The plaintiff, Howard Heggen, brought an action to quiet title to the Southeast Quarter of Section 10, the Southwest Quarter of Section 11, and the North Half of Section 15, all in Township 150 North, Range 101 West of the Fifth Principal Meridian, situated in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In his complaint he alleged that he had a fee simple interest in the property and that he was entitled to the immediate possession thereof.
The defendant McKenzie County failed to answer the complaint.
The other named defendants, Mabel Marentette, formerly Mabel Leer, Glen Humphrey, Louise Humphrey McManus, also known as Lois McManus, and Marion Humphrey Howard, in their answer generally denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that they together claimed a ¾ undivided interest in the property and that their interest is as tenants in common with Mr. Heggen.
In their counterclaim they asserted that they and Mr. Heggen are the owners in fee simple and are in actual possession of the real estate described in the complaint and of Lots 1 and 2 of Block 6 and Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 of the original townsite of Rawson in McKenzie County. They alleged that Mr. Heggen had been in possession of the land during the years 1954 through 1961 as a tenant in common, that he was still in possession of the premises, and that he had retained all of the income from the property and had paid none of it to the defendants. They alleged that the property was so situated that a division of it could not be made without gross injury and prejudice to the owners.
In their prayer for relief they asked that the plaintiff’s claim be dismissed and that they be granted judgment on their counter*221claim for a partition of the real estate; or, if a partition could not be had without material injury to the owners, that a sale of the premises be ordered and that the proceeds thereof be divided among the parties according to their respective rights; and that an accounting be ordered and proper payment be made by the plaintiff. Lastly, they asked that the costs of partition, including counsel fees and all other expenses incurred by the defendants for the benefit of all, be fixed by the court and ordered paid by the parties entitled to share in the lands, or that the lands be charged with these costs and fees proportionately.
In the plaintiff’s amended reply to the answer and counterclaim of the defendants, he denied that the defendants had any right, title, or interest in the property and, in a number of defenses, he asserted his legal reasons in support of his contention that he was entitled to have the title of the property quieted in him.
The trial court found for the plaintiff and ordered judgment accordingly. It is from the judgment entered pursuant to this order that the named individual defendants have appealed, demanding trial de novo.
The respondent, Howard Heggen, contends that the defendants are not entitled to a trial de novo. He contends that the demand for trial de novo was contained only in the notice of the appeal. This is not the case. An examination of the order settling the statement of the case discloses that the order incorporates a demand for trial de novo. Accordingly, we are required to try the case anew. See Syllabus 1, Renner v. Murray, 136 N.W.2d 794 (N.D. 1965).
The material facts do not appear to be in conflict.
For purposes of discussion of the issues, we need trace the chain of title to the Southwest Quarter of Section 11 and the North Half of Section 15 back only to Neils Heggen and the chain of title to the Southeast Quarter of Section 10 back only to John Heggen.
Neils Heggen died intestate in 1930, leaving his wife Maren and his son John surviving him. John died intestate in 1936 and Maren died intestate in 1940. John’s wife Otilda preceded him in death in 1920. Title to the land descended to the children of John Heggen, namely, the plaintiff herein, Howard Heggen, his brothers Neil Heg-gen, Norman Heggen, and James Heggen, and his sisters Mabel Heggen, Inga Heggen, and Stella Heggen, so that they each became owners of an undivided ⅜ interest as tenants in common of this property.
It should be noted that the parties stipulated that Inga Heggen died in 1932. If this is true, on her father’s and grandmother’s deaths her two children acquired the undivided ⅝ interest which otherwise would have descended to her.
Neil, Norman, James, and Stella have each conveyed their interest in the property to Howard. Thus, through inheritance of an undivided ⅛ interest and by conveyances of an undivided ⅜ interest, Howard has acquired an undivided ¾ interest in the property.
Heirship proceedings initiated by Howard purport to distribute the ⅛ interest that would have descended to Inga, had she survived her father and grandmother, to her surviving husband Glen Humphrey and her two daughters Louise Humphrey Mc-Manus and Marion Humphrey Howard. So that the issues raised by respective counsel and parties may be more fully discussed, we shall assume that the stipulation as to Inga’s date of death is in error and that the decree was correct in this respect.
