreement of council and the affected property owners that public access be barred, but private access permitted.
Moreover, the ordinance specifically vests in the board power “to interpret the meaning” of the zoning ordinance “when the meaning thereof is not clear.” The ordinance is silent as to whether easement area is to be excluded or included in determining lot size. The board’s interpretation in favor of respondents’ contention seems, under the facts of this case, to be reasonable.
Appellant relies upon decisions from other jurisdictions (Loveladies Property Owners Assn. v. Barnegat City Service Co., 60 N.J.Super. 491 [159 A.2d 417] ; Sommers v. City Council of Baltimore, 215 Md. 1 [135 A.2d 625]; Clarks Lane Garden Apts. v. Schloss, 197 Md. 457 [79 A.2d 538] ; and San-Lan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N.J. 148 [145 A.2d 457]). These decisions hold that road easement area cannot be considered in computing lot size. But they deal with different ordinances, other communities, and distinct fact situations. We are concerned with the Carmel ordinance as it applies to the particular property here in issue. Even within this state, *66cities have widely varying needs and problems in zoning. Our Legislature has wisely recognized this variety, and has carefully refrained from attempting rigid standardization of all zoning in all cities. Rather, it has left to the cities a wide discretion, limited, of course, by constitutional bounds and by the broad requirements of statute. No excess of those limits is here suggested, and thus there is no reason for the courts to intervene in this problem of local government.
Judgment affirmed.
Devine, J., concurred.