¶ 15. {concurringI dissenting). I join part II.A. of the majority decision in which it remands for a determination of whether sanctions should be imposed under Wis. Stat. § 802.05. I agree that it appears from the record that the "potential client" who called Marshall & Ilsley seeking reference information on Freer was not a potential client at all. Thus, further inquiry, as directed by the majority, is needed. I do not, however, join part II.B. of the opinion addressing whether the words of a Marshall & Ilsley employee were defamation per se.
¶ 16. Before tackling the merits of the majority's defamation per se discussion, I make two observations.
¶ 17. First, I question the value of the broad and ill-defined defamation per se categories set forth in Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962). I do not question the value of having types of defamation that are defamation per se. Rather, I question whether all of the categories listed in Martin make sense and I am concerned with how poorly defined they are.
¶ 18. Second, I question the legal merit of this particular lawsuit, though not for the reason contained in the majority decision. As the majority points out, the record before us indicates that Freer, through an attorney, hired the person to whom the allegedly defamatory statements were made. Defamation per se is an exception to the general rule that a party alleging defamation *737must also allege special damages. The justification for defamation per se is that some false statements are so likely to cause pecuniary loss that " 'proof of the defamation itself is sufficient to establish the existence of some damages so that the jury may, without other evidence, estimate the amount of damages.'" Bauer v. Murphy, 191 Wis. 2d 517, 525-26, 530 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 287 N.W.2d 747 (1980)). That being the justification, it seems odd to permit a defamation per se claim in a case where it appears undisputed that the statements neither caused, nor could cause, pecuniary loss. If I were writing for the majority, I would explore whether defamation per se applies when the audience is a person hired to "test" whether a party will make a defamatory statement. But that topic was not briefed, and I will not venture forth on that path.
¶ 19. I turn now to the reasoning employed by the majority and focus in on the narrow legal reasoning it uses to dismiss Freer's defamation claim.
¶ 20. Freer argues that statements by a Marshall & Ilsley employee were defamatory per se because they constituted false statements of fact to a potential client about Freer's relevant experience while employed at Marshall & Ilsley. Freer alleged that when a prospective investment client telephoned Marshall & Ilsley to inquire about Freer's experience with managing investments, the caller was falsely told that Freer had no such experience while at Marshall & Ilsley. This allegation falls squarely into the recognized defamation per se category for false statements affecting a plaintiffs profession. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 cmt. c, at 193 (1977) ("When peculiar skill or ability is neces*738sary, an imputation that attributes a lack of skill or ability tends to harm the other in his business or profession.").
¶ 21. The majority does not say that there is a problem with Freer's claim because Sherman was only an apparent potential client, not a real potential client. And, the majority does not say that giving false information about a person's relevant professional experience to a potential client does not constitute defamation per se. Rather, the majority holds that the statements made by the Marshall & Ilsley employee must be viewed in isolation and, when so viewed, the statements are not defamatory per se because "many business people undoubtedly fall within the ambit of employment encompassed by [the Marshall & Ilsley employee's] alleged statements to Sherman about Freer and lead proud and productive lives." Majority at ¶ 13. I disagree that the law directs this context-free analysis.
¶ 22. The majority writes: "It is settled in Wisconsin that words are not slanderous per se if anything other than the words are needed to make them defamatory." Majority at ¶ 12. The majority goes on to apply this rule so strictly that it does not even take into account the immediate context in which the statements were made. The four cases relied on by the majority in paragraph 12 of its opinion do not support this context-free approach to defamation per se.
¶ 23. In Bauer, 191 Wis. 2d 517, we were asked to decide whether defamation per se occurred when basketball coach Mary Murphy called student-player Amy Bauer a "disgrace." during a team meeting. The per se category at issue in Bauer was "unchastity" of a woman. Bauer argued that Coach Murphy's "disgrace" statement — viewed in the context of things said by other people at the team meeting — was a declaration *739that Bauer was guilty of disgraceful sexual acts with an assistant team coach named Peckham. The majority here seems to say that Bauer informs us that we do not look at such context when determining whether a statement is defamatory per se. But we did look at context in Bauer:
[W]hile the "chastity" rule is apparently good law, Bauer has not persuaded us that Murphy's "disgrace" remark imputed "serious sexual misconduct" to her within the meaning of the Restatement rule.