Mabel Heggen, who owned an undivided ⅝ interest, is now married to Steve Maren-tette, who is also known as Steve Leer. Unless these parties have lost their interests in this property, Mabel Heggen Marentette would now be entitled to an undivided ¾ interest, and Glen Humphrey, Louise Humphrey McManus, and Marion Humphrey *222Howard would each be entitled to an undivided ½1 interest.
Howard Heggen contends that he is entitled to have full title to all four quarter sections of land quieted in him. He asserts as reasons therefor the following: He took possession of the Southeast Quarter of Section 10 in the spring of 1941 and has continued in possession ever since. He has cropped it, paid taxes on it up to the time of this lawsuit, and has improved the soil by following soil conservation practices. He has retained all of the income, and no demands for a division of the income have been made upon him during this period of time. He has leased the land for oil and gas purposes and retained the rentals therefrom; he has repaired the fences and annually picked the rocks on the land; he has built and erected on the premises a quonset building costing $5,000.
He has possessed the Northeast Quarter of Section 15 in the same manner except that he has not constructed a building on it.
Howard’s testimony as to how he acquired these two quarter sections of land is as follows:
Q. Now as to these other two quarters of land, that would be the Southeast of 10 and the Northeast of 15, how did you acquire those?
A. I just moved onto them.
Q. Well, did you ever buy them from anybody ?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t ever purchase that from anybody ?
A. Nobody chased me off neither.
Q. You never received any deed, did you?
A. Only I have got them there, quitclaim deeds (indicating).
Q. Except for those deeds and those are not recorded?
A. That’s right.
Q. In other words, you didn’t get any deed from the County or any instrument of conveyance on those other two portions of land?
A. That’s why I’m here today.
THE COURT: These are the tracts that you paid up taxes on back in 1930 ?
A. Yes.
Q. (By Mr. Tschetter) And those particular portions are your grandfather’s land beforehand?
A. Yes.
Q. And you just went in and paid those taxes?
A. Yes. Well, it was going to be lost for taxes anyway.
Q. But you did pay those taxes up and that was it and then you moved on right away?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: I thought you testified that the County had taken title to those two tracts ?
A. They were about to.
THE COURT: I see. You testified the opposite a little earlier.
A. You had me confused.
By auditor’s tax deed dated October 1, 1940, McKenzie County acquired title to the Southwest Quarter of Section 11. On February 13, 1943, Howard wrote a letter to the Board of County Commissioners of McKenzie County as follows: “I hereby offer the sum of $849.41 for the repurchase of the SW%, Sec. 11, Twp. 150, Rge. 101 on contract terms, I am one of the heirs of the Neils Heggen Estate. Yours very truly, (signed) Neils Heggen Estate by Howard Heggen.”
A “Contract for Deed in Redemption of Real Estate” for the Southwest Quarter of *223Section 11 was entered into on February 13, 1943, by the County Commissioners of McKenzie County as first party and Howard Heggen for the Estate of Neils Heggen as second party. This contract was signed by the party of the second part as “Neils Heggen Estate by Howard Heggen.” When the contract on this quarter section of land was fulfilled, the County executed a county deed on November 1, 1944, wherein the grantee was described as “Neils Heggen, Rawson, North Dakota.” At that time Neils Heggen had been deceased for fourteen years. The deed was sent to Howard Heggen, with a letter which said: “We enclose herewith your deed to the above described land. If you wish to have this deed recorded, mail it to the Register of Deeds with a fee of $1.50.”
