dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This case presents us with the sole issue of whether the Agreement required Guy to change beneficiaries on his life insurance policy. When construing a contract, courts give the contractual terms their plain and ordinary meaning. Reaver v. Rubloff-Sterling, L.P., 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559 (1999). If the contract’s language is unambiguous, courts must determine the parties’ intent solely from the words of the contract. Reaver, 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559. We review the circuit court’s determination of a contract de novo. Reaver, 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559.
Here, the Agreement reveals that the provision on life insurance benefits does not specifically mention Guy’s life insurance policy. Furthermore, the provision’s plain language requires the parties to obtain life insurance policies, not change an already-existing policy. The two uses of the word “maintain” are not dispositive and refer to the requirement that the parties keep the policies in effect once they have obtained the policies. In addition, I do not believe that the generic language of the miscellaneous provision required Guy to change the beneficiary designation on his fife insurance policy. Nothing in these provisions can reasonably be construed to indicate that the parties intended the children to be the beneficiaries of Guy’s life insurance policy.
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson, 71 Ill. App. 3d 900 (1979), cited by the majority, does not support the disposition. In Lincoln National, the court ordered that the child receive the proceeds of the father’s life insurance policy, even though the father did not change beneficiaries as was required by a previous court order. However, in Lincoln National, unlike the instant matter, the divorce decree specifically required the father to name his children as beneficiaries of his existing life insurance policy. The same cannot be said for this case. I would hold that, under the plain language of the Agreement, Guy was not required to change the beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy, and thus the circuit court properly ordered State Farm to pay the policy’s proceeds to Colleen. I dissent on that basis.