dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Article VI, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Removal Provision) provides that a civil officer “shall be removed upon conviction” of an infamous crime. The majority concludes, and we agree, that Braig was a civil officer and that he was convicted of an infamous crime.
*138The majority further states that although the Removal Provision is self-executing, the provision only authorizes a trial court to remove convicted officers. Accordingly, the majority holds that the State Employees’ Retirement Board (Board) has no authority to consider the impact of the Removal Provision. The majority states that even if the Board has the general authority to apply the Removal Provision, the Removal Provision is not applicable to Braig because he resigned.
The result reached by the majority is flawed for two reasons: (1) the State Employees’ Retirement Board must consider the Removal Provision when it reviews applications for retirement benefits; and (2) Braig’s fortuitous resignation does not abrogate the effect of the Removal Provision.
As to the first reason, the majority holds that the Removal Provision authorizes only a trial court to remove an officer as part of a criminal sentence. The majority has failed to fully recognize the mandatory and immediate effect of the Removal Provision.
The Constitution is the voice of the people; they have unequivocally ordained that ‘All officers * * * shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.’ (Emphasis added.) This is a direct recall by the people of criminally unfaithful public servants who, sworn to obey and enforce the law, themselves violate it. Their self-executing mandate must be complied with____
Commonwealth v. Knox, 172 Pa.Superior Ct. 510, 524, 94 A.2d 128, 134 (1953), affirmed, 374 Pa. 343, 97 A.2d 782 (1953) (emphasis added).
The people’s self-executing mandate is that convicted officers must be removed. The people have also demanded in Article 5, Section 16(b) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (No Compensation Provision) that a removed officer must receive no compensation. Retirement benefits have been held to be compensation. King v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 129 Pa.Common*139wealth Ct. 444, 566 A.2d 323 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 525 Pa. 589, 575 A.2d 118 (1990).
Braig applied to the Board for a retirement allowance. This court has stated that while a self-executing constitutional provision cannot be used to expand an agency’s statutory authority, it must restrict the power of an agency when acting within its statutory authority.1 Here the Board was authorized under the State Employees’ Retirement Code (Code),2 to receive, consider and grant applications for retirement benefits. The Removal Provision and No Compensation Provision directly address the Board’s authority under the Code. The Board cannot ignore these constitutional provisions or their restriction on its authority. I believe the Board properly considered the effect of these provisions on Braig’s application.
As to the second reason, the majority concludes that the trial court which convicted Braig “was not presented with the removal question because Braig had already resigned.” 3 This disposition is based on the majority’s conclusion that the purpose of the Removal Provision is merely to provide an expedient means by which to remove officials who are unfit for office and that the provision does not provide for sanctions other than immediate removal.
I believe that the Removal Provision must be read together with the No Compensation Provision. The purpose of these provisions is not only to remove unfit officers but also to submit those officers to all the sanctions which flow from their removal.
*140Braig was convicted of an infamous crime and the constitution mandates that he lose both his office and his retirement benefits. The majority’s disposition of this case allows Braig’s resignation to nullify loss of his benefits by concluding that his resignation avoids the constitutional sanctions for his conviction. By giving Braig’s resignation this insulating effect, the majority is placing in a civil officer’s hands the opportunity to obviate constitutional sanctions by fortuitously resigning on the eve of his sentencing.
I believe the Board properly concluded that it was bound by the Removal Provision and that Braig could not use his resignation to avoid constitutional sanctions. Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s order denying Braig’s application for a retirement allowance.
DOYLE and BYER, JJ., join this dissent.. See Borough of Moosic v. Public Utility Commission, 59 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 338, 343, 429 A.2d 1237, 1240 (1981), and Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 335, 358, 342 A.2d 468, 482 (1975).
. 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5956.
. The trial court was the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Although the majority discusses whether the trial court was presented with the applicability of the Removal Provision, I believe that whether the trial court should have applied the Removal Provision is irrelevant to the questions presented here.