The County acquired title to the Northwest Quarter of Section 15 through an auditor’s tax deed dated October 1, 1940. On January 27, 1943, the Board of County Commissioners of McKenzie County entered into a “Contract for Deed in Redemption of Real Estate” relative to this quarter section of land, wherein the vendee was described as “Howard Heggen for Estate of Neils Heggen.” Howard Heggen, without reference to the estate, signed as party of the second part. When this contract was fulfilled, the County, on November 1, 1944, executed a deed in which Neils Heggen, Rawson, North Dakota, was named grantee. As with the other quarter section of land, a letter was sent by the county auditor’s office to Mr. Howard Heggen, at Rawson, North Dakota, informing him that his deed was enclosed.
The Northwest Quarter of Section 15 and the Southwest Quarter of Section 11 were farmed in the same manner as the other two quarter sections of land, except that they were said to have been leased from the county the first two years.
It should be noted that the United States Department of Agriculture dealt with Howard Heggen as the owner of all four quarter sections of land in administering federal farm programs.
As previously stated, Howard entered into possession of the Northeast Quarter of Section 15 and the Southeast Quarter of Section 10 in the spring of 1941. The taxes were then delinquent back to the year 1930. He paid all of the delinquent taxes and has continued to pay the taxes on the premises up to the time of the lawsuit. He asserts that he thereby became a preferred purchaser of the land. Except for Howard’s testimony that the county was about to take title to these tracts, there is no evidence that tax deed proceedings had been consummated. There is no proof that notice of the expiration of the period of redemption had been served. These tracts were never conveyed by deed to the county or to Howard. There is no contract in evidence indicating on what basis Howard may have paid these taxes.
The tax receipts are in evidence.
A statute in effect when Howard entered onto these tracts of land provided for contract settlement of delinquent taxes. The provision thereof pertinent to this discussion reads as follows:
The board of county commissioners may, upon application of any person owning property upon which taxes, either real or personal, are delinquent for the year 1937, or prior years, permit the payment of any such delinquent taxes, except special assessments levied for local improvements and special assessments levied by drainage or irrigation districts, on the reduced amounts hereinbefore provided for, in not to exceed ten (10) annual installments, without interest, at the rate of 4% per annum from April 1st, 1939, payable on or before October 15th of each year, provided that ten per cent (10%) of the principal is paid when the extension is allowed, ten per cent (10%), on the-following October 15th, and ten per cent (10%) on each succeeding year until the amount is fully paid; and upon the pay*224ment in full of such installments, with accrued interest, such delinquent taxes shall be cancelled and discharged of record.
N.D.Sess.Laws 1939, ch. 227, § 1(3).
If it were to be said that the aforede-scribed receipts infer such a contract settlement, we are still faced with the question of for whose benefit the contract settlement was entered into. Record title to these tracts was in the name of the deceased former owner, and thus title was in the heirs of the deceased former owner, subject to probate. Under these circumstances it appears to us that Howard entered into this contract settlement as a cotenant, if in fact there was such a contract.
Howard states that the last time anyone in any way related to the heirs of John Heggen or Neils Heggen other than himself farmed the land was when his sister Mabel’s husband, Steve Leer, also known as Steve Mar-entette, tried to farm it, either alone or with his brother-in-law Neil Heggen, in 1936. He says that he was in possession of the land and farming it in 1941 when his sister and her husband left for the West Coast about the time of Pearl Harbor Day, and thus that they were aware that he had taken possession of the land, and yet neither they nor the other defendants ever made any claims upon him until the commencement of this action. An heirship proceeding was commenced in 1937 in the matter of the estate of Neils Heggen. This, as well as a proceeding for the appointment of a special administrator in the matter of the estate of Neils Heggen, was abandoned.
He argues that he further tried in good faith to clear title to the land by paying a claim against the John Heggen estate, which claim arose out of a note signed by Steve Leer, also known as Marentette, and cosigned by John Heggen, which was given in connection with the purchase of a tractor used by Steve Leer when he was attempting to farm the land back in 1936. He states that he paid this claim in the County Judge’s office in the presence of Steve Leer, who made no objections.
Howard lived in the buildings on the Northeast Quarter of Section 15 from 1941 to 1950. A friend and former neighbor, Selmer Ohnsager, testified that Howard had been in continuous possession of the premises since 1941, that he held himself out as owner, and was considered to be the owner of the land by all of the people in the neighborhood. This was corroborated by the testimony of another friend and neighbor, Alva Ensor.