As we have noted above, the only statement specifically relating to a purported "relationship" with Coach Peckham was the announcement to the group by the athletic director, Marra, that Peckham had been suspended for having formed an "inappropriate relationship" with Bauer. Beyond that, the only discussion about Bauer before she entered the meeting took place among her teammates, several of whom were discussing among themselves various occasions on which Bauer and Peckham had been seen together, and some expressing the view that Bauer was "too close" to Peckham. Bauer argues from these facts that Murphy's remark that Bauer was a "disgrace" must be considered as referring to some form of sexual misconduct with Peckham.
As Murphy points out, however, slander, unlike libel, is an individual, not a joint tort. If Marra's remarks, or the remarks of Bauer's teammates, about her purported relationship with Peckham defamed her, Bauer was free to proceed against them. There is no authority for holding Murphy liable for statements made by others at the meeting, however.
Nor do we see that the context in which Murphy's remark was made adds a sexual misconduct gloss to her words. First, as the supreme court noted in Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 476, 277 N.W. 177, 180 *740(1938), " '[wjords which are defamatory per se do not need an innuendo, and, conversely, words which do need an innuendo are not defamatory per se.'" (Quoted source omitted.)
... While Murphy's alleged "disgrace" remark was made during a meeting at which the athletic director and several team members were discussing Bauer's relationship with Beckham, it also came in the context of a heated discussion between Bauer and Murphy regarding Bauer's criticism of Murphy's abilities as a basketball coach and the rules Murphy imposed on the team. Indeed, it was after that exchange that Murphy's comment was allegedly made.
To be called a "disgrace" is generally disparaging in any context, as the Bander court recognized. As the court also recognized, however, it is "equally discreditable as applied to all persons," and we believe in this case that the word does not reasonably carry with it an assertion of "unchastity" or sexual misconduct, whether taken in isolation or in the context in which the remark was made.
Id. at 528-32 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted). If context does not matter, we should have made quick work of the defamation per se claim in Bauer because, without the context of the team meeting, Coach Murphy's "disgrace" remark is not even arguably a reference to unchastity. But we obviously thought context did matter, and so discussed it. We certainly did not suggest that context must be ignored when the claim is defamation per se.1
*741¶ 24. The supreme court's decision in Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 277 N.W. 177 (1938), criticized on other grounds, Martin, 15 Wis. 2d at 460-61, similarly fails to support the majority's context-free analysis. In Kassowitz, the question was whether defamation per se occurred when it was stated that a group of persons, including the plaintiff, "are so-called arrested cases of tuberculosis." Kassowitz, 226 Wis. at 471, 475-76. The Kassowitz court's analysis of whether the statement was defamation per se did not turn on whether the statement should be viewed in context. Instead, it turned both on the court’s conclusion that tuberculosis is not a "loathsome disease" and its conclusion that the "arrested case" qualifier indicated that the person was not contagious:
It may be unfortunate, but it is no disgrace to be tubercular. Contracting the disease is not due, as in some cases of disease, to any immorality.
The alleged libelous statement in the instant case *742refers to so-called "arrested cases of tuberculosis." The words, "arrested case," may be defined in a medical way [all "constitutional" symptoms absent], or may be interpreted in the much looser terms of the layman, to whom it may mean an individual well enough to leave a sanitarium and resume his usual existence. It may mean that the person afflicted has so far recovered that he would not communicate the disease to others.
Id. at 475.
