Dissenting:
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent. While I agree with much of the majority’s analysis as to the implications of a suppression ruling generally, I must disagree that this analysis applies under the specific facts of this ease. My reasons follow.
¶ 2 Whether viewed as an issue of collateral estoppel or coordinate jurisdiction, I agree with the trial court that the only evidence available to the Commonwealth to connect appellee to the unsuppressed drugs is inextricably intertwined with Officer Henry’s tainted testimony that he watched appellee sell and stash the drugs from an impossible location. See Commonwealth v. Harper, 416 Pa.Super. 608, 613, 611 A.2d 1211, 1213 n. 1 (1992) (this court “may affirm the decision of the trial court if there is any basis on the record to support the trial court’s action. This is so even if we rely upon' a different basis in our decision to affirm[]”) (citations omitted).
¶ 3 The majority posits, however, that because this not a case in which the same evidence that was previously suppressed is to be admitted, but is instead a case that turns on the nexus of the suppressed evidence to the admissibility of other evidence, the Commonwealth should be given an opportunity to establish that the evidence connecting appellee to the unsuppressed drugs was not tainted by Officer Henry’s testimony. (Majority opinion at 633-34.) I do not agree.
¶ 4 The trial court found as a fact during the suppression hearing that appellee neither sold drugs to a passenger in the van nor stashed drugs in the vacant lot because Officer' Henry’s tainted testimony was the only direct evidence the Commonwealth presented that he did. (R.R. at 118a, 138a-139a.) As a result, the court found that the police lacked probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot to support appellee’s arrest, and therefore suppressed the drugs found on appellee, the only drugs in which appellee had a privacy interest.3 (Trial court opinion, 6/16/98 at 3.) As the court noted, “I can’t believe anything [Officer Henry] says, and I don’t; and therefore, there is no credible testimony that justifies the arrest and the search....” (Notes of testimony, suppression hearing, 12/9/97 4 at 101.) Assistant District Attorney John Minges then asked the court, “The Court has granted the motion to suppress, saying there is no probable cause to arrest the defendant?” (Id. at 103.) The court responded, “I also found that the officer is unbelievable.” (Id.) The Commonwealth did not’ appeal the suppression court’s order.
¶ 5 It is true that Officer Willie Jones, who was one of the officers who stopped the van and arrested its passenger and also arrested appellee, also testified at the suppression hearing. It was clear, however, from Officer Jones’ testimony that all of his actions and observations were predicated on information he received from Offi*639cer Henry. (See, e.g., id. at 7-8, 28.) Regardless of Officer Jones’ credibility, therefore, I do not agree with the majority that the Commonwealth may now call Officer Jones to testify at trial.
¶ 6 Nor do I believe that the Commonwealth may call two additional officers, Officers Brad Mitchell and Daniel Heeney, to testify at trial in place of Officer Henry. When the Commonwealth proffered the testimony of these two witnesses in response to the motion in limine, the trial court rejected this proffer because these officers, who recovered the stashed drugs, stopped and searched the van, and arrested its passenger and appellee, had, like Officer Jones, acted solely on information received from Officer Henry. See R. at, Investigation Report Form 75-49 (“At approximately 5:40pm, P/O Daniel Heeney ... working with P/O Willie Jones ... stopped above blue Ford van”; “At approximately 5:45pm, P/O Willie Jones ... working with P/O Daniel Heeney ... were directed to the 400 block of W. Ontario Street by P/O Henery [sic]”; “At approximately 5:55pm, P/O Brad Mitchell left surveillance which he was conducting with P/O Aubrey Henery [sic] ... at which time P/O Henery [sic] directed P/O Mitchell to above cyclone fence and removed from underneath a piece of wood above large clear baggie which P/O Henery [sic] observed deft Garcia place underneath.... ”). See also notes of testimony, suppression hearing, 12/9/97 at 106-110. Thus, these officers’ testimony, like the testimony of Officer Jones, would bear the taint of Officer Henry’s testimony.5
¶ 7 The Commonwealth argues, however, that possession of the drugs found in the van and vacant lot, an element of the crimes with which appellee is charged,6 was not at issue at the suppression hearing. I agree that possession of those drugs was not at issue; however, the facts underlying possession were very much at issue. Thus, the essential issue of fact underlying constructive possession, i.e., whether appellee sold or stashed the drugs, was at issue at the suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 418 Pa.Super. 82, 87-89, 613 A.2d 581, 584 (1992).