In support of their contention that they are entitled to a judgment decreeing that they have together an undivided ¾ interest in the land, the defendants argue that Howard did not purchase the Southwest Quarter of Section 11 and the Northwest Quarter of Section 15 in his own name, but that he purchased it on behalf of the heirs, as indicated by the fact that the estate was named as the grantee in each of the contracts, and that the deeds were finally issued in the name of Neils Heggen, who was then deceased.
They argue that Howard’s intentions are more fully indicated by the fact that in 1953 he initiated heirship proceedings in the matter of the estate of Neils Heggen and in the matter of the estate of John Heggen, wherein as petitioner he asserted, in the one instance, that he claimed an interest in the Neils Heggen property because he was a grandson of Neils Heggen and was entitled to a ⅜ undivided interest in the property, and, in the other instance, that he claimed an interest in the John Heggen property because he was a son of John Heggen and was entitled to an undivided ⅜ interest in the property. In both of these petitions he set forth the interests of all of the other heirs, including the undivided interests of the defendants. In the process of the heirship proceedings, he signed the inventories, which listed the property now in dispute. The proceedings were completed and decrees were entered on March 10, 1954, which decreed to Howard *225his undivided ⅛ interest and to the other heirs their respective interests.
The defendants contend that the only indication they had that Howard was claiming title adverse to them was when, in 1959, he told Mr. McManus (apparently the husband of the defendant Louise Humphrey McManus) that there wouldn’t be any ac- ■ counting made.
Howard testified that the heirship proceedings which he initiated were the result of a misunderstanding between him and his attorney, Helen Arildson. He testified that he asked Attorney Arildson to quiet title to the property and did not realize until he received the bill for her services that she had instead determined heirship. He cites in support of this contention the receipt which he received from Attorney Mullaney when he issued his check to Attorney Arild-son for delivery through Attorney Mullaney, after Attorney Arildson had left the community. This receipt acknowledged that he paid the bill under protest.
He explained that he intended to purchase the Southwest Quarter of Section 11 and the Northwest Quarter of Section 15 for himself and not on behalf of the heirs. In an attempt to support this contention he called the former county auditor to testify on his behalf. The auditor was asked this question:
Can you explain then why the vendee was designated in the contract for deed as Howard Heggen, for the estate of Neils Heggen ?
He replied:
Our policy was to restore the title where we found it.
No abstracts of title relating to the lots in the village of Rawson were received in evidence. Howard, however, contends that he is entitled to Lots 1 and 2 in Block 6, upon one of which is situated an old hotel building from which he has received a total of $25 in rent, having paid all of the taxes from the year 1930 to the time of this lawsuit. He used the hotel as his home in town when he was not living in the buildings on the farm all through the 1940’s.
There is nothing in the record concerning the use of the vacant Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 of the original townsite of Rawson or the payment of taxes on them.
The four lots are, however, described in the heirship proceedings and are decreed in fractional interests consistent with the division made of the other land.
Paragraph 4 of the trial court’s amended findings of fact reads as follows:
That Plaintiff, Howard Heggen, entered into possession of the SE14 of Section 10 and the NEJ4 of Section 15, all in Township 150 North, Range 101 West in the spring of the year 1941. That Plaintiff repurchased said lands as a preferred purchaser, for himself and no others. That Plaintiff, Howard Heggen, repurchased said premises by paying all real estate taxes levied and assessed against said lands for all previous years to and including the year 1930. That Plaintiff has paid all real estate taxes levied and assessed against said lands for each and every year since the year 1930 except real estate taxes for the year 1962 not yet due. That Plaintiff, Howard Heggen, has been in continuous possession of the SE}4 of Section 10 and the NE(4 of Section 15, all in Township 150 North, Range 101 West since the spring of the year 1941 and has continuously claimed a full fee simple interest therein. That he has cultivated and worked said land since the spring of the year 1941. That he repaired and maintained an old fence, picked rock, raised small grains upon the cultivated land, purchased, paid for and erected a 32 foot by 72 foot quonset building upon the land, leased said land for oil and gas on the 11th day of April, 1951; that he received and retained all bonus and delay rentals payable thereunder and that he and his family actually moved upon the land in the spring of the year *2261941, living in and occupying said land and buildings and making his home thereon until the year 1950 when Plaintiff moved his residence to Alexander, North Dakota.
