dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not err in permitting the cocaine discovered during the strip search to be introduced into evidence.
As the majority notes, subject to a few well-delineated exceptions, searches and seizures conducted outside of the judicial *692process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Stalling v. State, 713 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
The exception at issue here is the investigatory stop exception. An investigatory stop of a person is constitutionally permis-gible only when an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Polk v. State, 789 NE.2d 666, 668 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). "Reasonable suspicion exists if there are specific and articulable facts which lead a police officer to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur." Id. "Based on the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of engaging in criminal activity." Reeves v. State, 666 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Indiana has adopted this rationale for the purpose of determining the legality of an investigatory stop under Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied, trams. demied.
In general, we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence despite a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Burkett, 736 N.E.2d at 306. However, the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de movo. Id.
While the police officers suspected criminal activity at 1506 S. Governor, none of the officers involved had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in relation to a particular person. At the hearing on EFrye's Motion to Suppress, Detective Hackworth was asked if he remembered whether or not Epstein described the individual who sold him the cocaine. Detective Hackworth testified that Epstein described the individual as a "black guy, wearing a white tank top." (Appellant's Appendix at 105). Detective Hackworth also testified that he conveyed this information to Detective Johnson. However, Detective Johnson testified that Detective Hackworth described the person who sold Epstein the cocaine as a "black male." (Appellant's Appendix at 64).
Furthermore, at trial, on cross examination, the following exchange took place between Frye's counsel and Detective Johnson:
Q. The white male stated to Officer Hackworth that he had just bought the cocaine from someone at 1506 South Governor, and the subject had a quarter ounce of cocaine. Now, that is from a document that you wrote?
Yes. |»
And are those your words? ©
Yes. p
And to the best of your recollection that's the events of that evening? p
Yes it is. >
Someone? $
p Someone.
# ock ok
Q. And you have no recollection of hearing Officer Hackworth tell you that Epstein gave a particular description?
A. I did not hear a description.
(Appellant's Appendix at 248-244, 246-247).
Officer Philip Leuke, Detective Robert Hahn, and Detective Cliff Simpson accompanied Detective Johnson when the decision was made to approach the rear of 1506 S. Governor. Officer Leuke testified at the hearing on EFrye's Motion to Suppress that there were a lot of complaints that drug dealing was going on at 1506 S. Governor. Officer Leuke also testified that he was aware of an officer stopping a *693vehicle. Detective Hahn also testified at the hearing. Detective Hahn did not testify as to any knowledge of a black male in a white tank top selling cocaine to Epstein. In fact, Detective Hahn did not testify as to any knowledge of Detective Hack-worth's stop of Epstein.
At trial, Detective Hahn testified that Sergeant Lauderdale, the supervisor on the scene, made the decision to approach the back of 1506 S. Governor. When asked if Sergeant Lauderdale was on the scene when the officers approached 1506 S. Governor, Detective Hahn testified that he was not sure. Detective Simpson also testified at the trial. Detective Simpson testified that he was present at the arrest at 1506 S. Governor. However, Detective Simpson did not testify as to any knowledge of a black male in a white tank top selling cocaine to Epstein, nor did he testify as to any knowledge of Detective Hack-worth's stop of Epstein.
Of the four police officers who approached 1506 S. Governor on July 27, 2000, one officer, Detective Johnson, knew that Epstein purchased cocaine from either a "black male" or "someone" at 1506 S. Governor. (Appellant's Appendix at 64 & 248-244). Officer Leuke seemed to be aware of Detective Hackworth's stop of Epstein. However, he did not seem to have any knowledge of the details of the stop. Detectives Hahn and Simpson did not testify as to any knowledge of Detective Hackworth's stop of Epstein. The only officer that had any particularized knowledge of the person who sold the cocaine to Epstein was Detective Hackworth. Detective Hackworth was not one of the officers who approached 1506 S. Governor. In fact, at the time the officers approached the residence, Detective Hackworth was in the process of booking Epstein for possession of cocaine.
Based on the foregoing, I can only assume that the four officers who approached 1506 S. Governor intended, at best, to conduct an investigatory stop of every black male at the residence. Thus, I cannot find that any of the four officers who approached 1506 S. Governor on July 27, 2000 had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting any particular person of engaging in criminal activity. See Reeves, 666 N.E.2d at 934. Without more particularized knowledge of the person who sold Epstein the cocaine or a search warrant, it would be my determination that the officers should never have approached the residence.
Because I do not believe that the offi-cerg' conduct falls within the investigatory stop exception to a search warrant, I next look to whether the evidence obtained from the search of Frye should be exelud-ed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine bars the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in the course of unlawful searches and seizures. Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). "To invoke the doctrine, a defendant must show that challenged evidence was obtained by the State in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Stated differently, the defendant must show that the search or seizure was illegal in the first instance." Id.
The arrest and search of Frye were illegal in the first instance. Accordingly, I would find that any evidence or testimony concerning Frye's possession of cocaine, resisting law enforcement, and/or visiting or maintaining a common nuisance should not have been admitted in the criminal proceeding against him, as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." Therefore, I dissent.