Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Chief Justice Bell :The decision of the Majority in this 1930 murder case is, to me, incomprehensible. In 1930, appellant-petitioner, while represented by counsel was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. No post-trial motions were filed, nor was any appeal taken. Appellant made no contention and offered no proof at his trial that he was indigent—it is obvious that he couldn’t have.
Thirty-seven years later, viz., in 1967, appellant, while represented by counsel, filed a P.C.H.A. petition for a new trial because (he alleged) his privately-retained trial counsel failed to inform him of his constitutional light of appeal under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353. In this, his present P.C.H.A. petition, appellant did not allege post-trial indigency, nor did he at*238tempt to prove at the P.C.H.A. hearing—where he had another attorney—that he could not afford counsel in this appeal. The hearing Court found that appellant had knowingly waived his right to appeal and denied relief. In the light of this record, the Majority of this Court now vacate the lower Court’s Order of Dismissal and remand for a hearing as to whether the sentence was “legally correct” and place the burden of proving this upon the Commonwealth.
How the Commonwealth could prove this 41 years later, i.e., that appellant was not indigent in 1930 when he was represented by counsel and was not informed or cognizant of his right of appeal until 1967, when the Judge and witnesses are either dead or cannot be found, or undoubtedly will be unable to remember specific details in this case, is so unrealistic as to be beyond my comprehension.
To release this murderer 41 years after he committed the murder, because, although represented by counsel, he allegedly was not cognizant of his constitutional rights is not only unjustifiable to the law-abiding people of the Commonwealth, but likewise very unfair and very costly and very dangerous. Such decisions, especially when applied retroactively, will greatly increase the financial cost in every criminal case and will multiply the enormous Court backlog. Furthermore, it will unfairly and unwisely delay Justice for all other persons (criminals and accused alike) seeking a Constitutionally-ordained speedy public trial in criminal cases.
It is important to note in this connection that the test for retroactivity and the effect of retroactivity upon the administration of justice is set forth in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 ;* Stovall v. Denno, *239388 U.S. 293, 297; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-727; Commonwealth v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A. 2d 315; Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A. 2d 923;** Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A. 2d 613; and these cases would prohibit retroactive application in this case.
To grant this appellant another hearing is so unfair to the safety of the law-abiding public and to countless other persons accused of crime that it will be catastrophic to the administration and application of justice and of the constitutionally-granted right to a speedy public trial.
*240Once again I asli, “Is there never to be an end to a conviction and sentence of murder (or to a major felony conviction), when everyone in the United States knows that the colossal Crime Wave is increasing to such a degree as to be of Himalayan proportions?”*** No wonder (1) the Courts are bogged down with mountainous backlogs of criminal cases and (2) a large majority of crimes are perpetrated by convicted criminals who have been placed upon probation or released from jail on Judicially-created rights made of straw!
I vehemently dissent.
In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., supra, the Court said (pages 248-249) :
*239“[3] Ever since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, established that ‘the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect’ for decisions expounding new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials, the Court has viewed the retroactivity or nonretroaetivtiy of such decisions as a function of three considerations. As we most recently summarized them in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199;
“ ‘The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and (e) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards’.”
The Court said (page 535) ; “ ‘. . ., we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ (381 U.S. at 628, 629) The considerations which should be weighed in the balance in determining whether a decision should be applied prospectively only were spelled out in greater detail by the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 E. Ed. 2d 882 (1966), holding that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), would not be applied retroactively. In Johnson, the Court stated, ‘We must look to the purpose of our new standards governing police interrogation, the reliance which may have been placed upon prior decisions on the subject, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda.’ (384 U.S. at 727.)”
See the Uniform Grime Report compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and released on December 29, 1971. See also, the report of the crimes committed in Philadelphia as detailed in The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 30, 1971, which are far more numerous and far worse.