With part of these findings we cannot agree. In particular, we disagree with the finding that the plaintiff repurchased said lands as a preferred purchaser for himself and no others. We have previously set forth herein our reasoning in relation to this point, finding that Howard entered onto these two tracts as a cotenant.
The situation confronting us for decision is therefore quite similar to the situation with which we were faced in the case of Hagen v. Hagen, 137 N.W.2d 234, decided by this court in September 1965:
The plaintiff relies on certain evidence which he contends establishes his claim of adverse possession. He points out that he and his parents before him have been in possession for more than the statutory period required to establish adverse possession ; that he and his parents cut hay upon a part of the premises, farmed a portion of such property, and received whatever income there was from such operations; that during such period neither the plaintiff nor his parents paid any rents; and that the plaintiff’s parents and, after the death of his father, the plaintiff paid taxes on the property during such time. Plaintiff admits that when his father died, in 1956, the land in question was not included in the inventory as a part of the father’s estate. He further shows that, in February of 1964, his mother gave to him a quitclaim deed conveying to the plaintiff any right, title, or interest she had in the property.
Hagen v. Hagen, supra, at 235.
The court, in stating the applicable rules of law, said:
* * * [A] tenant in common who enters into possession of the common land is presumed to be exercising the rights which he has as such tenant in common, and his possession is presumed to be consistent with the title that he holds as such common tenant. Mere possession itself and the payment of taxes is presumed to be for the benefit of all tenants in common, and the appropriation of rents and profits will not constitute adverse possession on the part of a tenant in common. Hare v. Chisman, 230 Ind. 333, 101 N.E.2d 268; 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 26, p. 384.
While it is true that a cotenant may oust the other cotenants, such ouster cannot be accomplished except by acts so hostile to the rights of the others that his intent to dispossess such other cotenants is clear and unmistakable. Morrison v. Hawksett (N.D.), 64 N.W.2d 786; Ellison v. Strandback (N.D.), 62 N.W.2d 95; Smith v. Tremaine, 221 Or. 33, 350 P.2d 180, 82 A.L.R.2d 1.
* *****
Thus, in order to support the plaintiff’s claim of title to the entire estate in this case, there must be evidence to show adverse possession; there must be an ouster of the other cotenants, followed by possession for the entire statutory period. Such possession must be shown to be actual, exclusive, hostile, and with notice to the cotenants. Mere permissive possession by the plaintiff will not be presumed to be adverse, for possession by one cotenant is presumed to be in the exercise of his rights as a cotenant unless it is clearly shown that such possession is not only actual but is exclusive and hostile as well.
Hagen v. Hagen, supra, at 236.
Under the circumstances of that case, this court held that the evidence was insufficient to show adverse possession by the plaintiff for the statutory period. The facts of Hagen and of this case are very similar, and the rules applied in that case apply here.
*227Our view is that Mr. Heggen failed to establish that he had acquired a full title to the said two quarter sections of land by adverse possession. As to these two quarter sections he has established that he is entitled to an undivided ⅝ interest therein, and the defendants have established that together they are entitled to an undivided ¾ interest therein.
Paragraph 5 of the trial court’s amended findings of fact reads as follows:
That Plaintiff, Howard Heggen, entered into possession of the SWj4 of Section 11 and the NW}4 of Section IS, all in Township 150 North, Range 101 West in the spring of the year 1941. That for the years 1941 and 1942, Plaintiff, Howard Heggen was in possession and farmed said lands as tenant of McKenzie County, North Dakota. That in the year 1943, Plaintiff Howard Heggen redeemed said land from McKenzie County, North Dakota, continued in possession and ever since the year 1943 has paid all real estate taxes levied and assessed against said lands, and has continuously claimed a full fee simple interest thereon, under color of title. That he has cultivated and worked said land continuously since the year 1941. That he has picked rock, repaired and maintained fences, raised small grains upon the cultivated land and has leased the land for oil and gas on the 11th day of April, 1951, retaining all bonuses and delay rentals payable thereunder.