¶ 8 Furthermore, Officer Henry’s testimony was, and at trial can be, the only evidence finking appellee to the aforementioned drugs because all of the other officers who filed reports or testified in this case indicated that they acted on information received from Officer Henry. See discussion supra. Because the suppression court found Officer Henry’s testimony incredible, the Commonwealth cannot establish a prima facie case that appellee possessed those drugs, much less sustain its burden of proof of possession beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 416 Pa.Super. 59, 62-64, 610 A.2d 970, 972 (1992) (in order to establish a prima facie case, the Commonwealth must show that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Haskins, 450 Pa.Super. 540, 543-45, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (1996) (“When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the Commonwealth must establish ‘constructive possession,’ that is, the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control[]”), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 751, 692 A.2d 563 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 613 A.2d 548 (1992).
*640¶ 9 The majority agrees with the Commonwealth, however, that Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477, 509 A.2d 863 (1986), relied upon by the trial court, is inapposite. While I, too, agree that Laga-ña is factually and procedurally distinguishable, I find the court’s discussion in Lagana instructive. In that case, the police responded to a radio call indicating that a man with a gun was standing on a street corner in Philadelphia. When a police officer arrived at the corner, he observed Lagaña standing in the rain looking into a sandwich shop with binoculars. Following a pat-down that revealed a gun, the officer .arrested Lagaña. Prior to arresting him, however, the officer noticed two nearby carrying cases. When Lagaña responded hesitantly to the officer’s questions regarding the cases, the officer seized the cases, which contained the fruits of a burglary.
¶ 10 Lagana was charged separately with a firearms violation and with burglary, and the cases proceeded separately through the system, the Commonwealth not having consolidated them. As a result, defense counsel filed separate motions to suppress. At the suppression hearing on the burglary matter, the court suppressed the burglary evidence, finding that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Lagaña because there was no evidence regarding the reliability of the police radio information that led to the arrest. Rather than appealing the decision, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the burglary charge. Id. at 479-81, 509 A.2d at 864.
¶ 11 At a suppression hearing on the firearms matter, the suppression court, who was not the same judge who presided over the burglary suppression, ruled that by operation of collateral estoppel, the burglary suppression court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were binding. As a result, without taking evidence, the firearms court suppressed the gun. Id. While this court affirmed the trial court, our supreme court found appropriate a limited form of collateral estoppel, in which the ruling of the first suppression court would be incorporated into the record of the second hearing, thereby allowing review of the first decision on appeal in the second proceedings. Id. at 866.
¶ 12 The Commonwealth argues, however, that this case is distinguishable from Lagana because the issues before a suppression court are not the same as the issues at trial. I agree with the Commonwealth that a suppression court’s ruling as to probable cause does not usually implicate the Commonwealth’s ability to go forward with its case beyond precluding the Commonwealth from introducing the suppressed evidence: it is free to go forward as to any other, non-suppressed evidence. Nevertheless, as I noted supra, this is an unusual case. Variations on the facts of Lagana will explain.
¶ 13 As already noted, Lagaña was charged separately with the firearms and burglary violations. Even if these charges had been consolidated, however, and defense counsel had moved to suppress only the contents of the carrying cases but not the gun on the basis of the unreliable radio report, I envision the following possible scenarios. In the first scenario, the officer arrived at the corner and saw Lagaña standing there with the gun. The Commonwealth could then proceed on the firearms violation because independent credible evidence, i.e., the officer’s observation of Lagaña holding the gun on a public street, would establish a prima facie case of a firearms violation.7
¶ 14 If, on the other hand, the radio report indicated that Lagaña had thrown the gun into nearby bushes, and, on arriving, the police officer found the gun in the bushes, only the unreliable radio report could establish a connection between Lagana and the gun. The Commonwealth *641would therefore be unable to establish a prima facie case that Lagana constructively possessed the gun and would be unable to proceed on the firearms violation. This is our case.
