Concurring
I would concur in denying the appeal, but base my finding upon much broader grounds than those specified in the majority opinion.
Section 6, Chapter 60, R. S., 1954 reads in part as follows :
“If the commissioner shall notify any insurance company doing business in the state that any policy form or form of endorsement used or proposed to be used by any such company does not meet with the approval of the commissioner, for the reason that it does not comply with the statutes of this state or is otherwise illegal or is misleading or capable of a construction which is unfair to the assured or the public, (emphasis supplied) such policy form or form of endorsement shall not thereafter be used by such company in the state.”
Pursuant to authority vested in the commissioner, he disapproved the policy in question for two principal reasons, viz.:
*518(1) That the policy is misleading in that the coverage afforded by it is so limited as to be beyond the reasonable comprehension of the average policyholder; and (2) the policy is capable of a construction which is unfair to the assured or the public because the assured would normally expect coverage to exist where it does not; and the public, therefore, would be left unprotected in many instances.
These two principal statements of disapproval were enlarged by twenty detailed reasons which are set forth in the majority opinion.
It is not my intention to discuss in detail all of the twenty reasons specified by the commissioner. However, I make reference to a few of them.
Under specification (1), (2), (3), and (4), it is indicated that there is no liability coverage for the named insured while his car is being operated by anyone else with or without his permission, when he is not a passenger. This includes the spouse of the named insured, a member of his family, or his employee or agent.
Under specification (5), it is pointed out that there is no liability coverage for the named insured owner when his son or daughter is driving the car with his permission with his wife as passenger, even though the wife is a named insured.
When we consider, in relation to this specification, the provisions of Section 156, Chapter 22, R. S., 1954, which makes an owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of 18 years to operate such vehicle upon the highway, jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by the negligence of such minor, it is easy to visualize one of the great weaknesses of this policy.
Under specifications, (19), it is pointed out that the policy provides for automatic cessation upon the date of death *519of the named insured. This is a clause most dangerous to the public and is not commented upon in the majority opinion. Under the ordinary liability policy, the coverage remains in force and the estate of the insured is afforded protection.
Moreover, many of the terms of the policy are veiled in obscurity and nebulousness.
For example, in describing the named insured, the policy • provides as follows:
“The following are insured under Part 1: (a) The named insured, with respect to (1) his operation of any motor vehicle, except that no coverage is afforded hereunder for the operation of any vehicle other than an automobile (as defined hereunder) if such vehicle is owned by or regularly and frequently used in a business or occupation of the named insured, and (2) the operation of an automobile by a ‘person insured’.”
In defining the meaning of the word “operation” there is a clause in the policy which reads as follows:
“ ‘Operation’ means to physically control and regulate; to have charge of it as the driver; and includes the insured’s legal liability for Bodily Injury and Property Damage (1) caused by the automobile whether owned or non-owned while the insured leaves it unattended, (2) caused by his owned automobile while it is in the care and custody of a garage, service station, repair shop, storage garage or public parking place; provided however that with respect to this coverage . . . .”
Ability to read and understand these two clauses warrants defiance, and there are many other clauses just as difficult of comprehension.
Conceding the honesty of the motives of the company in drafting a contract of restricted liability which can be sold at a low premium, what about the acts of unscrupulous *520agents in selling this policy without explaining either with intention or carelessness how restricted is the liability?
Granting that persons have a right to enter into contracts which are not clouded with fraud or otherwise illegal, no argument is needed to point out that the ordinary, average person, does not read his policy of insurance and if he does so, has great difficulty in understanding the many clauses contained therein. If we can suppose that a prospective purchaser of this policy were told there was no liability for his spouse, a member of his family, or an employee or agent in driving the insured car with or without permission unless he is a passenger; that the policy ceases upon his death; that if he allows his 17 or 18 year old son or daughter to use his car there is no coverage; or if he sends a friend to a neighborhood store with his car to run an errand there is no coverage; then if the policy is purchased with a full and clear understanding of its contents there would be no legal objection to such a contract.
However, there is a matter of public policy involved here. The sale of this policy will undoubtedly lead to unsatisfied judgments and litigation between the policy owner and the company involving matters of interpretation and construction.
It is my considered opinion that when the legislature enacted Section 6 of Chapter 60, it was imbued with a praiseworthy desire of affording protection to the public and had within its contemplation a situation such as is now before us.
The commissioner has properly exercised the power and discretion reposed in him. He is to be commended for using his prerogative in the interests of the public welfare. I would sustain all of his findings and deny the appeal.
Appeal denied.