Section 19 of Chapter 286, Session Laws of 1941, the law at the time the plaintiff entered into the contracts for deed, authorized the owner or his successor in interest to repurchase real estate forfeited to the county under tax deed proceedings. Howard Heggen contends that he purchased these sections of land for himself under this statute.
The trial court found that the description “Howard Heggen for Estate of Neils Heg-gen” as grantee in the contracts for deed was “merely descriptive de personae as to Howard Heggen and as for him color of title.”
It should be noted that, although the estate is referred to in the description of the vendee in the body of both instruments, the contract relating to the Northwest Quarter of Section 15 was signed “Howard Heggen” as party of the second part without reference to any estate. The trial court found that the inclusion in the description of the grantee of the words “For the Estate of Neils Heggen” was the result of a policy adopted by McKenzie County in cases involving redemption or repurchase of land to attempt to restore the title to the former or last owner of record. This finding is supported by the testimony of the former County Auditor.
Some authority could be cited in support of the trial court’s conclusion. See: Scott v. Cain, 77 Ga.App. 826, 50 S.E.2d 99, 103; Dorsey v. Rankin, 43 Ga.App. 12, 157 S.E. 876, 877; Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71, 80, 156 A.L.R. 1.
In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, it is necessary that the parol evidence or testimony of Howard Heggen be considered, for without his explanation or without actual knowledge of his alleged intentions, anyone examining the records in the county auditor’s office would have been justified in concluding that Howard purchased these two quarters for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased former owner, Neils Heggen, as the contracts read: “Howard Heggen for the Estate of Neils Heggen.” In fact, deeds later executed in the name of the deceased Neils Heggen were sent to Howard Heggen and were not returned or rejected by him, although he. did not record them.
Our court in a 1958 decision held that although title was lost while the county had a tax deed to the land, the acceptance by the county of money for redemption or re*228purchase reinvested the heirs of the former owner with title to the property, even though the county issued the deed to the deceased former'"‘Owner on payment of the redemption or repurchase money. See Chapin v. Letcher, 93 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1958).
In Chapin we quoted with approval from Frandson v. Casey, 73 N.W.2d 436 (N.D.1955), as follows:
Where a person who has no right to redeem or repurchase under Sections 57-2818, NDRC 1943 or 57-2819, NDRC 1953, Supp., furnishes the money to redeem or repurchase land forfeited to the county for taxes, and the evidence discloses that such redemption or repurchase was made for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, who held the record title prior to the tax forfeiture, the acceptance of the money tendered for the redemption or repurchase in accordance with the thirty day notice provided by the statute, reinvests the heirs of said deceased with the title to the land held by them as tenants in common upon the decease of their ancestor, and the issuance of a*deed by the county subsequent thereto is but a ministerial act, and the issuance bf the deed evidencing the redemption or repurchase in the name of the deceased owner does not affect the tenancy in common of the heirs of said deceased created by the acceptance of the money required to redeem or repurchase from the county.
Frandson v. Casey, supra, Syllabus 3.
Under these circumstances, Howard’s subjective intent, disclosed now through pa-rol evidence, should not prevail over the records made at the time possession was taken. It is contended that Howard manifested his hostility to the heirs by entering onto these two tracts as the tenant of the county. No such leases are in evidence. All we have before us is Howard’s testimony that he leased the tracts from the county the first one or two years he was in possession of them. There is no evidence that the fact was communicated to the heirs at that time. We therefore hold that his taking was not unequivocal enough to adequately warn the other heirs of his adverse intentions.
