On Petition for Rehearing
KNUDSON, Judge.The petitioners request a rehearing or a reconsideration of certified question No. 2 which we declined to answer in the opinion for the reason stated therein that the Master Contract did not require the levy of the tax levied by the resolution, and that any answer to this question would not be determinative of the issue but would be merely advisory.
However, the petitioners inform us that the term “assessment,” as used in paragraph 24 of the Master Contract is meant to include “general property taxes,” as well as assessments for local improvements.
Paragraph 24, on page 16 of the Master Contract, reads as follows:
C-District shall cause to be levied and collected all necessary assessments, tolls, and other charges, and will use all of the authority and resources of C-District to meet the obligations of C-District to make in full all payments to be made pursuant to this contract on or before the date such payments become due and to meet its other obligations under this contract.
The term “assessment” in this instance is used in a broad sense. It includes general property taxes and is not limited to assessments normally made in special improvement districts, even though some are included herein.
As the term “general property taxes” comes within the meaning of the term “assessment” as used in the above paragraph it *95was intended by this language to require the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District to use its full authority and resources to levy the general property tax of not more than one mill in compliance with § 61-24— 14, and as authorized by § 61-24-08(9).
The term “assessment” coupled with the language, “and will use all of the authority and sources of C-District * * leaves no doubt that one of the conditions of the contract is that the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District will assert all of its taxing power to meet the obligations of the contract.
It is called to our attention that question No. 2 contains several phases, portions or questions which may be stated separately as follows:
Part 1. Is subsection 9 of § 61-24-08 a valid delegation of legislative power ?
Part 2. Was the procedure adopting the Resolution levying a property tax valid ?
Part 3. Was the tax levied by the Resolution on each piece of property valid even though the property may not be located within an irrigation district of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District ?
We have already indicated that subsection 9 of § 61-24 — 08 is valid, as we held § 61-24— 08 to be a valid delegation of legislative power in our affirmative answer to question No. 1 in the main opinion. However, a further discussion concerning the delegation by the legislature of the power of taxation to minor political subdivisions of the state would be appropriate.
The right of taxation, inherent in the people, has been vested in the legislature by the Constitution. As a general rule this sovereign power of taxation is incapable of being delegated by the legislature. It is, however, a well-recognized exception of the rule in the case of minor political subdivisions of the state, which are usually vested with the power of providing revenue to defray the expenses of the local governments and to pay for local improvements made for the public use and benefit. In North Dakota this power to tax has been delegated to counties, cities, villages and townships. This court has passed upon this question in Vallelly v. Board of Park Commissioners, 16 N.D. 25, 111 N.W. 615, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 61, wherein we said:
It is conceded, and could not reasonably be doubted, that the power to levy taxes is a legislative power. The legislative power is by the Constitution vested in the Senate and House of Representatives. [And in the people through the initiative and the referendum.] * * * It is a general principle that legislative powers cannot be delegated. A general exception exists to the effect that legislative powers may be delegated in reference to matters of local government or concern. The power of levying taxes by municipal corporations or other governmental agencies may be delegated; and section 130 of the Constitution plainly recognizes the power of the Legislature to delegate such power to municipal corporations. * * *
It has become a well-recognized principle of constitutional law that local boards and councils elected by the people are bodies to which the power to tax may be delegated. This is so upon the principle that the legislative power to levy taxes rests with the people; and, so long as the people have a voice in the selection of bodies to which the power to tax is delegated, the constitutional restriction is not violated.
The directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District are elected by the people of the several counties within the District, thus constituting a board of a body politic elected by the people to whom may be delegated the authority to levy taxes,, within the limits prescribed by the legislature.
The answer to part 1 of question No. 2 is, yes; we hold that the power and *96authority conferred on the directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District by subsection 9 of § 61-24-08 to levy a tax of not to exceed one mill annually on each dollar of taxable valuation in the district is a valid delegation of legislative power and not in violation of § 25 of the North Dakota Constitution.
The proceedings for the adoption of the resolution by the directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District levying a general property tax of one mill annually on each dollar of taxable valuation in the district in conformance with the requirement of § 61-24-14, and as authorized by subsection 9 of § 61-24-08, have been examined and we find were held in strict compliance with the statutes providing the procedure to be followed and were in accordance with due process.
The answer to part 2 of question No. 2 is, yes.
We come now to part 3 of question No. 2 posing the question whether the tax on each piece of property is valid even though the property is not located within an irrigation district of the Conservancy District.
The answer to this question involves special rights reserved to aggrieved parties under § 176 of the North Dakota Constitution requiring that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the taxing district.
This is not at issue in the proceeding and any answer we may give to the question would be merely advisory and would not be determinative of the issue.
Therefore, we decline to answer part 3 of question No. 2.
To summarize our answer to question No. 2 we say: The levy of the general property tax was pursuant to §§ 61-24-14 and 61-24-08(9) which we have held to be a constitutional delegation of power, the exercise of which was in accordance with due process. However, whether in specific instances the enforcement of the levy would be violative of certain rights reserved to aggrieved parties under §' 176 of the North Dakota Constitution is not at issue in this proceeding and any opinion at this time would therefore be merely advisory.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
TEIGEN, C. J., and MURRAY and STRUTZ, JJ., concur.
ERICKSTAD, J., being absent from the State did not participate.