dissenting.
I dissent. Once again the majority of this Court seeks to strangle the spirit of modern administrative law with the trappings of the more technical and formalistic style of pleadings associated with early common law. As stated by Mr. Justice Roberts in his dissent to Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. U.S. Steel Corp., 458 Pa. 559, 325 A.2d 910 (1974), “[t]his sterile and unrealistic approach results in a restrictive construction of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act which may cripple the Commonwealth’s efforts to correct the more subtle forms of discrimination.” Id., 458 Pa. at 567, 325 A.2d at 914 (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Nix, J.).
In the instant case the 1970 complaint filed by the Commission alleged:
On or about to wit, December 22, 1970 the complainant alleges that the respondent Company engages in unlaw*561ful employment practices which are discriminatory with respect to female employees, because of their sex, in hiring, assignment, seniority, transfer, salary, overtime, promotion, denial of training, and layoff. It is further alleged that the respondent Union concurs in and aids and abets the discriminatory practices of the respondent Company.
Unlike the general allegation of discrimination held insufficient by all members of this Court in U.S. Steel Corp.,1 supra, 458 Pa. at 563, 570, 325 A.2d at 912, 916, the complaint filed in this case adequately put the defendant on notice that the Commission intended to conduct an investigation and hearing regarding sex discrimination against its female employees. The term “set forth the particulars” as used in Section 9 of the Act, Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744 § 9, as amended, 43 P.S. § 959, should not be read to mean that a statistical report is required in the original complaint.
The complaint in this case sufficiently alleged that the employer had engaged in across-the-board discrimination against female employees. When, as the record amply reflects,2 an employer engages in such widespread sex *562discrimination as was the case here, it is difficult to imagine how much more “particularized” the pleadings need be to provide the employer with notice of intent to investigate. Under the reasoning employed by the majority the complaint would resemble a detailed report. Such specificity is absurd in light of the fact that oftentimes in these cases the necessary “particularized” information will not be disclosed until the investigation is completed.
I would rule, therefore, that initial complaints in discrimination cases brought by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Board need only give notice to: (1) enable a respondent to lighten the burden of the investigation and hearing process itself, and (2) encourage voluntary compliance with the Act. See U.S. Steel Corp., supra, 458 Pa. at 569, 325 A.2d at 915 (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Nix, J.).
I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission does not represent the individual claimants’ interests when it files a complaint alleging discrimination.3 If such is the case, then a complaint by the Commission is nothing more than a mere formality which can impose no monetary penalty upon the discriminating employer. Such a conclusion also is contrary to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). Logan held that an individual’s right to *563redress grievances through the adjudicatory procedures of a state agency charged with providing relief to citizens who have been unjustly injured by discrimination in employment is a species of property protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 431, 102 S.Ct. at 1155.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has the power and the duty “[t]o initiate, receive, investigate and pass upon complaints charging unlawful discriminatory practices.” 43 P.S. § 957(f). The eleven female employees who went to the Commission in February of 1970 thus had reason to believe that their rights were being vindicated by the Commission. Certainly claimants such as those before this Court have an interest in freedom from discrimination in employment, in back pay or other monetary relief, and in public vindication of their rights. They also have an interest in redressing their grievances through the administrative agency that was established for that purpose by the legislature as an expert in the field of discrimination, and in the full benefits of an investigation and hearing as provided by the Act. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., supra at 431, 102 S.Ct. at 1155.
For the above reasons I would hold that the original complaint filed by the Commission sufficiently satisfied the “particularity” requirement of Section 9 and that the rights of the individual complainants were preserved by the Commission. I would thus remand the action to the Commission for the award of back pay or other monetary relief for the individual complainants not inconsistent with the finding that the original complaint was valid.
. The comparable section of the complaint held insufficient in Pa. Human Relations Commission v. U.S. Steel Corp., 458 Pa. 559, 325 A.2d 910 (1974), read:
The Respondent has in the past and continues until the present time to maintain a discriminatory system of recruitment, hiring, training, employment, compensation, promotion, demotion, job assignment or placement, transfer, layoff, retention, referral, dismissal, rehire, retirement, and pensions, and has otherwise discriminated in the past and continues until the present time to discriminate regarding terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of sex, race and national origin.
Id., 458 Pa. at 562-63, 325 A.2d at 912.
. Indeed the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission found as a conclusion of law that:
At all times from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975, Crown engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination based upon the sex, female, of applicants and employes in hiring, job assignment, job transfer, compensation, layoff, and recall from layoff, ón a continuing basis.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., P.H.R.C. Nos. E-4027, E-4249 (Aug. 28, 1981) at 29.
. The majority supported this proposition by citing Smiler v. Toll, 373 Pa. 127, 137, 94 A.2d 764 (1953) and Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950). Neither of these cases, however, involved the situation where a public agency was charged with the duty to safeguard against constitutional violations. Smiler involved the issue of a real party in interest under a sealed contract and Hanover Fire Insurance Co. merely held that a third party beneficiary under a fire insurance policy must be named or referred to in the contract. We are not dealing with theories of contract in the instant case. Here we have the situation where a public agency has been established to safeguard the public against unlawful discriminatory practices. Since this Commission benefits the entire Commonwealth, it does not follow that individual complainants are not represented by the Commission. Rigid principles of contract law should not obstruct the legislative intent behind the establishment of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.