The defendants argue that Howard Heg-gen initiated certain heirship proceedings, that the proceedings relate to these lands, which were specifically set out in the inventory which he signed, and that Howard’s actions support their view that from the very beginning he intended to and did acquire the property as a cotenant. They say that this action is an attempt on the part of Howard to collaterally attack the decrees which ascertain the heirs and their interests and that this cannot be done.
In support thereof the defendants refer us to § 27-07-39, N.D.C.C., which reads as follows:
The proceedings of a county court in the exercise of its jurisdiction shall be construed in the same manner and with like intendments as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction, and to its records, orders, and decrees there shall be accorded like force, effect, and legal presumptions as to the records, orders, judgments, and decrees of courts of general jurisdiction.
Pertinent also is § 30-22-11, which reads:
The decree entered in a proceeding to determine heirship is final and conclusive upon all:
1. Creditors of the decedent;
2. Heirs and other persons and their successors or assigns; and
3. Parties named in the proceeding, including the unknown persons respondent.
Upon the entry of such decree, a rehearing may be granted or an appeal taken in the manner provided in this title, but no other proceedings which would affect *229the property described in the decree shall be entertained by the county court.
This is not an appeal from the decrees of the county court.
In Jensen v. Schwartz, 90 N.W.2d 716 (N.D.1958), Syllabus 4, this court said:
The judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter imports absolute verity as long as it stands.
We believe that this rule defeats all of the contentions of the plaintiff in support of his plea that he be awarded full title to these premises, including those which he has stated and which we have considered but have not discussed.
As the decrees were entered in 1954 and this action was commenced in 1961, less than the statutory period to establish title by adverse possession had run. The decrees, therefore, import absolute verity in this case.
The plaintiff’s case for full title to Lots 1 and 2 of Block 6 of the original town-site of Rawson, is based upon facts quite similar to those pertaining to the Southeast Quarter of Section 10 and the Northeast Quarter of Section 15. We hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he is entitled to more than an undivided ¾ interest therein, and that therefore the defendants are entitled to the other undivided ¾ therein as their interests appear.
We are in accord with the trial court in its finding that neither the plaintiff nor the answering defendants have been in actual and open possession of Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 of the original townsite of Raw-son; but, as the decrees establishing heir-ship have determined the interests of the parties herein and as these decrees have not been appealed from, the determination of the interests of the parties therein is conclusive, adverse possession for the statutory period not having been established thereafter.
Conveyance by Glen Humphrey of his interest to his daughters was not champ-ertous, contrary to the plaintiffs contention.
Our statute on champerty reads as follows:
12-17-14. Buying pretended titles— Misdemeanor. — Every person who buys or sells or in any manner procures, or makes or takes any promise or covenant to convey any pretended right or title to any lands or tenements, unless the grantor thereof or the person making such promise or covenant has been in possession, or he and those by whom he claims have been in possession of the same, or of the reversion and remainder thereof, or have taken the rents and profits thereof, for the space of one year before such grant, conveyance, sale, promise, or covenant is made, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
North Dakota Century Code.
As the plaintiff held possession as a cotenant and not adversely, his possession is deemed possession by the cotenants and their heirs. The conveyance here being by an heir of a cotenant, it cannot be said that the conveyance was made by someone not in possession.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion, awarding plaintiff an undivided ¾ interest and the defendants together an undivided ¾ interest as their interests appear herein in the four quarter sections of land less the railway right of way and in the four lots in the original townsite of the village of Rawson. Notwithstanding the previous statements contained in this opinion concerning the interests of the defendants Glen Humphrey, Louise Humphrey McManus, also known as Lois Mc-McManus, and Marion Humphrey Howard, the undivided ½1 interest of Glen Humphrey having been quitclaimed to his *230daughters Louise Humphrey (McManus and Marion Humphrey Howard, their interests are thereby increased from a ½1 interest each to a Yu interest each in the entire property.
The trial court is instructed, further, to take additional testimony if necessary and thereafter make its determination of the defendants’ application for a partition of the property or for a sale thereof and for an accounting.
TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, J., concur. MURRAY, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.