concurring in result as to issue I.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that Officer Lehman's pat-down search of Wright was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. I write separately to explain my disagreement.
Wright properly concedes that Officer Lehman was justified in performing an investigative stop, but he does not concede that Officer Lehman was justified in performing an investigative search for weapons. The Terry court enunciated the following test for determining the reasonableness of an investigative search:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the cireumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such cireumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate *1239and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see also Tumblin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 317, 322 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ("A generalized suspicion that an individual represents a threat to an officer's safety does not authorize a patdown search. There must exist articulable facts to support an officer's reasonable belief that the particular individual is armed and dangerous.") (citation omitted).
At most, Officer Lehman claimed that Wright's movements made him "very nervous." Tr. at 12. Cf. State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (upholding Terry search conducted in "neighborhood well known for drug trafficking and shootings" and where defendant "began fidgeting with his hand between the console and the driver's seat of the car" and "put his hands where they could be seen. . only after the police officer had made repeated demands and had drawn his gun. The police officer testified that [defendant's] actions had frightened him."). Officer Lehman never testified that he believed that Wright was armed or that he believed that his safety was in danger. Cf. Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (upholding Terry search where officer testified that defendant's "actions and behavior as he approached the car caused him to believe [defendant] was reaching for a weapon"); Tumblin, 736 N.E.2d at 322 ("[An officer's knowledge that an individual carries a weapon or has previously been arrested on a weapons charge is sufficient to justify a patdown search. The behavior of an individual during a traffic stop, e.g., acting in an aggressive or hostile manner, may cause an officer to reasonably fear that his safety is compromised.") (citation omitted).
In fact, Officer Lehman testified that he pulled Wright from the vehicle within "see-onds" of asking him whether he had any drugs or weapons. Tr. at 12. An investigative search for weapons "must, like any other search, be strictly cireumseribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation" and therefore "must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby[.]" Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (citation omitted). Once Officer Lehman removed him from the vehicle, Wright could not reach for any weapon that might have been concealed there, and once Officer Lehman handcuffed him, Wright could not reach for any weapon that might have been concealed on his person. Thus, not only was there no indication that Wright was armed and dangerous to begin with, but there was also no exigency to justify Officer Lehman's investigative search for weapons onee Wright was out of the vehicle and in handcuffs. In my view, Officer Lehman's search of Wright was patently unreasonable, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wright's motion to suppress the cocaine obtained as a result of the search.
Nevertheless, since Wright failed to object at trial to the admission of the cocaine, his conviction for cocaine possession must stand. See Wright v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (Ind.1992) ("When the trial court denies a motion to suppress evidence ...., the moving party must renew his objection to admission of the evidence at trial. If the moving party does not object to the evidence at trial, then any error is waived.") (citation omitted), cert. denied. Therefore, I concur in the majority's result as to issue I, and I fully concur in the majority's opinion as to issues II and III.