dissenting:
I dissent because I believe the majority has simply made a mistake. In my judgment, the unequivocal statutory language mandates inclusion of the value of the retail coupons in the gross receipts subject to the retailers’ occupation tax. Under the statute, a tax is imposed on total gross receipts defined as “the total selling price ***” and “selling price” is defined as “the consideration for a sale valued in money whether received in money or otherwise, including cash, credits, property *** without any deduction on account of the cost of the property sold, the cost of the materials used, labor or service cost or any other expense whatsoever ***.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 440.
This case is perhaps best illustrated by the following hypothetical: Plaintiff advertises that, if the reader clips and brings to plaintiff’s store the coupon in the ad, the reader may buy a $5 paint brush for $4. Without the coupon the buyer will pay $5 for the brush; by delivering the coupon to plaintiff he buys the brush for $4. To say, as the majority does, that delivery of the coupon is not a part of the “consideration for a sale” defies elementary contract principles and ignores the plain meaning of the statutory language. My colleagues seem to believe that “consideration” refers only to cash, since they say that because “the face value of the plaintiff’s coupons is never received by the plaintiff” (81 Ill. 2d at 564), that value cannot be included as. a part of the selling price. What seems to me the obvious fallacy in that reasoning is that the statute defines “selling price” as “the consideration for a sale valued in money whether received in money or otherwise ***” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 440). As was said by this court in Hornof v. Korger Co. (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 125, 130, in upholding a statute which used the retail value of the merchandise transferred as the measure of the occupation tax on the redemption of trading stamps: “The term ‘Gross receipts’ is defined as the ‘total selling price or the amount of such sales,’ i.e. sales of tangible personal property, while the phrase ‘Selling price or amount of sale’ is defined as meaning ‘the consideration for a sale valued in money whether received in money or otherwise.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘gross receipts’ does not necessarily reflect a sale for cash, but is in effect the value placed upon the property by the seller and accepted by the buyer.” Clearly, the $1 differential in the cash payment in the above hypothetical represents the value to the retailer in having the coupon delivered to him. That value lies, at least in part, in the fact that customers are brought to his store with resulting increases in sales of other items; too, the number of coupons received enables him to guage the effectiveness of his advertising program. To say, as my colleagues do, that the value of the coupon is “speculative, does not increase the plaintiff’s gross receipts and therefore is not susceptible to taxation” (81 Ill. 2d at 565) completely ignores the statutory definitions and the Homof holding.
Further illustrating what seems to me to be my colleague’s misconception that only cash payments can be included in gross receipts is their statement that the plaintiff “very simply is selling its retail products for a reduced price” (81 Ill. 2d at 567). This misstatement is, it seems to me, the crux of the matter. Plaintiff is not simply selling its product for a reduced price — plaintiff will not sell at the reduced price without simultaneous delivery of the required coupon. Were plaintiff simply selling at a reduced price without the coupon, there would be no attempt by the Department to collect the tax for Departmental regulations in such cases explicitly measure the tax by the reduced price.
Keystone Chevrolet Co. v. Kirk (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 483, involved only the question whether a seller could deduct from his gross receipts rebates paid by a third party. It is not relevant here. Leslie Car Wash Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 488, likewise involved the question of deductibility of the cost of free car washes and is inapposite.
While there appear to be no court decisions concerning the taxability of retailers’ discount coupons, there are a number of administrative regulations and rulings. Those regulations are not uniform, but the reasoning of those taxing the value of the coupons is applicable here. Illustratively, the Connecticut sales tax which is based on gross retail receipts allows cash discounts. (State Tax Guide (CCH) par. 60 — 295, at 6065-68.) The Bulletin of the Connecticut Tax Commissioner (July 26, 1973) states:
“Coupons used to pay part of the purchase price of retail merchandise are the same as money. Anything of value which is counted toward the purchase price of goods sold at retail is, under the law, regarded as the same as money for tax purposes. The sales tax is owed on the full purchase price of the merchandise, regardless of how much is deducted by the retailer for coupons turned in by the consumer.”
Maryland and Massachusetts have similar rules. (1 All State Sales Tax Rep. (CCH) pars. 15 — 638, 15 — 711.) Statutory provisions or administrative regulations in some States provide otherwise as noted in Comment, The Retail Sales Tax: Shall the Value of Retailers’ Coupons be Included in the Basis for Computation, 13 J. Mar. L. Rev. 717, 721 n.36 (1980).
It seems to me our statute is explicit, and requires reversal of the appellate and circuit courts, dismissal of the complaint for injunction, and a declaratory judgment including in plaintiff’s gross receipts the undiscounted value of plaintiff’s products for which coupons are required.