¶ 25. I note that Bauer and Kassowitz both say that "innuendo" may not be used to show that words are defamatory per se, Bauer, 191 Wis. 2d at 528-32; Kassowitz, 226 Wis. at 476-77, but I have a hard time discerning just what is meant by this limitation. Regardless, my review of Bauer and Kassowitz, and the authorities cited in those cases, does not suggest that the "innuendo" limitation extends to stripping allegedly defamatory words of their immediate context. For example, Kassowitz relies on Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, et al., 245 N.W. 231 (Iowa 1932), for the proposition that statements that are defamatory per se do not need an "innuendo." Kassowitz, 226 Wis. at 476. In Shaw, a dry cleaner advertised: "Garments Cleaned at Half-Price are only Half Cleaned. When you buy cleaning for half price you get just what you pay for. . . half-way cleaning and pressing." Shaw, 245 N.W. at 232. A competing dry cleaner who regularly used "half-price" advertising claimed defamation per se. Although the Shaw court ultimately determined that the challenged advertisement was not defamation per se, the court did consider context along the way. The challenged advertisement in Shaw did not name the plaintiff. Only by considering context — that the plaintiff used half-price advertising *743—could it be known that the target of the statement was the plaintiff. In this respect, the Shaw court stated:
It will be noted that the published advertisement does not name the plaintiff, but it is averred in the petition that the advertisement was a libel of the plaintiff in that the matter printed therein referred to the plaintiff, etc. It is not necessary that the defendant name or directly refer to the plaintiff in the published article in order to constitute libel. [In a previous case we stated]: "A person reading the entire matter said to have been taken from the 'Live Wire' might connect the discussion to and reasonably infer that it referred to ... [the plaintiff].... The characterization of a person by insinuation, allusion, imputation, or irony may be quite as certain and effective as though directly applied. ... And in the case at bar, if the jury should find that plaintiff was intended, there is no escape from the conclusion that the article constituted a libel per se."
Id. at 234 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In addition, without saying so, the Shaw court necessarily considered the context that the plaintiff is a dry cleaner. Without that backdrop, there was no possible defamation.
¶ 26. The remaining two cases the majority cites are Holsapple v. Smith, 599 S.E.2d 28, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), and Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1998). As with Bauer and Kassowitz, neither case, discusses whether the context in which a statement is made should be considered. For example, although the Cook court quotes an Ohio decision for the proposition that slander per se must be "accomplished by the very words spoken," neither Cook, nor the Ohio case quoted, King v. Bogner, 624 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ohio Ct. App. *7441993), contains any suggestion that the "very words spoken" must be divorced from the context in which they were spoken.
¶ 27. I also think the majority's reliance on examples in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573, comment c, illustrations 1-6, is misplaced. Majority at ¶ 13. Saying that a bricklayer is a hypocrite is not actionable because a perfectly competent bricklayer might also be a hypocrite. In contrast, saying that a lawyer is unqualified to practice law is actionable because it disparages the lawyer's ability as a lawyer. None of the examples from the Restatement address the context issue.
¶ 28. In addition to a lack of legal support, I do not see the common sense in the majority's context-free analysis. If a former employer provides false information about a person's relevant work experience to a prospective client, why not take into account the reason the prospective client called? I wonder whether the majority would ignore context if it provided an innocent interpretation for words that, viewed in isolation, are defamation per se. See Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1301-02 (Ill. 1996) (" 'We therefore hold that a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se.'")(quoting Chapski v. Copley Press, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ill. 1982)); see also Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 757 (7th Cir. 1986) (under Illinois' innocent construction rule, "a written or oral statement is to be considered in context").
¶ 29. I cannot join the majority's defamation per se discussion because I believe it will be used to defeat *745defamation per se claims that our supreme court intended to cover when it adopted the per se categories. Meaning is commonly derived from context, and I am unable to come up with a good reason to ignore context when deciding whether a statement is defamation per se.
The majority reasons that the Bauer court must not have considered the context of the "disgrace" remark because, if consideration of context is permitted to interpret a remark, *741then a trial in Bauer would have been necessary. The majority states: "If the context of that discussion was material, there were, as Bauer noted, arguably other things to which the 'disgrace' remark might have referred, including insubordination, and a dispute whether the 'disgrace' remark referred to those other matters or, as the plaintiff argued, the 'inappropriate relationship' discussion, would have required a trial...." Majority at n.3 (citations omitted). I agree that my reading of the Bauer decision suggests that a trial should have been ordered. I do not agree that, in Bauer, we ignored the meeting when discussing the meaning of "disgrace" or suggested that a defamation per se analysis should ignore the context in which a statement is made. In effect, in Bauer, we correctly discussed and considered context, but then failed to follow through with the logical next step: ordering factual resolution of what Coach Murphy was referring to when she called Bauer a "disgrace."