¶ 15 Nevertheless, the Commonwealth also argues that the suppression court’s order was not a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel. (Commonwealth brief at 11.) Our supreme court held in Lagana, supra, however, that collateral estoppel should apply to pre-trial suppression rulings where separate prosecutions arise from a single arrest. Id. at 479-81, 509 A.2d at 864. Noting that collateral estoppel applies in criminal prosecutions where double jeopardy concerns are implicated, the Lagana court held that it also applies to avoid “having judges of equal jurisdiction, sitting on the same bench, overruling each other on the same record.” Id. at 483, 509 A.2d at 866. If the coordinate jurisdiction rule is sound public policy where there are two separate prosecutions as in Lagana, it is even more sound where the rulings will be part of the same case.
¶ 16 It is well recognized that “ ‘judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court and in the same case should not overrule the decisions of each other.’ ” Boyle v. Steiman, 429 Pa.Super. 1, 12, 631 A.2d 1025, 1031 (1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 663, 649 A.2d 666 (1994), quoting Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, 410 Pa.Super. 506, 509-11, 600 A.2d 568, 570 (1991) (other citations omitted). As the Boyle court noted, however, “[A]n exception exists where new evidence is placed on the record in the interim between the first trial court judge’s ruling and the second trial court judge’s reassessment.” Boyle, 631 A.2d at 1031 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As the court in Boyle continued, “Where the record is materially different from the record that was before the preceding judge, it is not improper for the succeeding judge to reach a different result.” Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 17 Perhaps on other facts, I could agree with the majority that “it is conceivable that the Commonwealth can produce credible evidence of the discovery of the stash and transfer of drugs untainted by the discredited testimony of Officer Henry.” (Majority opinion at 634.) In reality, however, the Commonwealth’s proffer of new evidence in the form of the testimony of Officers Brad Mitchell and Dennis Hee-ney is tainted by its dependence on information received from Officer Henry, as is the testimony of Officer Jones. See, e.g., notes of testimony, preliminary hearing, 3/21/97 at 19-21 (Officer Jones testified that at the direction of Officer Henry, he and Officer Heeney stopped the van and arrested its passenger, and then arrested appellee; Officer Jones testified that Officer Henry then directed Officers Jones and Mitchell to the vacant lot). Thus, while it is always conceivable that the Commonwealth may be able to unearth untainted new evidence, the Commonwealth had not placed on the record new, untainted evidence when the trial court granted the motion in limine, and has not met that burden on appeal. Boyle, 631 A.2d at 1031.
¶ 18 Finally, I would reject the Commonwealth’s arguments, sounding in logic, to the effect that under the suppression court’s analysis, if the suppression court does not believe a witness who claims to have seen the Titanic sink, then the Titanic did not sink. (Commonwealth brief at 7.)8 I find the suppression court’s reasoning to be that if the Commonwealth can produce only one witness who claims to have seen the Titanic sink, but the defense proves that the witness was in Antarctica at the time he claimed to have witnessed the sinking, then without any other evidence, the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of proving that the Titanic sank. *642In a criminal case, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the Commonwealth could not even meet its burden of establishing that appel-lee was probably committing a crime, and had no additional, untainted evidence to offer. I find no flaw in the court’s logic.
¶ 19 For all of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
. Appellee conceded he had no expectation of privacy in the drugs in the van or the vacant lot. (R.R. at 143a-144a.)
.Citations to notes of testimony from the suppression hearing are citations to a volume of testimony dated December 9, 1997 and filed in this court on November 23, 1998.
. In its letter brief in support of its motion for recusal, the Commonwealth asserted it would call Brad Mitchell at trial, who would testify that he observed the drug sale arid also observed appellee walk into the vacant lot. (R.R. at 145a.) The investigation reports the police officers filed do not appear to support this claim. Additionally, Officer Mitchell was available to testify at the suppression hearing but the Commonwealth did not call him because he could add nothing. (Notes of testimony, suppression hearing, 12/9/97 at 50.)
. Appellee was charged with possession, possession with intent to deliver, and delivery of a controlled substance.
. While the gun may have otherwise been suppressible as the fruit of the poisonous tree, it would be admissible because defense counsel did not move to suppress it.
. The Commonwealth employs numerous examples of the suppression court’s allegedly fallacious logic. I address only one.